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ABSTRACT
Title: Black Economic Development as a Strategy for
Community Development
Author: Susan Starzynski Young
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Master of City Planning.
Discussion on the current attempts to increase black
economic development reveal widely divergent views on the
direction the development is expected to take. One view holds
that it will lead to a separatist black economy, while another
holds that it will produce greater integration. It is anti-
cipated both that traditional capitalistic structures and
communal structures will be the dominant form of organization.
It predicts that development will be large scale and dominated
by large corporations and also that it will be insignificant
and petty. The future of black communities will, in part,
be shaped by the direction economic development takes,
especially as goals being established by ghetto political
leaders could either be fostered or destroyed by the path
economic development takes. In particular, will future ghetto
economic institutions be supportive of attempts to increase
a sense of community and interdependence between blacks, or
will it run counter to it? The differences in interpretations
as to the future of ghetto development are partly based on a
lack of sufficient data on black economic enterprises as well
as the absence of a systematic way of looking at them.
This thesis, then, attempts to provide a somewhat more
rational basis for predicting the future course of develop-
ment. It examines the historical conditions which are res-
ponsible for suppressing the growth of black business and
the current constraints which limit it. It looks at the
major actors in the arena--government, white businesses,
and black self-help groups--focussing on the goals and pro-
grams of each. Case studies on the actual operations of
three different models of economic development were made,
and include EGandG Roxbury Inc., State Enterprises Inc.,
and Freedom Industries Inc. Each operation is examined in
terms of its goals and strategies, the problems it encoun-
tered, and the degree to which each served to benefit the
rest of the black community. Finally an examination is
made of the major issues involved in black economic develop-
ment and the implications of this development on the future
of the black community.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley Keyes
Title: Assistant Professor of City Planning
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INTRODUCTION
"When I use a word, " Humpty Dumpty said in
a rather scornful tone, it means just what
I choose it to mean--neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you
can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which
is to be master--that's all."
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
The current passion for "black capitalism" grows
in importance as more and more people turn to it in the
hope that it contains the answers to the problems of the
ghetto. Some see it as the most critical domestic issue,
the fate of which can determine the future approach to
urban problems. To even begin to evaluate black capital-
ism one must be clear on what the term conveys, and it is
obvious that it means "just what I choose it to mean--
neither more nor less."
President Nixon's perception of black capitalism
reveals a conservative orientation:
Much of the black militant talk these days is
actually in terms far closer to the doctrines of
free enterprise than to those of the welfarist
'30's--terms of "pride " "ownership," "private
enterprise," "capital,?, "self-assurance," "self-
respect"--the same qualities, the same character-
istics, the same ideals, the same methods, that
for two centuries have been at the heartof
American success, and that America has been
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exporting to the world. What most of the militants
are asking is not separatism, but to be included
in--not as supplicants, but as owners, as entre-
preneurs--to have a share of the wealth and a piece
of the action.
And this is precisely what the federal central
target of the new approach ought to be. It ought
to be oriented toward more black ownership, for
from this can flow the rest--black pride, black
jobs, black opportunity, and yes, black power....1
One of those "black militants," CORE's Roy Innis,
indicates that he in fact means something else by "black
capitalism."
As for Dick Nixon, I hope he understands that by
black capitalism--which he has been discussing--
we mean the acquisition of the instruments of
black capitalism, the community-owned means of
operating shops, factories, stores, and industry.
We're not interested in creating 10 or 15 black
capitalists. There's a big difference....
We will encompass all types--some individuals,
some small partnerships, some cooperatives. What
we want is a broad black industrialism, based on
community action, ownership and management, in the
hands of blacks, all the blacks in the community. 2
To one firm believer and practitioner of capitalism
(president of Chase Manhattan Capital Corporation) the
very term "black capitalism" is a contradiction.3 For
him capitalism is a concept that can be applied universally
1James Ridgeway, "Urban Bourbons and Blacks," Mayday,
No. 2, October 18-25, 1968.
2Milton Moskowitz, ed., "Where It's at: Black Capitalism,"
Business and Society, December 17, 1968, p. 3.
3Louis L. Allen, "Making Capitalism Work in the Ghetto,"
Harvard Business Review, (May-June, 1969), p. 84.
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and it is misleading to state the color, racial origin,
or religion of its practitioners for this suggests that
unique varieties of capitalism exist. Capitalism prac-
ticed by blacks is, and must be, the same as that prac-
ticed by whites and no short cuts or ready-made solutions
can be offered to anyone.
The problem here is that "black capitalism" has be-
come a slogan embodying many different assumptions and
the failure to identify and state a given set of assump-
tions has led to much futile discussion on the subject.
The lack of a common frame of reference has made much of
the criticism or support of black capitalism less than
fruitful. For example, to Nixon black capitalism means
the rejection of separatism, while the AFL-CIO position
is that it is a "dangerous, divisive delusion" fostering
"separate economic enclaves" and, as such, is "apartheid,
anti-democratic nonsense. To Cloward and Piven this
focus on economic development will almost inevitably
result in a mammoth Social-industrial" complex which will
control a new corporate imperialism in the ghettos.5
4AFL-CIO American Federationist, "Economic Progress
of Minorities," March, 1969.
5Richard Cloward and Frances Piven, "Ghetto Redevelopment:
Corporate Imperialism for the Poor," The Nation, October
16, 1967, p. 367.
Irving Howe, on the other hand, criticizes black capital-
ism for its small-scale effects, which he refers to as
"petty-bourgeois tinkering and trivial racketeering." 6
"Petty bourgeois tinkering will take the form of little
businesses--dry cleaning stores, a few small factories--
run by blacks....Trivial racketeering will occur as the
result of the emergence of a black entrepreneurial-
adventurist bureaucracy."
The failure to distinguish the real diversity behind
the concept of black capitalism gives a misleading picture
of the support available for it. A statement on the broad
coalitions behind black capitalism programs seems almost
obligatory in articles on the subject. Some note this
broad support approvingly:
"Black capitalism" is gaining backers--and financial
assistance--among white businessmen, bankers and
industrialists. It is winning widespread support
among Negroes. Already Government programs are
in operation, and privately financed projects are
springing up in many cities. 7
Others are critical of the purported new alliance formed
by:
...moralistic WASPs, righteous Lindsay-Republicans,
selling Nixon's "black capitalism" eyewash, and
6Irving Howe, "Nixon's Dream--and Black Reality," Dissent,
March-April 1969, p. 105.
7U.S. News and World Report, "Black Capitalism--What Is
It?," September 30, 1968, p. 64.
7.
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aligning themselves with "black militants" and
some "radical" intellectuals. 8
However, the following observation made in relation
to the reported wide consensus behind the Community Self-
Determination Act is even more fitting when applied to
the presumed consensus around black capitalism:
I suspect when Mr. Innis and Mr. Tower and Mr.
Alperovitz agree on something and even can draw
on the two senators of New York, they have also
agreed upon motherhood and the country, but they
haven't faced the hard obstacles to solving
problems. So let's cut out the rhetoric about
wide-range agreement. If there are such wide-
range agreements in something as basic as this
kind of social problem, it is suspect before it
even gets endorsed. 9
There are a number of reasons for the failure by
many spokesmen for black capitalism to more clearly ar-
ticulate the goals and strategies of their particular form
of black capitalism. First, and most importantly, they
often don't know precisely what it is they want or expect
from a program of black capitalism. All parties involved
are, in the words of The Wall Street Journal, moving
down "unfamiliar paths toward unfamiliar destinations.lO
8 Howe, "Nixon's Dream--and Black Reality," p. 104.
9Sar Levitan, et al., "Dialogue: Community Self-
Determination--Problems and Potential," New Generations,
Fall 1968, p. 24.
10Laurence G. O'Donnell, "In Motown, Caution Proves Suc-
cessful," The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1969, p. 8.
While any given actor in this arena may have a clearly
defined set of idealized goals, this may differ sharply
from the goals that are possible. The necessity or de-
sirability of alliances between various groups will re-
quire a readjustment of each group's individual goals
as they accommodate, to some degree, to the others' ob-
jectives.
No significant expression of goals, or willingness
to accommodate, or intention of remaining independent can
be made in the abstract; rhetoric can differ greatly from
action. While one may be able to make general predictions
on the course black capitalism will take based on the past
performances or public utterances of various actors in-
volved, only an analysis of actual ventures will support
or discredit these predictions. At present the best one
can hope for is a framework that facilitates an under-
standing of this state of change and accommodation that
must precede any new and stable coalitions and economic
structures.
A second reason for the lack of clarity surrounding
black capitalism is that it is tactically useful for many
to have the concept muddy in meaning. The less explicitly
the term is defined, the less is the potential for opposi-
tion; President Nixon benefits from the illusion that
9.
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black militants and arch-capitalists have found common
ground in a program. Others consciously distort the
language they use in discussing "black capitalism" to
take advantage of existing biases held by their listeners.
For example, a black leader in Roxbury who supports a
program of community-owned enterprises rejects the term
community-socialism as being unacceptable and refers in-
stead to community-capitalism. Still others are unwilling
to place a precise meaning on "black capitalism" until
they have developed a sense of what is possible in this
area.
A final source of confusion in discussions of black
capitalism is the lumping together of tremendously varied
ventures under one label. Journalists frequently report
any black enterprise as being "ghetto-owned" or "community-
controlled" despite the fact that it might be a private
venture run by a single black. This is like calling Harvard
a community college or saying that Macy's is owned by the
white community. Even scholarly approaches utilizing an
economic model of a ghetto in which resources and expen-
ditures are aggregated lead to such phrases as "community
income; " under such a model no distinction is made between
communities where the resources are held by one percent of
the people or by ninety percent. While dealing with an
11.
aggregate model of the ghetto can be useful, it must be
supplemented with information on the internal distribu-
tion of benefits if it is to have any political or social
meaning. The goal of "increasing the resources of the
ghetto" can encompass practically any economic development
program--only when one answers the questions "how?" and
"for whom" can one distinguish between programs.
Once one turns from the expected economic benefits to
the more diffuse social, political, and psychological bene-
fits that are held to follow black economic development
the inadequacy of the concept of "community" as the object
of development becomes even greater. It is not this anthro-
pomorphized concept which increases its self dignity,
pride, initiative, sense of efficacy, etc., but, again,
the individuals within that community. Here too the benefits
are almost certain to be unevenly dispensed with the new
holder of a job or the part-owner of a store having a much
larger share of the psychological or political advantages
than the person who only walks by the new store or factory.
Thus a rhetoric which speaks of black people developing,
acquiring, controlling, etc., as an aggregate further blurs
the distinctions between various models of economic develop-
ment which differ radically in the kind and number of
people they are meant to serve.
12.
In this regard the term "black capitalism" is es-
pecially inadequate as a cover term for the variety of
ventures being carried on in its name. The suggested
emphasis on individualistic endeavors excludes a very large
and crucial body of thought in this area. For this reason
the term black economic development will be used in this
paper, and is meant to include any business enterprise in
which blacks function in an ownership role.
The general intent of this paper will be to make the
current rhetoric, controversy, and activity around black
economic development somewhat more comprehensible. This
will be done by analyzing the current state of black eco-
nomic activity and by describing the actors involved as
well as the issues that are arising out of development
programs. An attempt will be made to relate the role played
by economic activity to that of other community develop-
ment strategies. The first section will be directed at a
definition of the problem--what has suppressed black entre-
preneurial activity and to what degree has it been cur-
tailed? This section will include an historical summary
of black business activity which reveals some of the roots
of today's problems. In addition, the present state of
black economic development will be discussed--this will
include a quantitative statement of the current level of
135.
black business as well as a description of the constraints
which continue to limit ghetto development. The second
section focuses on the major actors who are involved in
black economic development, the types of activity they
are entering into, the constraints on their behavior, and
the motivations that have led them into this arena.
The third section will, through a series of case
studies, provide some empirical data on:
1) the problems encountered in building economic
enterprises in the ghetto;
2) the particular goals and strategies of
specific actors and the process of accommodating
that occurs between actors;
35) the kind and magnitude of benefits that accrue
to the community at large from economic develop-
ment.
The final section will attempt, on the basis of both the
case studies and general data, to isolate the main issues
that distinguish the major strategies of development from
one another, and to suggest possible implications of these
strategies.
CHAPTER I
Historical Background
The current widespread faith in economic development
as a way out of the ghetto's woes has all the appeal of
a new, untried strategy. This appeal dims, however, when
one recognizes that the blacks in this country have had a
hundred years' experience in trying to use business as a
tool for social development. This has been a recurring
theme ever since the Civil War, while even earlier some
blacks used business as a route to personal advancement.
The history of this century-long struggle to make it, in-
dividually or collectively, through economic endeavor has
left a strong imprint on the current condition and status
of blacks. The constraints existing in the 18th century
still have an effect today, as do the political and social
conditions of the 19th century.
Some of the long-held conditions influencing black
economic development are now, in the sixties, beginning to
alter, so that the current emphasis on "black capitalism"
is not a new strategy, but an old one coming into contact
with a new and altered economic and political environment.
A brief history of black economic development is included
here to provide some perspective and context for reviewing
15.
current activities. It helps explain the relative lack
of black entrepreneurs today and suggests some problem
areas that are still operative today.
A. Pre-Civil War
The nature of slavery obviously prohibited chattel
slaves from owning businesses as well as eliminated the
possibility of their acting as consumers for enterprises
owned by free blacks, in that their basic needs were pro-
vided by their owners. The anti-literacylaws were created
to further shackle slaves and limit both their aspirations
and their capabilities, thus leaving them more dependent
on whites. While the free blacks of the north faced less
severe legal restraints, theiropportunities to develop as
businessmen were reduced as a result of another factor.
The black population in the north was sufficiently dis-
persed to eliminate the clustering that was necessary to
provide a market for a black business. In only four
southern cities--Charleston, New Orleans, Baltimore and
Richmond--were there communities of blacks large enough
to support black businesses.1
It was not mandatory that a black business serve only
1Robert H. Kinzer and Edward Sagarin, The Negro in American
Business, (New York: Greenberg, 1950), p. 35.
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a black market, in fact it was perhaps more common to find
a black enterprise serving a white market. To do so, how-
ever, meant incurring risks over and above the usual legal
and economic ones. One such case--that of a slave, Luns-
ford Lane, illustrates the harassment from the white com-
munity that often faced the successful black.2 As a house
servant for a wealthy man in North Carolina, Lane earned
small sums and tips by running numerous personal errands
for house guests, which he expanded to include services
for shopkeepers and members of the legislature. Eventually
Lane began hiring his own time from his master at a rental
of about $100 per year, and ultimately bought his own free-
dom, after which he opened a store and woodyard. Grumbling
began within a group of poor whites and sons of slave
owners, and they began to demand his expulsion from the
state, which was accomplished. When Lane attempted to re-
turn to North Carolina to make a final settlement of his
accounts, he was tarred and feathered and driven from the
state.
Another ex-slave in Cincinnati owned a manufacturing
venture which employed from 20 to 50 black and white
2Abram L. Harris, The Negro as Capitalist (Philadelphia:
American Academy of Political and Soi Science, 1936),
pp. 14-15, citing W. G. Hawkins, Lunsford Lane.
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workmen. The factory was burned down four times and re-
built each time until the insurance company refused to
continue to underwrite the risk.3 Numerous such examples
of white hostility indicate that it was not a rare occur-
rence.
These cases also reveal a common pattern in the de-
velopment of successful black businessmen in the 18th and
19th centuries. The pattern usually had its origins in
the class divisions based on the distinctions between house
servants and field hands. The former received special
privileges and often had access to influential whites;
more importantly, they served as the labor pool from which
apprentices in the skilled trades were drawn. The result
of efforts to substitute free black labor for paid white
labor was that by the middle of the 1800's almost all
knowledge of skills was held by free and slave blacks.4
The servile connotations that came to be attached to many
crafts further deterred the entry of whites into such work.
Marketable skills, therefore, did exist among blacks if
3Abram L. Harris, The Negro as Capitalist (Philadelphia:
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1936).
4Kinzer and Sagarin, The Negro in American Business, pp.
3-6.
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they were able to use these skills as free men.
Two common routes to manumission existed, one through
self-bought freedom by a slave who saved a surplus of money
and the other was through the granting of freedom by a
slave-master. The latter was generally limited to house
servants and was often related to incidents of inter-
breeding between slaves and their owners. 5 Thus a class
existed among blacks which was likely to be skilled, to
have connections within white society, and was most likely
to be free to use its skills for its own advancement.
This formed a potential base for entrepreneurial develop-
ment among blacks.
The fact that little capitalization was required for
most service enterprises made it even more likely that blacks
would enter such businesses. As a result barbering, cater-
ing, livery service, tailoring, carpentering, shoemaking,
etc., provided the backbone for black business ventures,
especially in the south. The northern blacks were more
likely to be found in personal service and domestic occu-
pations and less likely to be trained in skilled trades
like bricklaying or carpentry. This resulted in the free
blacks of the south being better off economically than
5E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (New York: Collier
Books, 1957) pp. 17-18.
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those in the north, especially when European immigration
became significant.6
These skills also provided the capital that allowed
blacks to invest in a variety of assets, primarily working
farmland, real estate, and slaves. One conservative
estimate of the real and personal wealth of free blacks
just prior to the Civil War places it at fifty million
dollars, to which can be added an additional ten million
representing the cost of self-bought freedom from slave-
owners.7 The free blacks and mulattos of New Orleans
alone were estimated to hold ten to fifteen million dollars
in assets.
The existence of this level of resources among free
blacks led some of them to talk of setting up their own
credit and banking associations. In 1851 a group met in
New York City to formulate plans for a bank that would
extend credit to black homesteaders and men who wished to
enter business. Groups in other cities attempted similar
projects but nothing came of these moves. It is difficult
6Ibid., pp. 33-34.
7 Harris, The Negro as Capitalist, p. 18.
8 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
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to determine the degree to which these attempts sprang
from the inability of blacks to receive credit and capital
from white institutions. While barriers between blacks
and the normal sources of capital no doubt existed, there
are explicit historical references to blacks obtaining
funds from the white community. However the industrial
development of the country put greater demands on available
capital, which further tightened the money market for
blacks. As investors, blacks often faced statutory limita-
tions on their participation in home building associations
and savings banks.
The only significant economic organizations which did
emerge at this time were the mutual assistance groups which
provided sick benefits and death payments to the very poorest
blacks. At a monthly cost of anywhere from twenty-five to
thirty-seven cents, these societies could provide minimal
insurance benefits oftentimes to newly freed slaves. 9
Mutual assistance groups, the first of which was formed in
1778, became centers of religious, secular, and fraternal
activities which reached large numbers of blacks.
In short, the period up to the Civil War was a time
of strong legal and social restrictions on the growth of
black enterprise. However, the widespread training in
91bid., p. 21.
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skilled trades among them provided a means of support and
a route to occasional wealth. It also established the
tradition of blacks entering personal service enterprises,
especially in the north. Most of the economic activity
was of an individual entrepreneurial nature, with the
exception of the mutual aid societies founded among the
poor blacks. The black leadership of that time was focus-
ing its efforts on the abolition of slavery, and only after
the Civil War did it begin to look toward economic develop-
ment as a strategy for racial development.
B. Post-Civil War
The period of Reconstruction revealed that few of the
businesses and little of the assets of blacks had survived
the war. The radical Republican philosophy of the day,
however, looked on equal citizenship as carrying not only
the right to vote and hold office, but also to acquire
economic goods. Thus a belief in frugality, saving, and
investment was urged on the blacks by many leading white
citizens. It was under these circumstances that the
Freedman's Bank was established. Founded as a depository
for the savings of black soldiers and laborers, it was
organized and controlled by whites who led the mass of
blacks to believe the bank was a government institution.10
10Harris, The Negro as Capitalist, p. 28.
A strong campaign to attract depositers was carried out
and the message of thrift and savings as a route to riches
was carried to over 70,000 ex-slaves. Fraud, mismanagement
and corruption led to the closing of the bank at a time
when it held three million dollars in deposit for some
of the poorest people in the country. It was at this
time that the current pattern of black business ventures
began to strongly take shape.
The growth of Jim Crow laws and the increasingly evi-
dent unwillingness or inability of government to meet the
needs of the black minority provided the impetus for the
growth of black economic institutions and segregated busi-
nesses. In addition to the form of the economic enterprises
changing, the entire focus on business as a basis of racial
development increased sharply. Black leadership began to
look to economic development as a means to independence,
a view best summarized by John Hope, president of Atlanta
University, in 1898:
The Negro's status has changed considerably since
the Civil War, but he is today to a great extent
what he has always been in this country--the
laborer, the day hand, the man who works for
wages. The great hiring class is the white
people. The Negro develops his resources, the
white man pays him for his services. To be sure
some few Negroes have accumulated a little
capital. But the rule has been as I have stated:
the white man has converted and reconverted the
Negro's labor and the Negro's money into capital
24.
until we find an immense section of developed
country owned by whites and worked by colored....
The wage-earner, the man on a salary, may, by
rigid self-denial, secure for himself a home, he
may besides husband his earnings so carefully as
to have a small income, but the wage-earner and
man of salary seldom save a competence...at that
time of life when men ought to be most able to
provide for themselves and others, these men are
least able. There is little or no independence in
the wage-earner, because there is no practical
security....
Now the age in which we are living is an economic
one; manufacturing and merchandising claim the
world's attention....I was saying, business seems
to be not simply the raw material of Anglo-Saxon
civilization, but almost the civilization itself.
It is at least its mainspring to action. Living
among such a people is it notobvious that we cannot
escape its most powerful motive and survive? To
the finite vision, to say the least, the policy of
avoiding entrance in the world's business would be
suicide to the Negro. 11
The number in black businesses in that year (1898) appeared
to be only 1900, but this increased to 70,000 by 1930.12
The largest numbers of these were in the field of personal
service where discrimination forced blacks to build a
parallel set of enterprises. The major tools needed for
large-scale industrial or commercial ventures were almost
1 1W.E.B. DuBois, "The Negro in Business," Atlanta University
Publications, No. 4, quoting John Hope, The Meaning of
Business, Proceedings of the Fourth Atlanta University
Conference--1898.
12' Harris, The Negro as Capitalist, p. 55.
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entirely beyond the reach of the black population.
One such tool, the availability of capital or credit,
was more and more difficult to get through white banks.
This fact, coupled with the failure of the Freedman's
Bank stimulated blacks to develop their own banks under
their own control. The first were organized in 1888 and
by 1928 a total of twenty-eight banks had been created.1 3
Almost all of these were designed as depositories for the
funds held by the mutual aid societies which expanded tre-
mendously following Emancipation. This also meant a close
relationship between the early black banks and the black
churches which fostered the aid societies; the ministry
was frequently represented on the boards of the banks.
By 1934 a total of one hundred and thirty-four banks had
been established, including the Eureka Cooperative Bank
and the South End Cooperative Bank in Boston. By 1936
the number of banks still in existence had been reduced
to twelve.
The failure rate of the black banks was probably no
higher than that of white banks of similar capitalization,
but the small scale of the typical black business, its non-
industrial character, and the non-commercial nature of its
13Ibid., p. 46.
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assets (primarily depreciated real estate holdings) all
contributed to the limited financial capabilities of
black banks.
Another group of economic enterprises which resulted
from the refusal of white institutions to serve blacks was
black insurance companies. Again, these had their roots in
the benevolent societies, the leaders of which organized
the early insurance companies. By the 40's these had de-
veloped into the largest business enterprises owned by
blacks, having a combined income of forty-two million
dollars in 1945. 14
The only other industry which showed any significant
development by black businessmen is that of the black
press. In the 40's there were 169 newspapers and their
total valuation was around ten million dollars.15
The picture of black business activity after the
Civil War was significantly different from that preceding
it. The "training program" component of slavery was
abolished with slavery, and the educational institutions
of the time failed to provide either adequate skills
training or a general education to the majority of blacks.
The increase in segregation provided a two-fold thrust to
14Frazer, Black Bourgeoisie, p. 54.
15Ibid.
the black businessman's concern for an ethnic market:
1) a white market was often closed to him and, 2) black
communities were often unable to get necessary goods or
services from white businesses. The exclusion of the black
man from supplies of capital at a time of growing indus-
trialization insured his absence today within large-scale
economic enterprises. Instead he turned to service, retail
trade, amusement and recreational concerns which remained
primarily small undertakings. Attempts at organizing
parallel capital and credit institutions suffered from the
lack of trained, experienced administrators and managers,
as well as from the narrow range of black businesses which
formed the foundation of the banks' commercial holdings in
the ghetto. The educational demands of a career in busi-
ness were becoming increasingly sophisticated, but the
lack of opportunity in small black firms and the exclusion
from small or large white firms discouraged blacks from
seeking training in business skills. The circle was quite
vicious. The government did not focus on this problem as
one appropriate for intervention. If any policy among
white businesses existed as to black business it was
generally a negative one--that is, one of avoidance or
neglect.
Cooperative action among blacks around economic
Ma
27.
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matters was fairly rare, only the most extraordinary need
was capable of producing a coordinated effort. Business
was still seen primarily as an alternative open to indi-
viduals who, by pulling themselves up, could contribute
to racial betterment. It is this pattern that has persisted
up to the mid-60's and it is this pattern that is the ob-
ject of attack in the recent spate of black economic develop-
ment schemes.
29.
CHAPTER II
Current Status of Black Business
A. Statistical Data
While exact information on the numbers of black busi-
nesses in the country today is not available, a fairly
reliable estimate can be derived. Table I, following,
gives the most recent information in this area. Although
the category of managers, officials, and proprietors includes
more than just the owners of businesses, it is the category
which best approximates this. The figures show a 17 percent
increase between 1960 and 1967 in the number of non-white
managers, officials, and proprietors. This can be compared
with a 6 percent increase among whites in the same category.
This means that even given this sharp increase among non-
whites, only a little over 2 percent of the employed non-
whites were managers, officials or proprietors. This can
be compared to the 11 percent of the employed whites who
functioned in these categories. The Small Business Associ-
ation reports that 3 percent is the maximum of all U.S.
businesses owned by non-whites, although this varies from
2 percent in the Watts area to 10 or 15 percent in Harlem.1
1U.S. News and World Report, "Black Capitalism--What Is
It?," September 50, 1968, p. 64.
Table 1
Employment by Occupation,* 1967, and Change, 1960-19672
(Numbers in thousands)
Employed,
1967
Total
Professional and technical
Managers, officials,
proprietors
Clerical
Sales
Craftsmen and foremen
Operatives
Service workers, except
private household
Private household workers
Nonfarm laborers
Farmers and fanmworkers
Non-
White
8,011
592
209
899
138
617
1,882
1,519
835
899
423
White
66,361
9,287
7,286
11,434
4,387
9,228
12,002
6,0137
934
2,6134
35,131
Change, 1960-1967*
Number
Non-
White
970
263
31
391
25
203
465
287
-169
-70
-453
White
6,721
2,141
396
2,158
99
1,083
1,434
1,136
-278
-61
-1, 389
Percent
Non- Wht
White White
14 11
80 30
17 6
77 23
22 2
49 13
33 14
23 23
-17 
-23
-7 
-2
-52 -31
The 1967 data pertain to persons 16 years of age and over, while in 1960 the
age cutoff was 14 years. Since 14-15 year-olds make up less than 2 percent
of total nonwhite employment, it can be assumed that they have almost no
effect on the 1960-1967 occupational change.
2U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Report No. 347,
July 196t., Recent Trends in Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the
United States, p. Ib.
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(The SBA also reports that in 1967 they financed only
about 2,200 loans to minority businessmen.) The other
estimates hold that the percent of black owned businesses is
closer to 1%, which means that only one black in 1,000 is
a proprietor as compared with one out of every forty whites.3
Andrew Brimmer, a governor of the Federal Reserve
System, points out that the total number of black business-
men shrank by 20 percent between 1950 and 1960, which he
attributes to the effects of desegregation and the accom-
panying invasion of white businesses into a previously
black market. If this is true, it means that the black
businessman's market, which was once white or racially
mixed, and which was then restricted to a segregated black
population, is being reduced even further as the black
businessman can no longer expect to benefit from a lack of
competition from white businesses. As it is these segre-
gated businesses form the bulk of black enterprises and any
serious inroads by white companies would have a large effect
on whatever entrepreneurial class now exists in black com-
munities. At present, black businessmen still tend to focus
5Time, "The Birth Pangs of Black Capitalism," October 18,
1967 pp. 98-99.
4Milton Moskowitz, ed., "Where it's at: Black Capitalism,"
Business and Society, December 17, 1968, p. 1.
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on the traditional types of business; the top loans of the
SBA during 1967-68 went for funeral and nursing homes, dry
cleaners, grocery stores, rooming houses, hotels, etc. 5
Statistics on the present status of black business
are somewhat more revealing if one looks at individual in-
dustries. The combined assets of the fifty or so black
life insurance companies is about 2 percent of the industry's
total.6 The largest black company, North Carolina Mutual
Life Insurance Company, has assets of 94 million dollars as
compared to Prudential's 25 billion dollars.7 While all
U.S. life insurance companies were growing at an average
annual compound rate of 9.5 percent between 1963 and 1966,
black companies grew at a rate of less than 3 percent. Two
years ago none of the 17,500 authorized automobile dealers
in the country were black, today seven are. Of the 6,000
radio stations (108 of which are programmed for black com-
munities), only eight are black owned. The assets of all
U.S. banks rose by 9 percent annually between 1963-66, while
black banks chartered before 1961 grew by 5.8 percent
51bid., p. 2.
6Ibid.
7Time, "Black Capitalism," pp. 98-99.
8Moskowitz, p. 1.
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annually. The largest black bank, Harlem's Freedom National
Bank, has deposits of 30 millon dollars, which ranks it
1,733 of the 14,000 commercial banks in the U.S. 9
Because all of the case studies later discussed in
this paper relate to Boston, specific data on this city is
included here. In Boston the picture is very much the same
as the national one. A survey of black businesses taken
in 1966 revealed the following distribution of businesses
as a percentage of the total 230 black businesses:
Table 210
Type of Business Number % of
Total
Grocery and variety stores 35 15%
Lawyers 35 15
Restaurants 28 12
Cleaners and tailors 24 11
Gas stations and auto repair 13 6
Doctors 10 4
Dentists 9 4
Record stores 7 3
Funeral parlors 5 2
Dancing schools 4 2
Others 60 26
100%
Despite the fact that over 60percent of Roxbury's population
is black over 90 percent of the area's businesses were white
9Theodore L. Cross, Black Capitalism (New York: Athenaeum,
1969), p. 50.
10Roxbury Associates, "Who's Black in Boston Business,"
ooklet).
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owned as of 1968. One significant addition to this list
is Roxbury's Unity Bank, a bi-racial bank organized in
1968 and already holding over seven million dollars in
the accounts of over 6,000 depositors, including some
white-owned firms. 1
B. Present Limitations on Development
The previous historical description served to indi-
cate the forces which suppressed the development of a
black entrepreneurial class. Going beyond this one can
look at the present conditions which, in the absence of
some of these historical forces, serve to maintain limita-
tions on development. The three most critical impediments
to the growth of black business are: 1) the lack of risk
capital 2) the lack of adequate debt financing or credit
to achieve leverage, and 3) the lack of training and ex-
perience among potential black businessmen.
Investment capital is created only where there are
savings, that is, a surplus of money over and above that
needed to meet living or business expenses which can be
used for investment. 12 Among ghetto residents such
11Time, "Banking: Assets for the Ghetto," February 28,
1969,-p. 89.
12 Cross, Black Capitalism, p. 142.
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discretionary income rarely exists; income from a job, wel-
fare, or a business is at best adequate only to meet normal
expenses. Rarely can friends or relatives be called upon
for such money for they generally share the same circum-
stances. Inadequate and erratic incomes militate against
savings in the ghetto. This is illustrated by comparing the
size of an average savings account in a predominantly white
and a predominantly black bank. In Harlem's Freedom National
Bank the average account holds a few hundred dollars, as
compared to the $2,300 city-wide average of the Dollar
13Bank for Savings. (The former also includes savings accounts
of many of Harlem's black businessmen who use them as a
substitute for business checking accounts.) The possibili-
ties for capital-gains opportunities arising from ghetto
enterprises are meager, eliminating another potential source
of capital investors. The traditional great source of
capital--the markets for new security issues--is not, at
present, a fruitful means of financing the start-up costs
of black ventures. As one investor notes "A lot of time is
wasted and needless involvement undertaken looking around
for 'front moneyt to protect the investor's interest. That
money is never there."1 4 Most sources of investment money
13Ibid., p. 56.
14Louis L. Allen, "Making Capitalism Work in the Ghetto,"
Harvard Business Review, (May-June, 1969), p. 86.
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are closed to ghetto communities because businessmen
choose safer, more stable, and more profitable investments.
They point to the unreliability and unpredictability of
the factors involved in doing business in the ghetto and
generally forgo such investment unless external factors
persuade them to do otherwise.
The same factors limit the availability of credit for
a black business even if front-money is available. A bank
will only provide credit on terms that command a compen-
sating rate of interest, but the risk involved in financing
a ghetto businessman is perceived to be so high as to be
satisfied only by usorous interest rates--therefore banks
rarely lend him money. The poor or non-existent credit
history of the black entrepreneur, his frequent lack of
experience, and the business conditions of the ghetto make
almost any loan to a black businessman a "soft loan."15
Visions of the publicity following the calling in of a
loan to a struggling black adds additional incentive to
the banks to stear clear. Running any kind of finance
operation in a ghetto is likely to be costlier because:
1) the loans are frequently small loans, and 2) unestab-
lished credit histories mean the undertaking of extensive
15Cross, Black Capitalism, p. 48.
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credit checks on the part of the lender, and 3) the in-
experience of the borrower means more time processing the
loan. The president of Harlem's Freedom National Bank
holds that his loan officers' major problem is in deter-
mining the amount a borrower needs to save his business
and that this process requires extensive counseling time.16
Any bank function, because of the smaller scale of each
transaction and the higher activity, is costlier in the
ghetto. While the Freedom National Bank has only 30
million dollars on deposit, it requires 85 employees; a
non-ghetto bank of this size would have half that amount
of staff. It is partly for these reasons that the number
of banks in the ghetto is so low--Harlem has one commercial
bank for every 30,000 residents, while the ratio in Manhat-
tan is one for every 5,000 residents.
As a result of the absence of legitimate capital in
the ghetto, loan sharks are frequently used as a source of
start-up money and for carrying a businessman through poor
times. The tremendously high interest rates charged fre-
quently trap the borrower and guarantee that a near-marginal
business will never develop successfully. 1 7
16Ibid., p. 52.
17 Ibid., p. 59.
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Many who are involved in programs of assistance to
incipient black businessmen hold that their greatest handi-
cap is not lack of credit but lack of managerial skills.
In one sense this is obvious. The skilled and experienced
black whose business judgment is sound can be judged by
white business standards and found acceptable. The question
for most interested blacks is how can they enter the world
of business to achieve the skills and training which would
make them acceptable risks. While they may be familiar
with the production side of a given enterprise, the require-
ments made of a proprietor or manager are frequently al-
together alien. Some writers raise the possibility that
blacks, on the whole, are lacking the necessary ethos or
value system required for success in business. This
spirit is said to consist of assertiveness, self-confidence,
and willingness to risk failure--qualities that white
society has worked to eradicate in blacks.l 8
While it is not clear that these qualities are rela-
tively absent in the ghettoes, it is clear that those
holding them have generally decided to forgo the business
route to success. The primary motivation of many of those
in the ghetto who do enter business appears to be a desire
18Michael Brower, "The Promotion of Black Ownership and
Business," (unpublished draft, December 1968), p. 12.
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for independence--needing to get out from under "the man."
A level of success that can simply maintain them is often
enough to satisfy them. The result is a lack of attractive
or persuasive models which in turn stimulate others to
enter business. As one Department of Commerce official
said:
More often than not, many Negro businessmen are
a symbol of frustration and hopelessness rather
than an example of achievement, success and
leadership. As a result "business" per se is not a
polite word in the Negro community and Negro parents
as a rule tend to discourage their children from
pursuing business careers either as employees or
as entrepreneurs. 19
One additional liability faces the black businessman,
and that is the greater likelihood of his enterprise being
a small business. It is estimated by the Small Business
Administration that the one-year failure rate of small
businesses is over 50 percent and one can expect the rate
for black small businesses to be equal to or higher than
this. Small retail stores today, unlike those of the 20's
and 30's, have to face competition from large chain stores,
be they supermarkets or discount appliance stores. The
economiesof scale available to the large firm provide very
stiff competition for the small shopkeeper. This is
reflected in the price of goods, the selection and quality
19Israel Unterman, "Black Capitalism: Can It Do the
Job?," Newsday, January 25, 1969, p. 11.
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available and occasionally, the availability of credit.
This also affects the management of the business
which, in a large firm, is diverse and specialized. A
small firm frequently has only the owner to serve as
buyer, bookkeeper, production manager, etc., and can rarely
afford to hire professional help. More often he must
rely on volunteer help, often student help from nearby
business colleges. The ability to support on-job manage-
ment training is also less in a smaller enterprise. The
picture is less bleak in the service enterprises, for
many of these--hairdressers, barbers, garages, television
repairs, etc., are typically small so that the black enter-
prise is not at such a great disadvantage.2 0
C. Thrust of Ghetto Development
The above description of the existing conditions of
black entrepreneurial activity implies that the lack of
black business constitutes a problem--it may be useful to
briefly state why it is regarded as a problem and what
expectations are held for it. The most obvious sense in
which it is a problem is that it reduces the options
available to the average black in his choice of a career
20 Ibid., p. 19.
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and it lessens the likelihood of his achieving affluence
(and the rights and privileges which accrue to affluence).
It is also a problem in that entire communities of blacks
are frozen into a static economic posture.
At present the residents of ghetto communities rely
primarily on their own labor and the wages it produces for
their income, or on welfare benefits. Our highly techno-
logical and industrialized economy results in a low marginal
product accruing to labor, thus wages paid out are not a
high proportion of the national income. The balance goes
to the owners of assets as profits or rents and in the
ghetto the owners of these assets are generally white non-
residents.2 1 Thus programs which are directed at reducing
poverty in the ghetto through limited income-supplement
programs (e.g., Job Corps, welfare) generally produce a
somewhat higher standard of living, although this additional
income can be expected to flow out of the ghetto as goods
and services are purchased. To increase the aggregate in-
come of the ghetto economy any or all of the following
must occur:
1) the value of goods or services exported from
the ghetto (primarily labor at present) must increase
21Eli Goldston, "Management and Man in the Computer Age:
The Moral Imperative, (unedited transcript of remarks
before the National Industrial Conference Board, November
14, 1966), p. 9.
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2) an increase in the volume of goods and services
produced within the ghetto must occur
3) there must be increased retention of the profits
and rents from the use of capital within the
ghetto.
In short, the flow of income into the ghetto should be in-
creased, the flow out decreased, and the flow within the
community enhanced. The consequence of doing this through
the development of black business has led one businessman
to point to an old Chinese saying:
Give a man a fish, and he can feed himself once
Teach a man to fish and he can feed himself the
rest of his life.
The way to multiply the effect of a shift of ownership
of an asset into the ghetto is by employing residents,
training them for higher paying jobs, selling to the white
community, producing major goods and services for ghetto
consumption and stimulating investment and sales between
ghetto enterprises. In this way black businesses would
act as a vehicle for trapping or increasing income in the
community and turning it back to the use of the community.
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CHAPTER III
Major Actors Involved in Black Economic Ventures
The conditions and constraints which have faced any
black man attempting to develop a viable business have
altered and shifted over the years, but two things have
remained constant. One, there have always been severe
legal or social limitations on his activities; and two,
he has never been the object of special programs designed
to aid him.* The black businessman has always had to go
it alone; the scale of his business has typically put him
beyond reach of the government subsidies that find their
way to larger corporations. A major shift in the area of
black business in the last few years has been the entrance
of government and private enterprise into the arena. For
the first time black business is considered an appropriate
object of direct aid and assistance and this has stimulated
the breakdown of the long-standing pattern of economic de-
velopment in the ghetto. The three major actors involved
in these changes--government, private enterprise, and
black self-help groups--are plunging into the existing
vacuum and attempting to define new roles for themselves
*
As recently as 1967 the Kerner Report on the riots devoted
only a few paragraphs to the problems facing attempts at
black economic development.
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as well as experimenting with a variety of forms that
can serve to link them together. A fourth, and less
crucial participant is the academic institutions that
are serving primarily as technical assistants or idea
formulators at present.
Unfortunately a number of the early responses on the
part of these groups have been crisis-produced, short-
range in orientation, and pragmatic in nature. In many
cases the availability and form of certain resources from
government or business have too often determined the shape
of a given black enterprise, rather than black needs deter-
mining the form of the resources. Few people have really
assessed the implications of various economic structures
nor related alternative strategies to a given goal.
One beginning in such an analysis would be in clari-
fying the motivations and forces which bring each actor
to the problem. Why, for the first time, is government
concerning itself with black business? What do the large
corporations stand to gain by entering this area? What
differencewould a program of economic development make in
the relation of black communities and city hall? If one
understands more about the way in which the self-interest
of each of themmajor groups is met, one is better able
to determine the feasibility of alternative programs and
45.
the limits of commitment to various strategies.
A. Government
The focus of most public programs of ghetto develop-
ment has either been directed at the immediate goal of
increased employment or the goals of improved housing,
education, health care, etc. The federal government first
directed its attention to the role of black business as an
anti-poverty strategy in 1964. At this time a program of
assistance to small businessmen was expanded to include
Economic Opportunity Loans under Title IV of the War on
Poverty legislation. Loans up to $25,000 along with manage-
ment training and individual counseling were made available.
This program continued under the control of the Office of
Economic Opportunity until 1966, when Congress revised the
anti-poverty legislation and rescinded the program. As of
June 1966, 90 of the 1,686 loans made were delinquent and
43 were in liquidation. Under OEO the intention of the
program was to provide assistance in high-risk situations
where a man had an undeveloped idea or talent but was lacking
in sufficient finances to start or expand an enterprise.
The criticism has been made, however, that OEO was never
1Cross, Black Capitalism.
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comfortable with the idea of someone gainfully employing
himself as well as others under the poverty program.2
Nonetheless control of the program has reverted to the
Small Business Administration since 1966. The 1967 hear-
ings before the Clark Senate Subcommittee of the War on
Poverty revealed a lack of satisfaction with SBA's handling
of the program.
The central criticism was that the SBA was reluctant
to alter its traditionally conservative standards to meet
the needs of the ghetto businessman. The administrative
red-tape discouraged those who might otherwise have been
eligible. A former director of an SBA office testified,
"Obviously SBA's methods of aid are out of tune with daily
realities of our minorities. We must devise more inventive
and more forceful methods." Senator Clark's summing up was
more blunt, "The Small Business Administration has backed
away from loans to the poor.!"5
Under the brief leadership of Howard Samuels as
Administrator of SBA the procedures and loan criteria
were liberalized. In regard to the program he said,
"These loans are showing a high failure rate--about double
2 Ibid.
5Cross, Black Capitalism, pp. 97-99.
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the regular rate--and this rate will probably rise....
But that is to be expected as they (blacks) have had less
business experience and we are taking a bigger risk."
He also established a goal of 10,000 loans to black busi-
nessmen by the end of fiscal 1969 and 20,000 loans by
1970 under the label, Project OWN. He hoped to stretch
the SBA's 1.1 billion dollar loan fund by relying more on
private investment and emphasizing SBA loan guarantees
rather than direct SBA loans.
Samuels also established a Black Advisory Council
in October of 1968, a group that has felt ignored by
current SBA administrator, Hilary Sandoval, Jr. The
Council, which includes such blacks as Mayor Richard
Hatcher, Floyd McKissick, and Representative Shirley
Chisholm, called for Sandoval's resignation in May of
this year, charging that the SBA lacked an earnest commit-
ment towards black enterprise. Phillip Pruitt, the chief
of SBA's minority program, resigned in protest over the
Administrationts lack of support which, he felt, muzzled
the SBA administrator. Pruitt told the Council, "If we
don't get any money for direct lending, if we don't get
Congress to move...if we don't get the President to put
4U.S. News and World Report, "Black Capitalism--What Is
It?," September 30, 19b8, p. 64.
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his arms around Sandoval and say I'm committed to SBA and
to this minority program then wetre not going to move." 5
The SBA program has been, to date, the major federal
program directly focused on the development of black busi-
ness although other programs (e.g. Labor Department train-
ing funds) have been utilized to assist some economic ven-
tures. The programs supported by Nixon in terms of future
legislation include: tax incentives for plants locating in
ghettos, reinsurance programs to reduce risks to ghetto-
based plants, expansion of the loan-guarantee program, and
a tax incentive program to encourage businessmen to provide
management training for black entrepreneurs.
A major piece of legislation submitted to Congress in
1968 (to be resubmitted in 1969) is the Community Self-
Determination Bill. This act serves as the culmination
of two separate approaches which have previously been advo-
cated for the ghetto. One of these, supported in legisla-
tion sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Percy, among others,
looks to subsidized private entrepreneurial action as the
5The Boston Globe, "SBA, Black Advisory Council Taking
Dispute to Congress," July 14, 1969.
6U. S. News and World Report, "Black Capitalism," p. 65.
7U. S. Congress, House, A Bill to Establish A Community
Development Corporation Program, H. R. lb460, 90th Cong.,
2nd sess., l960.
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key to in-ghetto economic development. A separate stream
of activity has developed around the use of a community
corporation as the mechanism for citizen control and ad-
ministration of social services. The community corporation
has also served as a focal point for discussion and activity
concerning decentralization of government directed at local
self rule.8
The draftsmen of the Self-Determination Act, Gar
Alperovitz and John McCloughry, worked with members of
national CORE to develop a model of economic development
that is supportive of local self-help activities and self-
government. It is intended to achieve three primary goals:
one, to promote the economic development of a community;
two, to provide services to the community through the use
of resources created by the economic activity and three,
to increase the opportunities for meaningful participation
by community residents in policy decision-making. The bill
would set up community-based corporations which would
acquire, create and manage businesses, primarily within a
depressed area. Ownership of the corporation would rest
with all the residents who buy a share of stock.
To set up such a corporation, a group would notify
the National Community Corporation Certification Board of
Milton Kotler, "Two Essays on the Neighborhood Corporation,"
Urban America: Goals and Problems, U.S. Congress Joint
Economic Committee; Subcommittee on Urban Affairs.
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their intention of establishing a Community Development
Corporation (CDC). The initiating group would define the
geographical boundaries of the proposed CDC and demon-
strate that the area qualifies for participation along the
poverty criteria established in the bill. In addition
at least 5 percent of the residents must pledge to buy
stock in the future CDC. An elaborate procedure is set
forth to assure that all competing groups are given equi-
table treatment.
All residents sixteen years old and over can be stock-
holders in a CDC, and a proposed area can include anywhere
from 5,000 to 300,000 residents. Any holder of a share
(costing five dollars) is eligible to vote on a one man-
one vote basis for a board of directors, who, in turn,
appoint a Business Management Board (BMB) to staggered
three year terms. BMB members are removable only for
cause, and this structure is intended to buffer the BMB
and its economic functions from direct control by stock-
holders. A majority of voters can remove the Board of
Directors at any time, with or without cause.
The economic endeavors of the CDC are supported by
a number of tax benefits which accrue to both the CDC and
to outside private investors. To motivate private business
to develop plants and facilities in an area, tax incentives
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make it profitable to build, purchase equipment, train
residents, get a money-making operation going and then
sell the operation to the CDC. Additional tax incentives
then encourage corporations to reinvest in additional enter-
prises, given that the CDC chooses to enter into turnkey
arrangements with them. The CDC receives a direct subsidy
through limitations on the amount of federal income tax
it must pay, as well as the amount paid by CDC subsidiary
corporations.
The decisions to allocate profits for either reinvest-
ment or social services are to be made by the BMB. The
bill limits the share going to services as no less than
20 percent and no more than 80 percent. The degree to
which access to the services provided by the CDC are limited
to CDC stockholders is a determination made by a local CDC.
The bylaws can either make no limitation as to the recipi-
ents of benefits or it can specify exclusive or preferential
treatment for stockholders. In general CDC profits can
be distributed only in the form of services, at least for
the first five years of operation. Restrictions on trans-
ferability and redemption of shares of stock further diminish
the ability of an individual to draw private monetary bene-
fits from a CDC that were not equally shared by other
stockholders. What is maximized under the Self-Determination
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Bill is the widespread and even distribution of any
profits generated by the increased economic activity in
the community.
An expanded program of SBA loans and a bill like the
Community Self-Determination Act are radically different
in intent, yet the current administration has publicly
supported both. In order to understand why government has
decided to concern itself with black economic development
and what, in the disparate approaches offered, is attractive,
it seems necessary to make some inferences as to the current
political forces bearing on this issue.
An obvious mainspring to government action is the
presence of the hostility, disorder, and rebellion which
has marked the urban scene for the past few years and which
has focused attention and action on ghetto problems. This
pressure has been partly responsible for much of the anti-
poverty programs, but does not, in itself, explain the
focus on the current economic development strategy. Other
political currents in the country appear more relevant in
the shaping of this policy.
A counter-balance to the pressures of black demands
lies in the existence of taxpayers and Congressmen who are
reluctant to raise the level of tax expenditures. Within
this group a distinction exists between those who primarily
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oppose allocations for social legislation directed at the
poor, and those who want to see the general level of ex-
penditures by government curtailed. The increasing visi-
bility and boldness of welfare-rights groups exacerbate
the anger felt by many taxpayers toward welfare-type pro-
grams. This opposition has been most prominently demon-
strated by the punitive welfare bills passed by Congress
and similar bills being developed at a state level. A
spate of taxpayer "revolts" and demonstrations has made
vocal the feeling held by many working and middle-class
taxpayers that a general increase in economy and efficiency
by government should be forthcoming. Requests for additional
tax money (as in the administration request for an extension
of the income surtax) often faces numerous political ob-
stacles. Thus government is faced with the problem of
mediating between the needs and demands of the poor and
that portion of the taxpayers who resist higher tax expen-
ditures.
One response to this predicament on the part of the
federal government has been to look to the increased use of
private enterprise to carry some of the burden. As Robert
Weaver pointed out, the
... primary responsibilities for developing and car-
rying out solutions to urban problems lies in the
private sector, since 90 percent of all decisions
made about life in our cities are private ones.
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The generation of jobs, the construction of housing,
the location of industries, the sale and develop-
ment and purchase of land are private decisions. 9
The potential advantages to government of increased utili-
zation of private enterprise could include: 1) reduced
governmental expenditures to achieve given ends and
2) programs more compatible to this country's values and
ethos.
In the presidential campaign of 1968, Richard Nixon
clearly expressed his expectations about policies geared
toward involving private enterprise in programs of black
economic development:
It costs little or no government money to set
in motion many of the programs that would in
fact do the most, in a practical sense, to
start building a firm structure of Negro economic
opportunity. 10
Hubert Humphrey responded to this by agreeing that the
bulk of investment capital must come from private sources
but he took issue with Nixon's "little or no government
money" stand. "This," he said, "is double talk. Of course
it will take money. Talking about black capitalism without
capital is just kiting political checks."
9Robert C. Weaver, "The Urban Crisis: A National Challenge,"
The MBA, February 1968, p. 13.
10U.S. News and World Report, "Black Capitalism," p. 65.
1 1 Ibid.
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The focus on private activity as a supplement or
alternative to governmental action did not, of course,
originate in the current administration. It has been ap-
parent in the past decade in the shifting of certain
federal financing programs into the private sector. The
Federal National Mortgage Association's secondary market
fund became a completely privately owned venture in 1968,
as did the credit banks and banks for cooperatives super-
vised by the Farm Credit Association. Even the T.V.A.
began selling bonds to private investors in 1960, which
was followed by the Export-Import Bank in 1967. The in-
tention of the Nixon administration is to finance the Post
Office operations through private loans. One financial/
political analyst holds that the result of this long-range
trend will be "to prevent the tax system from being used to
pay for public services." 1 2
The assumption that programs fostering black entre-
preneurial ventures are more in accord with American values
than programs fostering welfare is more conjectural. Again
it appears from President Nixon's public statements that
he, at least, sees black economic development as an affir-
mation of traditional American ideals and methods (see
1 2 David Deitch, "Agency Debt Aid to High Interest," The
Boston Globe, June 24, 1969, p. 18.
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quote on p. 4 ). It is less apparent, however, whether
Congress or taxpayers in general will be any more willing
to fund economic development programs than they are other
social programs. The emphasis on the development of entre-
preneurial values among blacks and the focus on private
enterprise as a mechanism may still be an insufficient
sugar-coating if large expenditures are still required of
government.
Government on the local level, being closer to ghetto
problems, riots and white backlash, is even more sensitive
to the state of domestic affairs. However, if the federal
administrators are feeling cramped by the insufficiency
of tax dollars, city officials are being squeezed to death.
The high costs of city services and the limited and over-
worked sources of income open to them makes local government
even less able to buy off blacks and their demands without
causing tremendous hostility among whites. Frequently
local police bear the heaviest responsibility for preventing
riots or quelling them, and it is local business that
suffers most by riots. Adding to this the fact that city
hall is almost inevitably white-controlled (in many cases
by threatened ethnic groups), the result is that local
government often turns to repressive means of keeping
peace. Riots and rioters are squashed. Thosewho attempt
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a less repressive method of dealing with the ghettos
incur the wrath of the white residents who are too close
and too threatened by the blacks to feel any sympathy.
The recent primary election in New York City demonstrated
the large loss of following Mayor Lindsay suffered in
office--in part due to his responses to the city's blacks.
Thus local government is both politically and financially
constrained from attempting large-scale economic develop-
ment programs in the ghettos. Local support, at present,
has consisted mainly of trying to grease some of the
existing channels between blacks and sources of financing.
These programs are likely to be supported by local firms,
civic leaders, union leaders, etc., often within the frame-
work of a local Urban Coalition.
B. Black Self-Help Groups
During the 1950's the civil rights movement focused
on political power for blacks primarily because the movement was
centered in the south, where the disenfranchisement of blacks
was so obvious. The political and electoral system was
seen as the means by which blacks could re-enter the
society that had excluded them. The emphasis at this
time was on tearing down the institutions and values that
obstructed the access of blacks into the white world, and
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tactics made heavy use of changing "the hearts and minds
of men."
As the movement got older and civil rights workers
wiser, the limitations of appeals to conscience became
more evident. It became clear that littlevoluntary action
on the part of people and institutions imbedded in racist
practices was going to occur. The recalcitrance encountered,
the complexity of the problems, and the limited commitment
by allies increased the bitterness among blacks and caused
a shift in the nature of the movement. Now the focus was
on power, rather than persuasion, and on the independence
of blacks. This came to form the basis of the major poli-
tical philosophy of blacks, and was embodied in the cry
for "Black Power."
The currency of these ideas is not due to the prosely-
tizing efforts of Stokely Carmichael or Rap Brown; their
role has been to popularize and consolidate the ideas that
were springing up, independently, in ghettos across the
country. It was part of a natural evolution of ideas
born of the common experiences and perceptions of many
black civil rights workers. The impact that this philosophy
has had on other than leadership levels is more difficult
to judge. It is obvious, however, that it has reached the
majority of blacks (e.g. a Gallup survey noted an increase
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in acceptance of the slogan "black power" as well as a
greater approval of black partition l), and has certainly
permeated the political activities of blacks.
While the views of the politically inclined militants
are obviously at some odds with those held by the rest of
the community (perhaps even a majority), the militant
leadership is the most vocal, and it sets the style for
political action within the community. One does not have
to believe that the leadership is "representative" to know
that they must be accommodated to some degree. For this
reason the attitudes and values of this leadership often
become coterminous with the values of the community, and
a broad statement of the goals of this leadership comes to
represent the goals and self-defined interest of the black
community. Black organizations, being the most ideological
of the actors involved in ghetto development, show the
most diversity in their analysis of the problems and in
the proposal of strategies to meet these problems. How-
ever, wide agreement exists as to certain assumptions or
values that underlie most of these diverse approaches.
One such value is the need for reversing the negative
self-image that had been cultivated in them as a race and
13Newsweek, "Angry--But They Still Have a Dream," June 30,
1969, p. 20.
6o.
for celebrating the belief that "black is beautiful."
The negative conditions associated with blackness now
become objects of pride. This increased self-awareness
and pride has led black communities to "recognize the
need to assert their own definitions, to reclaim their
history, their culture, to create their own sense of com-
munity and togetherness."14
A result of this changing perception of an individual's
blackness is a changing response to the blackness of others.
The value of other black people is enhanced and a growing
awareness of a common bond between black people is occuring.
A system of verbal and body language has developed which
emphasizes the fraternal (often secret fraternal) organiza-
tion which exists amongst many ghetto residents. It is
on this group basis that a significant attack on racism and
poverty is expected to be mounted. As more people become
involved and activated, and as they more clearly see the
injustices surrounding them, their political strength is
expected to grow.15 Solidarity is required--simply as an
affirmation of faith in other blacks--but also as a power
base from which to confront oppressing institutions.
14Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967) p. 37.
15Ibid., p. 43.
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This emphasis on the community as a base of power
is fostered by wide acceptance of the view that a ghetto
represents a colony controlled by the larger white society.
As Carmichael and Hamilton state, "institutional racism
has another name: colonialism."16 They feel the analogy
is marred in only two respects--a colony is generally con-
ceived of as a physically separated piece of land, whereas
the ghettos are not, and colonies have traditionally been
a source of cheaply produced raw materials which is, in
the ghetto, replaced by human labor. The influence of
Third World politics and thinking and the desire of many
ghetto leaders to identify with African and other under-
developed countries has led to wide acceptance of the colonial
analogy and solutions sought by colonialized countries begin
to act as models for action by ghetto residents.
Thus the image of truly independent political, economic,
social systems within the ghetto is becoming increasingly
accepted by black leaders, although the degree of indepen-
dence thought either desirable or feasible varies greatly.
It nonetheless forms the motivation for much of the poli-
tical activity within ghettos today, particularly in the
attempts at decentralizing government services as well as
16Ibid., p. 56.
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transferring capital and ownership of private enterprises
into black hands.
The reasons for this are many:
1) If one perceives the larger society as racist, one
concludes that no decisions made at that level can
have the best interests of blacks at heart. There-
fore, it is a matter of necessity (if one is to
survive and progress) that blacks make such deci-
sions in light of their own experience and goals.
2) Hostility to government for its inability and un-
willingness to act on behalf of blacks make them
seek more effective routes. The precariousness
of support by government makes some blacks seek a
source of support which is both more secure and
which allows independence of action on the part
of black leaders. It is assumed that one cannot
meet both the needs of black people and placate
government, for leaders often feel they must
choose between these alternatives.
3) Economic improvement achieved through the gener-
osity of white institutions does not disturb the
dependency relationship between blacks and whites.
Improvement must come through the strength and
efforts of the black community, not at the behest
of the white community.
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If one sees much of the current black activity as
being aimed at this "de-colonization" goal then the inte-
grationist approach of incorporating individual blacks
into the white society is obviously inadequate. It is in-
adequate because the scale of the problem requires a more
massive response, and inadequate because it undercuts the
development of a black community and violates the sense of
cultural integrity being fostered. In short, "helping in-
dividual black people to solve their problems on an individual
basis does little to alleviate the mass of black people." 17
Further one group can only integrate with another group, it
assimilates individuals.
This necessity for blacks to get themselves together--
to organize themselves and determine their goals and
strategies--is, to some, a prerequisite to the forming of
coalitions with any white allies. Only after each party
of the coalition has its own power base can forces be
joined without one group fearing that it will be consumed
or swept aside.18 It is also seen as necessary that the
self-interest of each party be served by the coalition, for
a reliance on sympathy or moral obligation has been found
17Ibid., p. 54.
18Ibid., pp. 77-80.
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to be shaky and inadequate. Thus it becomes necessary
for black communities to understand clearly where their
self-interest lies and to understand where the other
parties' interests are served. A strong, sustained rela-
tionship can only be built on a mutually satisfying pact.
A final condition of any coalition is that it must be built
around specific identifiable programs or goals, rather
than vague and general goals. A danger here is that agree-
ment on subordinate issues can disguise or belie the fact
that the long-term interests of the parties may be incom-
patible.
This approach toward coalitions is not shared by a
major political faction within black communities, the
Panthers. Since their analysis starts from a more Marxist
position, class and not race is crucial in determining
allies. Thus they express a greater willingness to form
alliances with broad-purposed white groups whose goals of
radical change seem compatible with the goals of the black
community.
The object of these various strategies of power
building is to supplant old values and institutions with
new ones that emphasize a more himanistic approach to life.
The "good life" would not be defined simply in material
terms; the values that aggrandize material things rather
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than the expansion of humanity are among those to be dis-
carded. 10 Essential to this is a broadened base of politi-
cal participation which fosters an increase in the quality
of participation as well as the quantity. The competetive
nature of society will, it is hoped, give way to cooperative
ventures in the ghetto, which are based on the mutual con-
cern of the community's residents for each other.
It is obvious that the special interests of all indi-
viduals or groups in the black community are not going to
be met within the goals of any black power ideology. As
Milton Kotler says, "Nor is the political interest held in
common and expressed in a unity of power in the Negro com-
munities the sum of the interests of particular groups and
classes within the community. This additive notion of
community does not hold." 20  One must separate out, if pos-
sible, those actions which serve some segment of the black
community and those which serve the power of the black
community as an entity. While much controversy can be pro-
voked about what does serve black community power, it
should be recognized that is something distinct from that
which serves the individual or aggregates of interests
1 9Ibid., p. 39.
20Kotler, "The Neighborhood Corporation,"
66.
within the community.
In looking at black economic development one can judge
the expected benefits that will accrue to certain groups as
well as the effect on the interest of the "black community"
per se. The degree to which any given black person identi-
fies his own interests with that of the community varies a
great deal--the black political leadership is certainly
more sensitive to this and in fact does perceive its
interests as being closely related to the well-being of
the community. While it might be true that "His blackness
is an everpresent fact of this racist society, whether he
recognizes it or not,"2 1 the average black man does fre-
quently identify along other lines; he is a postman, he is
a father, he is a union steward, and this identification
often has priority over his blackness.
The result is an even greater diversity in attitudes
among ghetto residents toward economic development than is
suggested by the variation in political philosophies. The
attitudes shared by men, in their capacity of businessmen,
are likely to be much more homogeneous than the attitudes
of blacks, as blacks. Thus the role of the black community
in the future of ghetto development is the least predictable
21Carmichael and Hamilton, Black Power, p. 54.
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one, for the self interest served can either be that of
general community power, or the special interests of a
group within the community.
For example, there are obviously going to be black
businessmen who will manipulate the new black awareness
to benefit their own businesses. Those businesses which
previously relied on enforced segregation to provide a
market may now have to substitute a plea for black unity.
On the other hand, a desire to serve the needs of the
community may supersede the desire of a businessman to
meet his company's needs. (One prospective businessman,
who was seeking counseling and assistance through a course
set up to aid black businessmen, hoped to develop a fleet
of taxicabs in Roxbury. There, as in many ghettos, taxi
service at the hands of white companies is frequently in-
adequate, and the developer kept emphasizing the hardships
this created for the residents. The business professor
teaching the course attempted to drum this concern out of
him and to substitute in him a primary emphasis on profits.) 2 2
The degree to which emerging black entrepreneurs share a
concern for community power and the effect this has on
their businesses is an area of concern on which there is
little informatian.
22 Observed at NortheasternUniversity, course conducted for
black businessmen, February 1968.
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C. Business
In order to develop any realistic expectation about
the capability of private enterprise to contribute to
ghetto development, it is necessary to make some assess-
ment of the motivations and constraints acting on business.
a) Forces Encouraging Business Involvement.
Riots and lesser forms of rebellion (e.g. boycotts)
are clearly a major factor in encouraging business to in-
volve itself in the ghetto. While some businesses have
been the direct target of rioting or hostile blacks most
have felt the impact in a more indirect or general fashion.
The more concrete and immediate the threat, the greater
has been the response on the part of a given corporation.
Those firms with large investments in land or plant
facilities in or near a slum have the greatest self interest
to preserve by reducing tension and hostility in the
ghetto. Those corporations having some vested interest
in the central city, if not the ghetto, are also highly
motivated to reduce urban disruption. Restrictive charters
prevent some of them from moving, while heavy investment
in immovable physical assets hinders others. As the
president of ATandT reminded stockholders in his 1967
annual report, "the city is where the central offices are
located and where 80 percent of your customers live."23
2 3Cross, Black Capitalism, p. 117.
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The utilities are in an especially good position to
undertake "social programs" since the law guarantees a
specified rate of return on invested capital allowing
expensive programs to be undertaken with the cost being
tossed into the utility rate structure. In addition a
long-range view shows that any program which raises in-
comes in the ghetto is likely to increase utility sales.
Other businesses, like hotels, which depend on convention
and tourist trade also suffer from riots. More generalized
effects, such as the impact of curfews or forfeited wages,
are felt by an even wider ring of business concerns. For
firms dealing in foreign markets, even a damaged national
image can have business repercussions. In short, hard
economic facts dictated that business confront some of the
ghetto's problems.
More indirect pressure has been brought to bear on
business from a variety of governmental and civic sources
Nationally and locally urban coalitions (or some variation)
have sprung up. Such coalitions have provided both a
forum in which business and government could begin to
integrate their separate activities, as well as a means of
organizing industry-wide programs. Such coalitions can
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also provide some implicit scale or measure to which a
given firm can gear its own activities. In a case study
of activities in Detroit the observation is made that:
Almost without exception, their (auto-makers) urban-
help programs--from hiring and training to loans
of staff members--have come only in response to
specific requests from government agencies, city
and urban coalitions .... The auto companies readily
admit this reluctance to go it alone to initiate
and innovate...24
The frequent tendency of business to seek other busi-
ness partners in its ghetto-help programs also serves to
distribute the cost and benefits of socially useful pro-
grams more equitably. The indirect benefits of such pro-
grams accrue to society at large, which consists in part
of other corporations. Only a portion of those indirect
benefits returns to the corporation initiating the program,
whereas all of the costs do. By engaging in collective
action the cost can be dispersed among more firms.
Governmental pressure becomes somewhat more pointed
when the given corporation is heavily dependent on federal
contracts or sales, or when an industry is government
regulated. Another pressure perceived by businessmen is
that of possible federal intervention into areas previously
reserved for private enterprise. Termed by one writer
24Lawrence G. O'Donnell, "In Motown, Caution Proves Suc-
cessful," The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1969, p. 8.
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"the gentle art of the Federal hotfoot," it leads to the
argument that "if we businessmen don't start new business
ventures in the ghetto the government will."n25
A further inducement to industry to engage in any
civic project is the publicity such activity evokes. A
favorable corporate image can serve as a business asset,
and ghetto projects are almost sure-fire publicity generators.
Rather perfunctory business operations performed in a ghetto
(e.g. opening of a printing plant) become front page news.
Not only is a favorable image useful in subsequent dealings
with labor, government, etc., but it serves as a source of
gratification for high management. The transition of a
corporate official from a businessman to a civic leader
can provide enormous prestige and satisfaction for an indi-
vidual.
The major efforts of business have been directed at
the hiring of blacks, either upon their own initiative or
in response to federal action. One effort, initiated after
the 1967 riots, began when the White House wrote to 500
major companies requesting cooperation. Only 160 businesses
responded and only 600 new jobs were created. In March of
25Cross, Black Capitalism, p. 125.
26Ibid., p. 74.
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of the same year the Labor Department produced a voluntary
concentrated ghetto employment program which resulted in
only 6,900 jobs. 27 A more ambitious program initiated by
the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) sought to create
100,000 jobs;within the first 14 months close to 50,000
jobs were pledged due to the promise of Labor Department
training subsidy contracts. A central figure in this NAB
effort was Henry Ford II, who early became a strong spokes-
man for the necessity of corporate involvement in urban
affairs, and was especially successful in his own city of
Detroit.28 General Motors alone hired one out of every
five men employed through the NAB program. At the time
that hiring was going on in the auto industries the auto-
makers "were desparately in need of workers in a hurry and
the unemployment rolls were skimpy."29 Earlier this year
when Ford had to cut back production it quietly closed its
two inner-city hiring centers and laid off some of its
hard-core workers.
Beyond the employment plans, in which most industries
are engaged individually or collectively, there are hundreds
27 Ibid., p. 85.
2 8 O'Donnell, "Motown," p. 8.
2 9Ibid.
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of corporate programs relating to economic development.
They include technical assistance, market guarantees, sub-
sidies and grants, and development banks. The structures
being experimented with include private black ownership,
cooperative ownership, franchises, employee share-holding,
industrial turnkey, and community development corporations.
b) Constraints on Business Involvement
The businessman has traditionally found community
chest-like projects an acceptable outlet for his civic
concern. To turn from pure charity to a hybrid charitable/
business venture like ghetto investment places most busi-
nessmen on alien ground. Judged on purely economic terms,
most ghetto ventures would be found infeasible--if they
weren'tmore ghetto investment would have occurred as a
part of normal economic activity.
To open a plant in a ghetto often means additional
costs in the form of real estate taxes, insurance (if it
can be gotten), pilferage, transportation, etc. The hiring
of unskilled or hard-core unemployed requires extensive
training, which can easily reach a cost of 5,000 dollars a
trainee. A corporate official involved in developing a
ghetto-based plant estimated that 10-20,000 dollars of
capital investment per employee is required in a small
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plant.30 Thus serious efforts on the part of business
entail significant expenditures, especially if any long-
term effort is to be sustained. If these expenditures can
not be recouped but must be charged off as losses, business
will be resistant to incur such costs. As one writer stated:
A traditional prerogative of the American business-
man has been his right to buy labor, materials, and
capital as economically as possible. This privilege
of improving profits through efficiency and control
of costs has been jealously guarded....Most business-
men and stockholders are appalled at the suggestion
that their companies should pursue a policy of
Uneconomic allocation of business resources" for
the improvement of conditions in the ghetto. 31
More bluntly stated is the view of a N.Y. Times editorial
writer who holds, "A business is not a social agency and
cannot be expected to perform tasks that properly belong
to government and society. A business is, in the end, a
business." 32
What is called into question here are the rights and
responsibilities of corporate directors--are they obligated
to prudently operate by a rule of profit maximization or do
they have the discretion of serving other objectives as
well? Harvard's Program on Technology and Society which
is directed, in part, at studying the relationship between
30Paul Dorr, private interview held July, 1969.
3 1Cross, Black Capitalism, pp. 75-76.
John A. Hamilton, "The Business of Business is Still
Business," The New York Times, February 10, 1969.
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business and social goals has focused on this question.
One of their members, an economist, concluded that within
large corporations management can generally choose between
profits or growth in the operation of a company, or it
can move from one goal to the other.33 Expectations of
higher future dividends may compensate stockholders for
lower current dividends in cases where a policy fostering
long-term growth is undertaken, but, whatever the goal,
no unnecessary sacrifice of profitability must be incurred.
Thus:
We are then forced to the practical conclusion
that whether a corporation is mainly s ockholder-
oriented, or whether it is also strongly growth-
oriented, under present conditions it is bound to
suffer a significant penalty if it diverts a large
proportion of its resources to "social" projects
which offer a low internal rate of return....The
more socially conscious the executives, the more
likely they are in the long run to face reduced
opportunities for (executive) job expansion
quite apart from possible sanctions from the
stockholders. [author's emphasis] 34
This theoretical analysis is borne out by one corporate
head who states, "There are few firms where management
feels free casually to reduce earnings to meet some un-
certain and unquantifiable social concern about the impact
33Robin Marris, "Businesses, Economics and Society,"
Social Innovation in the City (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1969) p. 30.
34 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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of a general urban crisis."35 The following characteristics
of contemporary big business heighten the concern for
profit on the part of management:
1) greater disclosure requirements by the SEC and
the growth of security analysis greatly increases
the amount of data about a company that is
available to the public.
2) the rise of management takeovers through "overhead
tenders" or "forced mergers" make- management
more responsive to the influence of stockholders
who are intent on profitable performance.
3) the increased use of stock options provides a
personal financial incentive to management to
run a more profitable business.36
One alternative to the dilemma of profit versus
social benefit is to make the solution of social problems
more profitable in the limited, orthodox sense, and this
is the approach being explored by growing numbers of
businessmen. This can be pursued in one of two ways--
by opening up new markets among the poor and by engaging
3 5Eli Goldston, "Management and Man in the Computer Age--
The Moral Imperative,' (unedited transcript of remarks
before the National Industrial Conference Board, November
14, 1968), p. 4.
36Eli Goldston, "New Prospects for American Business,"
Daedalus, Winter 1969, pp. 81-84.
in activities previously considered the province of
government.
The necessary component which would change previously
non-market activities of either of the above types (such
as providing low-income housing, or investment capital for
black enterprises) into profitable ones is, of course,
government incentives in the form of subsidies, tax benefits,
guarantees and insurance, contracts or franchises. In this
way, government can redirect the allocation of resources
without drawing the heavy criticism from business that
accompanies other government attempts to intervene in the
market.3
Given that policies can be pursued which serve the
common good of both government and private enterprise,
the question arises as to who, in fact, shapes these policies.
Theoretically, the direction and scope of action would be
determined by government, which would then provide the
incentive for business to implement its policies. Gal-
braith's contention in his latest book, The New Industrial
State, is that the alliance between government and business
has led to the adoption by society of the goals and values
of business rather than the reverse. Others, like the head
37Richard H. Holton, "Business and Government," Daedalus,
Winter 1969, p. 52.
I
78.
of New Jersey Bell Telephone, hold that corporations
are undergoing a significant re-evaluation of their goals
and are adopting many of the purely non-materialistic
goals of society. One test of these statements will
lie in the programs and policies which are developing
out of the efforts of business and government to aid
ghetto development.
In short, the need business has for harmonious rela-
tions with blacks and with government officials is an in-
ducement for corporations to enter programs for ghetto
development, but these activities will not be engaged in
to the detriment of the firm's well-being. The high cost
of doing business in the ghetto seems to preclude any
significant investments on the part of white business un-
less adequate compensation is forthcoming through govern-
ment subsidies.
38Robert D. Lilley, "Heroless Drama Ahead," The MBA,
December 1967, p. 17.
L
79.
CHAPTER IV
EGandG Roxbury Inc., Case Study
Introduction
The following case studies will focus on three
operations: EGandG Roxbury, Inc., State Enterprises
Inc., and Freedom Industries, Inc. All are based in the
Roxbury section of Boston and all started in the early
part of 1968. They were chosen to represent three dis-
tinct models of development--the first, EGandG Roxbury,
is an example of an industrial turnkey operation initiated
outside the ghetto by a national corporation. The second,
State Enterprises, has been termed a "community conglom-
erate," and is a self-organized group of ghetto residents
(between two and three hundred) who share in the owner-
ship and management of the company. The third, Freedom
Industries, is best characterized as a one-man operation
controlled by the president, structured to dispense its
profits to the community.
These enterprises could be said to represent the new
wave of black economic development in that the stated
purposes of each include some commitment to broader
social goals felt to be important to the black community.
The studies, then, will attempt to compare the original
objectives of each operationas defined by its founders,
with the structures and operations that have emerged a
80.
year and a half later. Those elements--like sources of
funding or technical assistance, type of personnel, hiring
and training policies, the decision-making process, etc.--
that appear relevant in shaping the emerging operations
will be analyzed. The focus of the studies will be on the
way each operation has contributed materially to the black
population and the degree to which it has promoted, or
is likely to promote, the collective political and economic
capacities of the black community to achieve further solu-
tions to its problems.
81.
EGandG Roxbury, Inc.
A modest training program directed at hiring the
"disadvantaged" blacks was initiated a few years ago by
EGandG Inc. (a technical firm involved in research and
development in such fields as optics, oceanography, and
physics as well as instrument design and some manufactur-
ing), but the program failed. Out of ten beginning trainees,
only one survived. The cause of the failure was thought
to lie in the poor work habits of the trainees, the problems
of transportation from their homes in Roxbury to EGandG's
Bedford plant and the psychological isolation of these
blacks in the nearly all-white plant. As one EGandG repre-
sentative said, "It was like a couple of specks of pepper
in a handful of salt.1
Disappointment over the company's inability to attract
and hold blacks led some members of the Industrial Relations
Department, particularly its director, Paul Dorr, to
attempt to develop a more attractive program. As one
executive of EGand G later said:
At first, companies merely talked about hiring
people out of the ghetto areas. Then they began
setting up plants in the areas to provide employment
lInterview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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opportunity. It seemed to us that the next step in
this process was not only to provide employment
opportunity as an impetus to economic development but
also to provide the opportunity for equity ownership.
It was a new idea which we saw as a natural evolution
of economic development efforts. We decided to try
it. 2
One model that looked feasible was that of Watts
Manufacturing in the ghetto of Los Angeles. Created by a
white firm, Aerojet-General, it was black managed and staffed
and Aergjet-General planned to sell 51 percent of the com-
pany's stock to the employees. At this same time AVCO was
receiving a great deal of publicity on the proposed printing
plant it was planning in Roxbury. Dorr and other members
of his department took this idea to Ed Finn, Director of
Corporate Administration, who responded favorably and car-
ried the discussion on to Bernard O'Keefe, the President
of EGandG, who also expressed interest. While the original
proposal arose out of a genuine desire to assist blacks,
the wide acceptance of it was due to a mixture of motives.
Indirect benefits could accrue to the company if such a
project were developed, particularly in its relations with
the federal government. A large part of EGandG's annual
revenue of $110 million comes from the Atomic Energy
Commission where companies must act in accordance with fair
2Stevan Trooboff, "EGandG Roxbury, Inc.," Harvard Business
School Case Study (mimeo), p. 4.
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employment clauses in the contracts.5 In addition to the
usual prohibitions against discrimination, they require
companies to develop "affirmative action programs" in seek-
ing out workers from minority groups.
At this stage it was thought that EGandG could under-
take the project as a member of a consortium of firms that
as a group would develop some enterprise in the ghetto.
O'Keefe, who was then serving as the head of the Boston
Chamber of Commerce, was thought to be in a position to
establish contacts with other interested firms. However,
O'Keefe, knowing the difficulty of getting agreement within
any given board of directors, felt that the difficulty of
getting a consensus between numerous boards was too great
and said instead, "We'll do it ourselves. EGand G's
Board of Directors approved the general concept that had
evolved and set the management free to develop it. Dorr
remembers, "We didn't know where to start."5 The EGandG
executive who was to carry the main responsibility for the
project was Ed Finn and his attitude was "We were deter-
mined not to take the white plantation-owner approach and
3Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury: 'Too Much, Too Fast',," The
Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1969, p. 10.
4Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
5 Ibid.
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come swaggering into Roxbury offering largesse." 6
Planning Stage.
The decision was made to begin with a planning board
which would include both EGandG personnel and community
leaders from Roxbury. Through contacts that Paul Dorr had
with a member of the community, a tentative list of names
was drawn up, though it soon became apparent that "no one
spoke for the black community and no matter what we did
or who we dealt with we were going to get criticized by
someone."!7 Since EGandG was determined to give blacks a
real role in the planning, they wanted ones who understood
the needs of business and its way of thinking. The planning
board that finally emerged consisted of:
Paul Dorr--Industrial Relations Director at EGand G
(white)
George Gage--Director of Corporate Planning at EGandG
(white)
Ed Finn--Director of Corporate Administration at
EGandG (white)
John Carlie--National Research Corporation (white)
Tom Atkins--Boston City Councilman (black)
Kenneth Guscott--President, Boston Chapter of the
NAACP (black)
6Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury."
7 Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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Curtis Chrisfield--college friend of Ed Finn's
and a schoolteacher (black)
Paul Parks--Administrator of Model Cities Program
(black) 8
Two members of the community who did not accept positions
on the board were Archie Williams and Bryant Rollins who,
at that time, represented the Grove Hall Development Cor-
poration in Roxbury. Their position was that some community
group, like the Grove Hall Corporation, should be given
the authority to do all the planning and that EGandG's
corporate funds for the project should be turned over to
a community group without qualification. They appeared
before the planning board at its first few meetings to pre-
sent their viewpoint. While they may have represented an
extreme position in this regard, a concern for black control
was evidenced by all the blacks on the board. While EGandG
was aware of strong currents towards self-determination
and ownership, they had not realized how strong it was. 9
The first planning session, which was to have covered a
number of other questions, never got beyond the ownership
problem. In the eyes of EGandG people this was a question
to be settled only after a determination had been made on
8Stevan Trooboff, "EGandG Roxbury, Inc."
9Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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such problems as what business was to be entered, or
where it was to be located, but it was clear that no plan-
ning could begin until the blacks had gotten a clear
commitment on the ownership question. EGandG officials
returned to O'Keefe who took a stand that some form of
community ownership was fine as long as EGandG got its
investment out. While they didn't expect to make a bundle
on the project they did expect to break even or, at best,
make a small return. EGandG's stand was "no one wants
charity" to which the black board members apparently agreed.
Thus a compromise to the Williams/Rollins stand of complete
and immediate control had to be sought, especially as EGandG's
Board of Directors would never have approved of an invest-
ment over which the corporation had no control. A sug-
gested plan had EGandG gradually divest itself of ownership
over a 5-20 year period down to a maximum of 25 percent
of the stock. This created a problem as to how and in
what form the community would own and hold the stock.
Early consideration was given to the possibility that
community groups could hold the stock, but black members
hastily pointed to the ephemeral nature of community organi-
zations that generally could not provide stability or
10Ibid.
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longevity. Thus it was decided to let employees own and
hold stock, and to provide stock options as incentives
to management. The schedule that was arrived at was held
to be flexible and subject to change as needed.
Finally the board was ready to begin focussing on
the type of industry it should consider entering. After
some embers of the board traveled about the country visiting
ghetto industries, the following criteria were set forth
for industry selection:
1) The industry had to be one in which there was
an opportunity for upward mobility in skill for
the workers.
2) The economic size of the new business should be
such as to make it a substantial enterprise em-
ploying more than 10 to 12 people. But, on the
other hand, the business should not be an unwieldy
giant.
3) The nature of the industry would have to be labor
intensive. The industry entered was expected to
have a high payroll to sales ratio.
4) If possible, the industry should offer EGandG
and/or the blacks who would operate the business
some competitive advantage.11
11Stevan Trooboff, "EGandG Roxbury, Inc., p. 3.
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Certain possibilities were, after some consideration,
ruled out. Defense work was one of these, and it was
opposed for two reasons. First, expectations at that time
were that the war would soon be over and that a cut-back
in defense spending was going to occur. When this happened
contractors would begin pulling sub-contracted work back
into their own shops to avoid extensive layoffs of their
workers. A small firm like that planned for Roxbury would
be very vulnerable if this happened. A second deterrent
was the obvious hostility toward the war among black leaders,
and it seemed unwise to offend the most vocal groups.12
It was natural to examine the possibilities EGandG itself
offered as a market for products, but it was felt that the
complex nature of EGandG's products would require a slow and
difficult training process.13 It was also a difficult time
to talk of expanding EGandG's regular operations because,
in general, their business in the Boston area was shrinking.
That portion of business that wasn't shrinking was of the
highly technical type. It was hoped that the industry
finally chosen would draw some competitive advantage in
the black community--that is provide a product which many
blacks used.
12Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
13Stevan Trooboff, "EGandG Roxbury, Inc." p. 4.
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The merits of an acquisition versus a new company
were also looked into, and the board decided it would
greatly speed development if they could acquire an exist-
ing company that met their criteria and could be purchased.
This was the manner in which EGandG had grown and they
were comfortable with the acquisition process. One of
the board members, Ken Guscott, was holding out for a metal
working plant and, after much searching they located one
that seemed to fit most of their criteria. It was the
E. Van Noorden Company, a family-owned operation run by
Michael Kantor and his nephew. A metal fabrication firm,
it had plants in both Quincy and Roxbury, a strong selling
point in that the Roxbury plant would be very accessible to
the workers. It produced a diversified line of goods rang-
ing from specialty metal detailing to ventilator hoods for
factories and jail cells. The technology required seemed
to meet the criteria of the planning group in that a
diversity of skills transferable to other operations would
be required. The company had an excellent reputation
within the construction industry and a review of their
financial status indicated they were a profitable operation.
As O'Keefe noted "These (fabrication industries) are about
14Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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the only businesses where you could start with a low level
of skills at entry, then build up product sophistication
as skills increased. Also, these businesses are generally
not subject to the economies of scale, so you're less likely
to be bumped out by a General Motors." 15
Unlike EGandG's other acquisitions, the metal fabri-
cation industry was in an area in which EGandG had little
experience. Even the type of production and marketing
involved in metal forming was alien to EGandG. The com-
pany did not get anxious about moving into new ground be-
cause of the arrangement under which they bought Van
Noorden, that of the "pairing concept." The Van Noorden
Company was to be split, with all of the original operation
to move to the Quincy plant and to be operated as an EGandG
subdivision. The new EGandG Roxbury, Inc. (ERI) was to
take over the Roxbury site and operate as a separate
EGandG subsidiary. The group at the Quincy plant, however,
was to provide any technical and marketing advice that ERI
might require. It was also expected that the profits
from the Van Noorden operation could offset some of the
losses incurred by the ERI until they could establish
themselves.
15Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury."
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Staffing and Training Period.
Once the business was bought, EGandG began to look
for key executives to run the ERI operation. The advice
received while visiting other black subsidiaries was to
start with a black management team, something the local
blacks also insisted on. The Jikelihood of locating
skilled black executives with experience in metal fabri-
cations was slight and the use of a black employment firm
in New York was considered to aid in the search. It was
felt that both the Chicago and New Jersey areas, having
heavy concentrations of metal fabrication firms, would be
fruitful places to look.16 The black members of the plan-
ning board, however, wanted local people if possible, so
that the search was limited to the greater Boston area.
Both Dorr and Finn, whoshared the responsibility for lo-
cating a manager for the plant, agreed that they didn't
want a subservient, Uncle Tom-type, but rather that an
agressive, independent man was needed. It was Dorr's
opinion that, with the exception of one man, the others
interviewed showed too much deference to a couple of
white businessmen. 1 7 The exception was Bertram Lee, who
16Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
17Ibid.
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at that time was Executive Director of O.I.C. (Oppor-
tunities Industrialization Center). A graduate of North
Central College in Illinois, Lee went on to study Public
Administration at Roosevelt University in Chicago. His
experience had been primarily in government work in the
areas of job training and youth development programs.
As general manager of ERI, Lee would have general respon-
sibilities for training, production and sales--in short,
the overall development of a business. At the time he
was interviewed for the position he expressed reservations
about accepting responsibilities for which he had little
experience--that is, sales and production. The EGandG
people assured him that they had not expected to find ex-
perienced personnel and that given both opportunity and
back-up support they felt he could do the job.
Subsequent hiring was done by ERI itself, and three
additional executives were brought onto the staff.18
These were James Ware as personnel director, Richard
Richardson as operations and sales manager, and William
Dilday as public relations director. An accountant,
James Hopkins, was hired a short time after. Of the
18The entire process of setting up operations was done
quickly. The Van Noorden Company was acquired in March
of 196 . ERI staffing was begun immediately and completed
by May, 1968. The training program was ready, filled and
ready to go a month later.
93.
managerial staff only Richard Richardson had any experi-
ence in actual production work. Previously he had been
production manager for metal fabrications at the Digital
Equipment Corporation and had nearly eighteen years ex-
perience in the manufacturing field. He had earlier made
application for the job as general manager of ERI, but did
not get the job.
When people in the community saw who had been hired
there were some objections raised that the selection of
managers did not really represent community people in that
most of them did not live in Roxbury and had little contact
with community organizations. Even Lee, who had been head
of O.I.C., was viewed as something of an outsider because
he had only moved to Boston from Chicago a short time ago.1 9
The managers appeared at a meeting before some community
groups to introduce themselves and to explain ERI's plans,
but left feeling that the groups still regarded the hirings
as a sign of the operation's indifference to community
influence. William Dilday, who was raised in Roxbury,
felt that the lack of local people in all the management
positions was a mistake and resulted in a lack of identi-
fication and interest on the part of community people in ERI. 20
19Interview with Bert Lee, September 10, 1969.
2 0Interview with William Dilday, August 15, 1969.
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The staff, primarily under James Ware and William
Dilday, immediately began to recruit trainees. Social
agencies were contacted, ads were placed in the local paper,
The Bay State Banner, recruiting stations were set up through-
out the community.21 An attempt was made to reach men who
for one reason or another were outside the normal labor
pool and who could be considered hard-core unemployed.
Dorr commented on this, saying "It might have been better
to get a greater mix of 'employables' along with the hard
core."22 To one of the black managers, the term "hard-
core" wasn't really applicable to the trainees ERI received.23
In his eyes the real hard core were still out on the corner
and you couldn't begin to work with them. The trainees,
while they often had poor work histories, were likely to
be kids just out of school and lacking in training or men
from the south who had poor educational backgrounds. A
few, he added, were only one step ahead of the law and
some were on probation, but this was common in the community.
Trainees fell into one of two groups: the men who had
problems in their attitudes toward work and generally
2 1Interview with William Dilday, August 15, 1969.
22Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
23Interview with William Dilday, August 15, 1969.
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were trying to be too cool and slick, and another group
who lacked primarily education and skills. These groups
were characterized as the city and the country fellows.2 4
The complete staffing of ERI, from managers to trainees
was accomplished in little over one month.
The haste in getting the trainees on board was the
result of constraints set up by a training program that
had been developed earlier by EGandG staff. In the hopes
of getting the program moving by the summer of 1968, EGandG
had applied for federal funds which they received but
which carried deadlines that pushed ERI into moving a
bit more quickly than was desirable.25 The federal grant
provided for reimbursement of training costs up to a level
of $600,000, but in order to be eligible for the funds the
program had to include at least 50 employees. This was
a larger training group than EGandG had expected to start
with, so that the whole operation had to be scaled up-
wards. The final plan was to complete two six-month
training cycles, hiring 70 trainees in each cycle.
The training program consisted of two parts, skills
training and remedial academic work. The skills to be
24 Ibid.
251nterview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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focussed on were drafting, welding, and the operation
of metal fabrication equipment, to be learned mostly
through on-the-job training, and requiring between 660-
720 hours of instruction.26 One of the ERI managers felt
that the EGandG staff who had devised the program had
lower expectations of the remedial education needs of the
trainees than was the case.27 The average level of profi-
ciency was somewhere near a6th grade level and it was anti-
cipated that an 8th grade average level of proficiency in
reading and math was required if the plant was to perform
adequately. Mathematics was required in the course of a
normal job performance setting up various operations and
the reading level had to be sufficient so that a worker
could cope with written work orders and job instruction
sheets. The actual production process could cover anything
from a simple metal piece requiring only one or two opera-
tions to an intricate product like a skylight requiring a
series of precise steps.
It had been planned that ERI would rapidly move from
a training facility to a production facility. When this
occurred counselors and instructors would begin to phase
26steven Trooboff, "EGandG Roxbury, Inc.," pp. 8-9.
2 7 Interview with William Dilday, August 7, 1969.
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into positions in production and trainees would begin
working while continuing to build up their level of skills.28
However, in August of 1968, two months after the start of
the training program, ERI was still functioning as a train-
ing facility though it was hoped that production could
begin within a month. If things went well, EGandG's
efforts in Roxbury could be expected to result in adequate
job and skills for nearly 150 men as well as the ownership,
by blacks, of a viable business. However, everything didn't
go well, in fact, practically nothing did. Many of the
problems that arose sprang from the nature of the industrial-
turnkey process that served as a model for ERI and can
probably be generalized to other similar endeavors. For
this reason it is worthwhile understanding the relationship
between EGandG and ERI and the degree to which it affected
the actual operation of ERI.
Major Problems.
Nature of the Acquisition: The Van Noorden Company,
which had appeared so attractive, turned out to be, in
the words of Paul Dorr, "an unmitigated disaster."2 9
While EGandG's president declines to comment on this
28 tevan Trooboff, "EGandG Roxbury, Inc.," p. 16.
2 9Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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charge, an anonymous company representative admits that
"We found we had bought a lot less than we thought we
did."3 0 The first thing that became apparent was that
the Van Noorden operation was far from being profitable
and had been in difficulty for some time. The owners of
the firm had obviously primed the operation to make it
attractive for acquisition. They had dumped most of their
expensive skilled help in order to reduce their labor costs.
At the same time an effort had been made to develop a
backlog of business by selling the work at cost. The re-
sult was a prosperous looking business on the surface.
In the absence of the skilled labor needed to do some of
the more intricate work contracted for, it was not even
clear how the work could be done. As an EGandG insider
said, "We were going to have to straighten them out and
launch a business we knew nothing about all at the same
time."51
The physical plant that had been acquired in both
Quincy and Roxbury was also significantly less than ex-
pected. First, it was found that the Quincy plant,
which had been expected to absorb the entire existing
30Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury."
31 Ibid.
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Van Noorden operation--men and machines--was smaller than
anticipated. The black operation which had expected to
have its own plant, found it had to put up with the Van
Noorden iron shop in its midst, until other arrangements
could be made. Even more troubling was the condition of
the Roxbury plant, described by Dorr as "one of the filthi-
est I've ever seen.132 Bert Lee said it was simply a
"shell of a building," but it is questionable if it was
even that.33 Another manager recalls that on a snowy day
there would be more snow inside than out, that the eleva-
tor had long been condemned, and that the toilet facilities
were primitive.34 If one attempted tocpen a window, the
whole thing, frame and all, would fall out. The refurbish-
ing of the building later proved a point of contention
between EGandG and ERI management, the former claiming that
ERI had spent almost three times the amount they should
have. Dorr explains that this refers to the $30,000
allocated under the federal training grant for rennovation
and the $80,000 that was actually spent.35 He admits that
32Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
535 nterview with Bert Lee, July 18, 1969
34 Interview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
351nterview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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some of the money could have been better spent, but holds
to the position that most of the expenditures were
necessary due to the state of the building. The $30,000
was never intended to do the entire job, being limited to
that part of the plant used by the trainees.
The fact that most of the equipment had been moved
to Quincy, leaving only a few old pieces of machinery,
meant that ERI had to completely equip the plant. Since
the machinery was of the type that could generally be
gotten only from other production plants, it was a time
consuming process to locate the equipment. Misunderstand-
ings between ERI and EGandG as to who was authorized to
requisition such equipment, plus the difficulty of deter-
mining the type of machinery needed, caused long delays.
(Delays up to six months were experienced in waiting for
equipment.36 ) Meanwhile trainees were without the necessary
equipment on which to train, and were also without class-
rooms, lights, teaching aides, etc.3 Due to this and the
lack of actual production work, the motivation of the
trainees began to diminish. A lot of time was spent doing
make-shift work and the men began grumbling and the absen-
tee rate rose.3 8
36Interview with William Dilday, August 7, 1969.
1 nterview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
38Interview with William Dilday, August 7, 1969.
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Most important was the failure of Van Noorden to
provide the crucial production and sales expertise that
had been counted on. As one EGandG representative said,
"Far from providing the start-up help we expected, we
found it unwilling, and often unable, to do so."09 it
was unable to provide the help because Van Noorden itself
was without any management depth. Rather than functioning
in the role of operating managers, the two previous owners
40had actually been the sales force of the firm. Without
them the company had no developed sales personnel experi-
enced in the business. What carried Van Noorden in the
period after its acquisition by EGandG was that it received
the existing product line. Thus the acquisition which
the managers of ERI were left with had a badly deteriorated
physical plant, little equipment, no product line, little
expertise or experience of its own, and little back-up
support on which it was dependent.
This whole acquisition procedure raises serious
questions about the business judgments of those at EGandG
responsible for the Van Noorden decision. The company
was obviously a poor choice of acquisition under any
39Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury."
40Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
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terms, but when an experiment in black-controlled industry
was at stake the choice became appalling. While a good
portion of the mitake can be laid to poor judgment, the
conditions surrounding the acquisition made a thoughtful
decision more difficult. For one thing, the hope existed
that the operation could be underway by the summer, so
that pressure existed to make the acquisition in a hurry.
Further, numerous constraints existed that would not
normally be considerations in making an acquisition, for
example it had to be very accessible geographically to a
pre-determined work force, and had to be an industry con-
forming to the existing skills of this work force. Also,
the non-business members of the planning board were in-
fluential in a decision (e.g. Guscott was holding out for
a metal fabrication plant) that would normally be made by
members of EGandG alone. Thus the Van Noorden decision
was only partly the result of economic considerations,
and did not represent the usual acquisition process of
EGandG, although Dorr admits "They've made a few other
bad decisions in this regard." The question can be asked
as to whether EGandG's sloppy business judgment in any
way represented their realization that ERI was not going
to be a long-term holding, and as such did not, perhaps
unconsciously, warrant the same attention as a normal
acquisition.
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The lack of a product line was especially critical
to ERI, and they turned to job-shopping instead--taking
one-shot orders on a sub-contracting basis. This work
was not best suited to an unskilled labor force, for it
required a variety of changing skills and specifications.
The jobs also tended to be small, and it would require an
active sales force to keep the full plant in production.
For these reasons ERI requested permission to take over
some of the product lines of Van Noorden, but "those guys
were fighting for their own lives and weren't going to
help the black operation."4l There had been an expecta-
tion within EGandG that the federal government could be
counted on to support such efforts as ERI, especially by
providing orders for them. However, this support was not
forthcoming, and very little work trickled into ERI.
The failure to get work was not attributed solely
to the lack of an adequate sales force. Ed Finn relates
"Our salesmen meet with very cooperative attitudes from
company purchasing departments and even top executives.
But when they give us a tentative offer, a survey team
usually shows up the next day at ERI and afterward they
call back to cancel out, telling us they don't think we
have the kind of operation to assure the quality controls
41Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969
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they need. 4 2 The implication here is that, had ERI
been able to do the job, work would have been available,
and the suggestion is that production skills were lacking.
While the ERI people agree that the level of skills was
a problem, they saw the inadequacy of the plant and the
lack of equipment as the barrier to orders from interested
companies. "Many companies wanted to give us work, but
had to ask us to contact them when we got X or Y piece of
equipment," says Ware.43
As financial, sales, and production problems mounted
and the need for ERI and EGandG to work closely together
increased, the relationship between them began to deterior-
ate instead. When Van Noorden failed to provide the needed
technical assistance no one else at EGandG made a move to
substitute for them. Bert Lee expressed the most sympathy
for their position as he noted that the problems con-
fronting EGandG were not ones they were familiar with,
since the only production they engaged in was with
printed circuit boards. 4 Instead of seeking outside
marketing help, however, EGandG executives instead main-
tained that they knew how to sell as a result of their
42Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury."
4Interview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
44 Interview with Bert Lee, July 18, 1969.
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45
experience selling to some government agencies.
Even more costly than the lack of special skills or
expertise on the part of EGandG was the almost total
lack of interface between EGandG and ERI. Everyone in-
terviewed agreed that the poor communications character-
ized the quality of the relationship between ERI and
EGandG. The Wall Street Journal quoted Bert Lee as
saying "We just couldn't seem to get across to each
other. I know our meetings with Mr. Finn must have been
as frustrating for him as they were for us."A 6 The image
evoked by this statement is quite different from that
presented by others on the scene. James Ware says that
a typical meeting would find "Ed Finn and Bert Lee
literally screaming at each other across a table." 4
Soon it reached the point where an "interface was required
within the interface"--that is, a special committee was
selected to act as go-between with Finn and Lee, especially
when they were in the same room. The problems discussed
below seem to have been the source of much of the conflict
that ultimately arose between ERI and EGandG.
451nterview with Paul Dorr, May 51, 1969.
46Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury. "
4 I1nterview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
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Interpersonal Problems: Bert Lee has been described
as a "tough, very intelligent guy with a great need to
achieve, but a tendency to be cocky." He has also been
called a perfectionist who was willing to work hard him-
self, and did, but who required that others work just as
hard.4 9 A criticism of Lee with EGandG was that he
wouldn't delegate authority to any of his subordinates,
a judgment that is corroborated by a community leader who
knew Lee in a previous situation and says, "Bert Lee tends
to have an autocratic hand." One of Lee's managers iho
was aware of Lee's reputation in this regard denied that
Lee was this way at ERI; decisions were generally made in
conference with the other managers and Lee's views could
be challenged by them.50 Ed Finn had some of the same
characteristics as Lee, proud and quick-tempered.51 Finn
was also felt to be ambitious as was Lee.52 Under the best
of situations it is doubtful whether these two personalities
would have avoided clashes.
Racial Conflicts: What exacerbated the existing
48 Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
4 9Interview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
50Ibid.
51lInterview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
5 2Interview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
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tensions between ERI and EGandG were the racial over-
tones to much of the conflict, something EGandG does not
acknowledge. Lee was hired, in part, on his ability to
handle his blackness boldly and without apology and this
is a strong characteristic of his personality ("perhaps
he's too black" added Ware). He was sensitive to racial
slights, tending to "carry a chip on his shoulder."53
Apparently he and the other black managers found plenty
of grist for the mill.
The feeling at ERI was that most of the whites tended
to be paternalistic in their relationship with the blacks.
One of the first meetings the black managers attended at
EGandG was called by O'Keefe and consisted of a basic
lesson on how a business operates, something that left
the ERI staff fuming. Lee says of the EGandG people
"They didn't expect us to know anything and were surprised
that we did."5 4 Paul Dorr from his position within EGandG,
agrees that the black managers were treated in a way
others weren't, and strictures were placed on Lee that
were not used on white managers. He described om meeting
with various EGandG personnel which Finn opened by
asking each person to state why he was uncomfortable
53Interview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
54Interview with Bert Lee, July 18, 1969.
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going down to the ERI plant. Such responses as "it's
impossible to get a decision from a subordinate" or
"can't place any reliance on their financial reports or
sales forecasts" were offered which Dorr, at that time,
pointed out were conditions common to most of the depart-
ments at EGandG.
What the blacks were most sensitive to was their
isolation from the rest of EGandG and their inability to
enter into the informal network within the corporation.
Dorr pointed out that "It's customary, when one has a
problem, to call on the help of people in other depart-
ments--Lee and the others had no access to this." Lee
requested that he be allowed to sit in on EGandG corporate
meetings but was informed that managers were not generally
in attendance.55 ERI management also felt at a disadvan-
tage in business as a result of the personal friendship
between EGandG personnel; one man pointed to Finn's ten-
year friendship with the manager who took over the Van
Noorden plant as being an influence on decisions concerning
Van Noorden and ERI.5 6 The result was a growing distrust
between the two groups, particularly between Lee and Finn.
5 51nterview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
56Interview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
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Even outsiders to the situation interpreted much of ERI's
problems as having a basis in racial conflicts.
Financial Problems: What executives at EGandG
were most conscious of in the ERI operation was the
size of the losses of ERI in its first few months of
operation. While EGandG staff decline to state the size
of the losses, most estimates place it in the area of
$300-500,000. Bert Lee maintains they were closer to
$100,000, and holds the figure is inflated by including
costs that were reimbursible under the federal training
grant. 57 Whatever the figure, the result was clear. As
O'Keefe recounts:
We got a report from our treasurer that
ERI's draw on corporate cash was running
many times what we thought should have been
normal in such a start-up operation. At
that point, I felt it was my responsibility to
our shareholders to step in and order corporate
control of accounting at ERI. 58
The black managers maintain that they were completely
in the dark as to the financial performance that was ex-
pected from ERI and that little explicit planning went
on. No adequate budgets or guidelines were established
except for a general understanding between EGandG and ERI
that no profit was expected for the first 18 months and
57 1nterview with Bert Lee, July 18, 1969.
58Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury."
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that from 18-24 months they were expected to break even,
and only after that begin turning a profit. In the fall
of 1968, however, ERI was informed that its losses were
unacceptable and that its overhead would have to be re-
duced.
ERI management set to work to begin cutting overhead
by reducing the number of administrative personnel which
EGandG held was higher than necessary. They also revised
the procedure of processing their federal funds to speed
the intake of money and moved some of the trainees directly
into production work.5 9 All of the managers began to
act as salesmen, drumming up contacts wherever they could
and turning these over to the regular salesmen. By
December they had received a number of tentative commit-
ments which, if they materialized, would be worth $900,000
in sales. Lee worked to revise the short-range plans
and budget of ERI and, armed with the list of tentative
contracts and a list of payroll reductions, the managers
at ERI went to Bedford to meet with EGandG staff. At
this meeting, held in December of 1968, the ERI managers
were informed that they were being terminated, along with
a dozen or so other ERI employees. The reason put forth
5 91nterview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
60Ibid.
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by Ed Finn is,
Our studies showed that metal fabricating
overhead should run about 50% of labor
content, but ERI's were running 300%. We
had to do something and we didn't want to let
the trainees take the blow, so we cut from
the top. 61
Thus, eight or nine months after coming to ERI, three
of the four managers left. Paul Dorr, who learned about
the dismissals upon returning from an out-of-town meeting,
left the employ of EGandG a short time later, largely be-
cause of its handling of ERI.
When questioned as to why the firings and restruc-
turing of ERI were not met with a greater response from
the community, one manager claimed, "The community gave
up on ERI long ago, starting from when the management was
hired.!62 Bert Lee argued with this, but added, "We made
a mistake in not trying to involve the community all
along. I thought at the time that we should build ERI
into something the community could be proud of before we
developed a greater relationship to the community."63
Some of the individual managers were personally involved
in community activities (e.g. Lee and the Gibson School
problems), but as a corporate body ties to the community
were minimal. When local groups like Exodus approached
61Tim Metz, "EGandG in Roxbury."
62Interview with James Ware, August 22, 1969.
63Interview with Bert Lee, September 13, 1969.
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EGandG for contributions, EGandG customarily pointed to
ERI--indicating that this was the form of EGandG's con-
tribution to the community. This was often interpreted
by the groups to mean that contributions should be sought
from ERI, something that ERI could little afford.64
Refusals by ERI were, naturally, resented by local groups.
In general though, ERI did not attempt to carry itself
as a community organization, but rather as a business,
and this is the way it was viewed by the community after
a while. A few community people questioned on the matter
indicated that they did not perceive the firings as an
issue in community control (as the hirings had been),
but rather a business decision dictated by the losses in-
curred under the ERI managers. One held that Lee was
more of a social service administrator that a business-
man and, as such, he made himself dispensible when the
management became top-heavy in relation to its productivity.
Since ERI was handling itself as a straight-forward
business operation, there was little it did to attract
attention in the community. Most of the conflicts and
tensions of the operation occurred internally and never
reached the public's view, so that the nine months that
intervened between the opening of ERI and its major
64 Ibid.
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overhauling were ones in which the community had little
reason to be involved in ERI.
If the people of the community had been aware of
the troubles occurring during this period, they might
have perceived that some critical questions were being
hammered out between ERI and EGandG. At times it appeared
as though the two bodies were working at cross-purposes
rather than on a common development, and some probing
reveals that it is quite possible that ERI and EGandG
were working toward separate and, somewhat incompatible,
goals. A look at what these separate goals appear to have
been probably explains more about the many self-defeating
actions taken by both sets of management than can be
explained by personal hostility, poor business judgments,
or even racial tensions.
Differing Conception of the Role of ERI: Whites at EG and
G, especially the more sympathetic and savvy of them,
were very sensitive to the spirit of black self-determina-
tion. The brush, early in the planning stages, with some
of the more outspoken blacks of Roxbury reinforced the
belief that this was a central concern of blacks and
had to be a necessary component of the ERI project.
Thus, the Roxbury plant was seen, by EGandG, as an indepen-
7114.
dent black operation. When they set out to hire a
manager, they looked for an aggressive black who could
sustain the operation. The fact is that the men they
got, while identifying with blacks, did not necessarily
hold to an ideology which emphasized the need for self-
determination by a collectivity of blacks. The managers
of ERI were not civil rights leaders but professional or
business men (from firms like IBM) and most of them lived
outside the ghetto. If self-determination meant running
a 50-man plant, they weren't interested. They were
motivated to seek access to greater opportunities and
power, either by enlarging the existing ERI operation
or by attaching themselves more firmly to the EGand G
corporate body. In discussions with EGand G, Bert Lee
argued against the development of a black corporation,
saying that the kind of skills required precluded an
all-black staff. 65 The EGandG people were resistant
to ERI hiring whites and kept pressure on them to "hire
black." Evenbeyond the benefits such a policy would
bring in relation to EGandG's "fair employment" needs,
it is understandable why EGandG would take this position. 66
65Interview with Bert Lee, July 18, 1969.
66William Dilday reports that corporate headquarters used
to call down nearly every week to get the number of black
workers at ERI to include in reports they were preparing
for Federal contracts.
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The corporate value to EGandG of the Roxbury operation
lay in its being a rather unique example of a black
industrial turnkey project. It is were simply another
subsidiary, even a predominantly black one, it would
lose all its punch. Lee feels that the publicity from
the operation was especially important to EGandG
president Barney O"Keefe who was also serving as presi-
dent of the Boston Chamber of Commerce in a fairly
lack-luster manner while other Boston businessmen were
the focus of attention because of their ghetto projects. 67
In addition, some people at EGandG presumed that an all-
black staff could work more effectively together; Dorr
himself was surprised that ERI hired a white man as one
of its counselors, a position thought by EGandG to be
"toosensitive" to be filled by a white. 68 Thus, there
was little incentive for EGandG to absorb the black operation,
especially as it was not a financially desirable business.
Even if it had been, EGandG was no doubt aware that any
retreat from the position of allowing independance to
the black firm would always appear to be the result of
a takeover by the white corporation rather than a willing
integration by the black one.
67Interview with Bert Lee, July 18, 1969.
681nterview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
116.
The managers at ERI, nonetheless, made a series of
suggestions that they felt would expand the operations
at their control. An early one was that they seek to
acquire a company with a strong sales base to merge with
the production force of ERI to form one larger, stronger
company. 69 They found some good possibilities, including
one in New England and one in the Mid-West, and the
enthusiastic managers took their plan to Finn. Finn
regarded the idea either as folly or a joke, and the
plan was dropped. A month later, Van Noorden, seeking
a similar sales base, did acquire one of the companies
in which ERI had expressed an interest. 70 Finally, ERI
suggested a merger with Van Noorden, but this also was
turned down.
The career objectives of some of the principals
involved also became enmeshed in this confliect. Ed
Finn had never handled operations before he was chosen
to oversee ERI and it became something of a testing
ground with him. Early in the project he and others at
EGandG recognized the possibilities of extending the
model of ERI into other "disadvantaged" areas like Indian
reservations or Appalachia and Finn realized the long-term
69Interview with Bert Lee, September 3, 1969.
70 Interview with James Ware, August, 1969.
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career possibilities this opened up. 71 If Finn were
successful in the Roxbury project he would be the
natural person in EGandG to head additional efforts.
Knowing this, he was reluctant to reveal his own
inadequacies--"Ed Finn was unsure of himself and didn't
want to bring in outside consultants and be criticized
for not knowing what to do. Even the production people
in EGandG weren't called in." 72 Someone outside the
operation noted, "Finn is a weak administrator in that
he's too cautious with his job and afraid to stand by
his decisions." The logical competition to Finn, if ERI
did become permanently imbedded into the parent
corporation was Bert Lee, who enjoyed the additional
advantage of being black. It is clear that Lee was also
aware of the career possibilities with EgandG and saw
himself in a competitor's position with Finn. Others report
that Finn was jealous of his own authority and was concerned
lest Lee go over his head on decisions. The differences
between Lee and Finn reached the notice of EGandG's
president, who responded by saying, "If I'm forced to
choose between the two of you, one of you is going to
have to go." As it turned out it was Lee who went and
Finn has continued to oversee the ERI operation.
71lInterview with Paul Dorr, May 31, 1969.
7 2 Ibid.
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At present, ERI is a subsidiary of Van Noorden rather than
a direct subsidiary of EGandG corporate and the remaining
black manager, Richard Richardson, is now general
manager. All the payroll and accounting functions are
carried out by Van Noorden and EGandG is seeking to have
ERI classified as a small business to make it eligible
for SBA assistance. 73 Although losses have narrowed
since the December overhauling, "there's still no black
ink yet in sight." 74 At present, ERI's production
staff includes only 42 people instead of the 140 originally
envisioned. When questioned as to the future plans of
ERI, a representative there says the goal is still to
have "a company owned and operated by the people of the
community" and denies that EGandG has any plans to sell
ERI. 75 The former ERI managers stated that they felt
EGandG might make some attempt to put the firm on its
feet but it was more likely to dispose of it or shut it
down. Information gathered in the course of studying
Freedom Industries reveals that this company is presently
negotiating with EGandG for the sale of ERI. 76
73Interview with Walter Reed (ERI public relations),
September 15, 1969.
74Tim Metz. "EGandG in Roxbury."
7 51nterview with Walter Reed, September 15, 1969.
76Interview with Archie Williams, August 13, 1969.
119.
The head of Freedom Industries says EGandG would like
to get rid of the operation but wants to avoid the
appearance that it is dumping it. Further, EGandG
feels it must recoup its investment (estimated by
Williams to be about $400,000) if it is going to exit
gracefully, whereas inany other situation it would
probably be willing to sell even at a loss. From Freedom
Industries' point of view this means they might have to
pay a higher than normal market price to serve EGandG's
political needs, something it is reluctant to do. The
solution appears to rest in a sales agreement which
returns EGandG less than it put in but allows a higher
level of return in the future if the ERI, under Freedom
Industries' control, develops into a profitable business.
In looking back over the short history of ERI and its
many problems, the head of EGandG, Barney 0"Keefe,
could only conclude, "I guess we tried to accomplish
too much, too fast." 77
"EGandG in Roxbury."7Tim Metz.
120.
CHAPTER V
State Enterprises Inc.
The origins of State Enterprises Inc. can be found
in a meeting held in Roxbury on December 4, 1967. At
that time, Secretary Robert Weaver dedicated the "nation's
largest rehabilitation program," to be carried out under
FHA's Rent Supplement Program. In addition, Weaver an--
nounced a pilot project, later known as BRP (Boston Re-
habilitation Program), of rehabilitation to be carried
out under the 221(d)3 program at the cost of over 24
million dollars. The program was a response to criticism,
particularly on the part of Senator Edward Brooke, of
FHA's failure to adequately serve the needs of low-income
families. The BRP program represented an attempt by FHA
to drastically modify its bureaucratic procedures and its
standards to allow for greater speed and flexibility in
inner-city rehabilitation. Processing time was reduced
from an average of eighteen months to less than two
months, and architectural specifications were reduced to
a minimum.
Whatever virtues the program had, the manner in which
it was introduced to the community caused an uproar.
lPress release, "Secretary Weaver to Dedicate Nation's
Largest Rehabilitation Program in Roxbury," December 3,
1967, from the Federal Housing Administration (mimeo).
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Although the program had been in a planning and negotia-
tion stage for three or four months, nothing had been
made public for fear that the acquisition costs of property
would soar if word leaked out of the extent of federal
funds available. Weaver's announcement, before four hun-
dred local citizens and public officials at Freedom House,
was the first formal news release to the community.2
It immediately brought a response by Bryant Rollins, a
member of the New Urban League, who denounced the program
as "a robbery of the Roxbury people" which did not serve
the needs of low-income people and, further, by-passed
community developers. A shouting match flared briefly,
during which Weaver withdrew his prior agreement to meet
with the community groups whose views had been represented
by Rollins. Weaver and some local officials did meet
later with another group composed of Roxbury's three state
representatives, Royal Bolling, Franklin Holgate, and
Michael Haynes, as well as Samuel McCoy, a local black
realtor.3 This group urged Weaver to allow the community
to share in the monetary benefits of such programs as
BRP and to take special steps to inform local business
2Bay State Banner, "Rollins Attacks FHA While Weaver
Turns Back," December 7, 1967, p. 1.
31nterview with Samuel McCoy, August 5, 1969.
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people and help them participate. At this meeting
John Flynn, the local FHA director, promised future co-
operation with local developers. A letter to Weaver from
Mel King, the Director of the New Urban League, reemphasized
the need for community involvement, to be achieved through
training programs for skilled workers, potential developers
and contractors, bonding opportunities for local contrac-
tors, and development opportunities for local realtors
and community groups.5
The regional FHA director explained FHAt s failure to
involve local developers by saying that "it was considered
fundamentally necessary to avoid publicity in order to pre-
vent the escalation of prices for the buildings to be re-
habilitated. This required us to deal with developers se-
lected because of their experience in the field of rehabili-
tation and their control of the units necessary to accom-
plish our goal....n6
The end result of pressure from the community was a
call from the local FHA office to Samuel McCoy, inviting
a number of interested local people involved in housing
4Bay State Banner, "Rollins Attacks," December 7, 1967, p. 1.
5Correspondence from Mel King to Robert Weaver, undated.
6Correspondence from John Flynn to Daniel Richardson,
December 19, 167.
k6,
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to meet with FHA officials and representatives from
Eastern Gas and Fuel (McCoy explains his being chosen as
a community liason as being the result of a life-long
friendship with Robert Weaver). A number of real estate
people, as well as some developers and civil rights people
met and were told that 80-100 units could be committed
to a black developer. Sam McCoy, along with Tom Sanders
(a Celtic basketball player of prominence), Jack E. Robin-
son (a local black developer and real estate man) and
Lester Clemente (a black contractor) formed a group called
Sanders Associates to act as the developer of the rehab
project. The units in this package were owned by McCoy
and Robinson, who sought to maximize this opportunity by
forming another, and larger, group of developers.
Notices were sent out to people in the community in-
viting them to discuss the formation of a corporation
which would pool the "talents, properties, and abilities"
within the community toward the goal of improving the real
8
estate picture. Meetings were held each week at which
new members were sought and, sometime in January of 1968,
the decision was made to incorporate under the name of
State Enterprises Inc. 9
I1nterview with Samuel McCoy, August 5, 1969.
8 Progressive Report from the President, State Enterprises
Inc., July 24, 1968, p. 1 (mimeo).
9Interview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
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Philosophy of the Corporation.
The press statements relating to State Enterprises
consistently describe it as "a personal involvement
enterprise giving people from all walks of life a vehicle
for participating in various business ventures." As a
business entity State Enterprises would allow black people
an opportunity to "marshall their skills, abilities,
desires and hopes to achieve a higher standard of living."
An emphasis was placed on tie diversity of the membership,
the professional men and the blue-collar workers who,
together, were to provide the manpower needed to run
State Enterprises. In general the image that emerged
from the press was of a broadly-based community corpora-
tion which personally involved disparate types of people
in seeking solutions common to all of them.
The formal statement of State Enterprises' philosophy
reveals another, and more accurate, picture of the organi--
zation. However diversified the membership might be, the
business orientation of the founders of the corporation
is evidenced in a number of ways. Rather than emphasizing
the need for bringing black people into the mainstream of
American life, the stated philslophy asks how the black
10AnthonyYudis, "Hub Negroes Get Home Loan," The Boston
Globe, June 28, 1968.
11
Ibid.
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businessman can be brought into the mainstream.12  it
also notes Andrew Brimmer's evidence that disappearing
segregated markets are causing an attrition of Negro-
owned firms. This is especially pertinent since the
major force behind State Enterprises is that part of the
Roxbury community that represents the traditional black
businessman, many of whom have been operating fifteen
years and more. Due to the circumstances surrounding its
origin, the real estate interests are particularly well
represented; one member estimated that 90 percent of the
black realtors in the area are associated with State.1 3
The need, as stated in the philosophy, is less to
enter business than to enter it on a significant scale,
for "the tiny entrepreneurial manifestations of the pro-
prietors of the businesses struggling in the ghetto
could hardly be expected to motivate anyone. "l4 Although
a progress report states that "the creation of a large
multi-faceted corporation was the furthest thing from
the originators thinking, it very quickly became a
12Philosophy: State Enterprises Inc., p. iv (mimeo).
13Interview with George Daniels, August 7, 1969.
14Philosophy: State Enterprises Inc., p. iv (mimeo).
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15motivating vision for the members. State evidence a
tremendous diversity in the interests it pursued, touching
on most of the problems confronting the community as well
as more traditional business concerns. Within State
over a dozen and a half departments were set up to study
various problems and to suggest programs for State to
undertake--they included such concerns as research and
development, youth, sociology, security, human resources,
16industrial development, military, etc. State's broad
perspective was emphasized when after a few months opera-
tion, executives from State met with Alioune Kamara, an
17
official of a trade consortium in Africa. Kamara was
visiting the U.S. in an attempt to develop the inter-
national trade capacities of the Senagalese and explained
his reasons for meeting with State: "We are weak in our
country as you are in yours. The decision to negotiate
with State Enterprises rather than a larger American cor-
poration was quite logically made." The areas State plan-
ned to study included construction in Senegal, the tourist
15Progressive Report of the President, July 24, 1968 (mimeo).
16Fact Sheet: State Enterprises Inc. (mimeo).
17Bay State Banner, "State Enterprises Meets with
Senagalese Official," July 11, 1968, p. 2.
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trade, public relations and industrial development.
Thus not only did State attempt to foster broad
diversity in its membership, but it projected the image
of an innovative organization seeking to develop business
projects within a context of concern for social problems.
To clearly distinguish themselves from the many social
agencies in the community who were involving themselves in
business activities, the organization decided to forgo
funding from federal agencies as well as gifts from indi-
viduals and ir titutions. The reason given was "when the
governmental bubble bursts and the hundreds of giveaway
programs have been exhausted, the majority of groups,
individuals and businesses that have come this route will
be ill-prepared to compete on an economic basis." 1 It
was recognized that progress and growth might be slowed
by holding to such a decision, but it was felt that the
ultimate strength of State Enterprises would justify this
stand.
A final major focus which emerges from State's de-
scription of its goals is that of the role the middle class
must play in ghetto development. No longer must the
Negro middle class turn its back on the Negroes in the
18Progressive Report of the President, July 24, 1968
(mimeo).
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slum, but must help their "less fortunate brothers."
The pragmatic reason for doing so is indicated in a quote
from the Inter-racial Council for Business Opportunity
which notes "violent upheavals will be less likely to
occur in communities where the stabilizing influence of
a successful black business class exists." 19 The level
of financial well-being of the members of State Enter-
prises is reflected in the cost of their stock which
sold for $100 a share. While press statements held that
this could be paid in cash or services, all of the officers
of State who were interviewed denied that anything but
cash was accepted.
Organization of State Enterprises.
a) Membership: The goals of State proved attractive
enough to lead 280-300 residents to invest $100 each in
the venture. The membership of the corporation ranged
from teachers, attorneys and auditors to bartenders,
machinists, and beauticians; it encompassed more than 85
trades and professions.20 Almost every member interviewed
indicated that the vision of a large, viable black corpor-
ation able to make a significant impact on the community
was a factor that motivated them to join. As one member
1 9Philosophy: State Enterprises Inc. (mimeo).
20Fact Sheet: State Enterprises Inc., p. 7 (mimeo).
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and officer said, "I've been all over the country speaking
to groups about the need for business development in the
ghetto and I believed in it.n21 The same person also
suggested that State benefited from the success of Unity
Bank, a biracial bank opened six months earlier. The
value of Unity's stock almost doubled in that time and
residents who had failed to purchase stock did not want
to risk missing out again in by-passing State Enterprises.
A debate went on early in State's history as to whether a
large or a small membership should be sought, and arguments
in behalf of wide community involvement and the utilization
of many residents' skills tipped the decision in favor of
a large membership.22 The sale of stock was abruptly cut
off, however, when rumors began circulating that some
radical community groups were contemplating buying a
controlling share of the ownership.23 When elections were
held by the membership, Jack E. Robinson (one of the
founders of both State and Sanders Associates) was elected
president, Thomas Simmons was elected clerk and general
counsel, and Murphy Gregory, a realtor and businessman,
was elected treasurer.
2 1Interview with George Daniels, August 7, 1969.
2 2Interview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
231nterview with Pietrow Frierson, August 11, 1969.
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b) Programs: The format of State Enterprises
came to be conceived of as a "community conglomerate"
which would act as the parent organization to a number of
diverse ventures originally designated as departments,
but capable of becoming wholly-owned subsidiaries. The
major activities that State focussed on in its first
year included:
Real Estate Section
This consists of nineteen black real estate brokers
operating under the name of Roxbury Renewal, Inc.
As a wholly-owned subsidiary of State, this group
is acting as a developer in the rehabilitation
program established by FHA.
Contracting Section
Nine black contractors, under the name of Progressive
Construction Corp., doing the actual rehabilitation
work on the FHA project.
Business--Theatrical Section
A subsidiary of State, Roxbury Cinema Corp. purchased
an old theater, rennovated it and opened the city's
first black-owned movie theater.
Business--Retail Section
A Merit gas station is the first of a series of
retail developments in which State is involved.
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Industrial Development
A proposed machine shop, composed initially of
fifteen machinists, is under consideration.
Youth Section
State Enterprises Youth, composed of 16-21 year olds,
are proposing a record shop and a mod attire shop.24
Progress of State Enterprises.
The progress of the three operations that have
actually gotten off the ground--the rehab project, the
theater, and the gas station--will be discussed here in
greater detail.
A. Rehabilitation Project
Experience of State Enterprises: Since Roxbury
Renewal Inc. (headed by Jack Robinson also) developed out
of criticism of the lack of black developers in the BRP
program, it was natural that the first project it sought
was a piece of the rehabbing that was then going on. Nego-
tiations with FHA produced a commitment of funds for 134
units, far less than the 500 units that members of Roxbury
Renewal had hoped to get.25 All of State's members who
owned property were asked to submit it to FHA for inclusion
24Fact Sheet: State Enterprises (mimeo).
251nterview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
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but much of it was ineligible since FHA was considering
only brick buildings and much of the members' holdings
were in frame. The property that was finally acquired by
State has been described as "junk.26 While those inter-
viewed were in general reluctant to comment on this, most
argued that the property was not the best. One real estate
man now serving as trouble-shooter for the rehab project
felt that the program was used to "unload poor property."27
He went on to say "The problem wasn't that the other de-
velopers creamed off all the good stuff, because I'm getting
packages together now that are of better quality than
State's stuff."
Apparently State not only acquired poor property
but it is felt that it acquired it at premium prices. One
member stated "The other BRP developers bargained for and
got lower prices for their property while State sought the
highest acquisition price simply because the members it
bought it from stood to benefit.28 (Among the members
whose property was included were Jack Robinson, State's
26Anonymous comment by a member of State Enterprises.
27 Interview with William Weeks, August 15, 1969.
28 Interview with Royal Bolling, July 15, 1969.
president and Murphy Gregory, its treasurer.)2 9 When
questioned as to why FHA appraised the properties at more
than their worth, the answer was that State officials
felt that FHA could be expected to appraise the property
at the price established by the developer as long as it
was within the guidelines established for the program.30
While State was still restricted to coming in under
the $12,000 limit set by FHA, it jeopardized its own
financial standing by paying inflated acquisition costs
and being faced with high rehab costs as well. The uncer-
tainties and trouble inherent in rehabilitation favor
properties requiring a minimum of work, by acquiring poor
properties State Enterprises opened itself to a number of
financial and production difficulties. As the cost of
materials increased, as well as the cost of money, it be-
came more difficult for State to keep its head above water.
The cost of labor was also a problem for the operation.
The desire of and necessity for the black contractors to
hire a black labor force was apparent, but this often
meant that unskilled labor had to be used. This necessi-
tated the incorporation of informal training programs
2 9Interview with William Weeks, September 9, 1969.
30Interview with Royal Bolling, August 15, 1969.
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into the cost of labor. Some whit labor was employed
but the bulk of the workers were black and many learned
their skills on the job. The size of the job itself
proved a difficulty, for none of the black contractors
had ever attempted this big a job. The necessity of co-
ordinating half a dozen previously independent small
contractors into one large operation was itself a time-
consuming process.51 Even banding together the black con-
tractors were unable to get the necessary $1 million
bonding. Finally an arrangement was made with Poley-
Abrams, a large white contractor, who, as co-contractor,
assumed the responsibility for the successful completion
of the job. Poley-Abrams has assisted the black contract-
ing group in general administration and purchasing, and
inspects the work as it is completed.32
Insurance was another problem faced by State in the
rehab project. The difficulties of getting insurance were
overcome only by using the clout of the white firms involved
in the project who interceded in behalf of State. Vandalism
insurance proved impossible to get, and, given the nature of
scattered sites and the inability of policing all of them,
31 Interview with Pietrow Frierson, August 11, 1969.
32Ibid.
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vandalism costs have been high.
State's Relationship with Eastern Gas and Fuel:
Eastern Gas and Fuel, a Boston-headquartered holding group
with subsidiaries in a number of fuel-related activities
became involved in the BRP program at its inception. One
of the nation's largest producers and distributors of
energy, it has experienced significant growth in the last
six years under a policy directed at meeting "new realities"
in its "product market and consumer environments." 53 Much
of the company's growth has been attributed to its presi-
dent, Eli Goldston, who stressed the point that ultimate
financial success would depend on the company's antici-
pating and meeting human needs. It was this attitude
which led Eastern to involve itself in the rehabilitation
programs in Roxbury, particularly the BRP program. A sub-
stantial amount of working capital was needed beyond the
government mortgages, so Eastern, for $300,000, acquired
a limited partnership with one of the developers.3 By
doing this Eastern was able to specify gas heating, gas
water heating, gas clothes drying, as well as gas cooking
in the rehabbed units.35 All gas facilities in any given
33Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, Case Study by Harvard
Business School, prepared by Mahlon Apgar, IV, under the
direction of David L. Birch, p. 1
3 Ibid.
35Eli Goldston, The Businessman's Role in the Urban Crisis,
brochure published by Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates.
apartment building would be handled on one meter, the
bill being paid by the landlord. Eastern persuaded
the State Public Utilities Commission that the BRP pro-
ject was sufficiently like public housing to warrant
application of the low public housing gas rate, the first
non-government owned project to be eligible. This pro-
vided the greatest single additional gas load in Eastern's
history and an annual revenue of $400,000.36 In addition
a substantial depreciation shelter against corporate
income was also acquired, along with some cash flow derived
from rents.3
While all of this represented good business for
Eastern, the whole thing threatened to turn sour following
the community outcry with which the BRP program was faced.
One community leader held that Eastern Gas and its
partner-developer were acting as neo-colonial agents who
were ostensibly helping blacks while operating in such a
way as to continue to deprive the black community and keep
it powerless.3 As a result of this kind of criticism,
Eastern was as eager as FHA to assist a black developer
36Eastern Gas and Fuel, Case Study.
57 Ibid.
3 Correspondence from Mel King to Robert Weaver, undated.
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participate in the program. They found an opportunity to
do so when Sanders Associates was formed around an 80-
unit package. (This group, as noted earlier, consisted
of Tom Sanders, Sam McCoy, Jack Robinson and Lester
Clemente.) Eastern began assisting Sanders Associates
in their application for 221(d)3 funds by providing
legal and financial assistance. A call from Eastern to
the local FHA office about a rather perfunctory matter
resulted in a real surprise for Eastern, the existence of
a second black development group. This group, later known
as Roxbury Renewal (the subsidiary of State Enterprises),
included, among others, Robinson and McCoy. Apparently
the black developers decided to take advantage of the
opportunity opened to them by creating an even larger
rehab package (they were originally seeking 300-500 units).
FHA expressed the hope that both the Sanders and the State
Enterprises packages could be funded simultaneously to
make the total mortgage money look greater. This created
some pressure on Eastern, who wanted to make the Sanders
deal public as soon as possible, to begin facilitating
State's application for funds, and in this way State be-
came involved with Eastern. The problems of working with
State may have appeared to be relatively high due to its
having over 260 members who shared in the management of
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the company. If nothing more, the ease with which rumors
could spread in Roxbury made such an operation a little
risky. However, the benefits to Eastern included addi-
tional expansion of its gas market and other possible
financial benefits, as well as the positive publicity
reflecting Eastern's role in fostering low-income housing
and black entrepreneurial endeavors. There appeared to
be sufficient incentive for Eastern to involve itself
with State, and it began to assist the group, primarily
through its president Jack Robinson and lawyer, Tom Simmons.
No one in State had ever participated in anything as
large as the rehab project and they had to draw a great
deal on Eastern for legal and financial expertise. This
ranged from straight-forward counseling in FHA's legal
requirements for initial closing to more subtle matters,
such as tactics for getting FHA to waive working capital
requirements. State also drew on Eastern's power and
influence by requesting that Eastern intervene on its
behalf with the financial or governmental institutions.
The problems of obtaining insurance, for example, were
minimized when Eastern directly contacted relevant people
among insurance concerns. State also relied on Eastern
for help with its public relations program, and Eastern
engineered and paid for a major press conference announcing
State's rehab project.
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To encourage additianal outside investment in the
rehab program, Eastern devised a somewhat unusual equity
plan. Under it State would sell 80 percent of the equity
in the rehab project in the form of a limited partnership
which would run about eleven years and then be extinguished
with 90 percent of each partner's equity reverting back
to State.39 The benefit to the buyers of the equity
would be the use of a tax shelter against income that
would otherwise be taxed. State could not be expected
to initially have much use for a tax shelter, whereas it
could use the money derived from the sale of equity to
finance the rehab project. During the term of the partner-
ship all operating decisions would remain with the general
partner, or State Enterprises. Eastern agreed to buy 10
percent of the equity, given that State could find buyers
for the balance. Eastern helped State develop a prospectus
and then began beating the bushes for the names of poten-
tial investors. It was felt, both by Eastern and State
officials, that the plan had to be very carefully explained
to State's members to avoid the accusation that State was
selling out its control to white investors. It was at
this time that some problems began to develop between
Eastern and State.
59Memo from State Enterprises on "Limited Partnership
Interests in Low-Income Housing Project."
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From the time of its inception, State had been in-
sinuating itself more and more deeply into a relationship
with Eastern, one that was costing Eastern a substantial
amount of time and effort. State officials, however, made
little attempt to develop their own resources independent
of Eastern, being content to make use of Eastern's greater
experience and resources. State was continuing to be
staffed by volunteer part-time officers who were attempting
to manage State's business as well as their own private
work. The degree to which State was consciously trying to
manipulate Eastern and its resources is unclear, but the
situation was such that Eastern could not help but be
frustrated by State's operations.
Part of the difficulty lay in the hybrid business/
social work nature of the relationship between State and
Eastern. Despite the underlying business rationale in
bringing State along, the voluntary and informal nature
of Eastern's efforts carried a spirit of benevolence.
When Eastern reasserted the business nature of their
arrangement by offering State a significantly lower gas
piping allowance than had been given the white developers
(in recognition of the extensive aid already received by
them), officials at State were not entirely happy with the
arrangement.
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Rumors began to drift through the black and white
business communities that State was in some financial
trouble, and anything that involved State and its rehab
project now involved Eastern. At this time Eastern began
to see how State had managed to box it in. By making a
corporate investment in State's operation, Eastern had
become publicly identified with it and stood to suffer
if State ran into trouble. Further, having served to
introduce potential investors to State, Eastern officials
had obligated themselves, both corporately and personally,
to see to State's well-being. However, only a fraction of
State's internal managerial and financial affairs had been
open to Eastern's staff and to insist on either disclosure
or control would be to create a monumental racial gaffe.
This led to a change in the role that Eastemplayed
in State's operations; it provided less direct services to
State and instead focussed on helping State develop a
more business-like operation. Under Eastern's direction,
State began to develop a more adequate accounting system
and began to turn to other outside rescurces for assistance,
thus relieving Eastern of the entire responsibility. In
this way it was hoped that there would be less identifica-
tion between Eastern and State and that the resultant
organization would be a more viable business.
-Th
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Eastern's interest in State no doubt extended beyond
the limits of the current rehab project. Officials at
Eastern were very much aware of the Model Cities program
and the business potential it offered. They were also
aware that increased demands for black control within
such a program made it difficult for white firms to
directly utilize this potential market. By helping State
Enterprises to develop, Eastern could better guarantee
that State became an important vehicle in future large-
scale rehab projects and that Eastern had a receptive
partner in the ghetto.
Current State of the Rehab Project.
The project is running behind schedule, and completion,
which was to have occurred sometime in August of this
year, is now expected to carry into the winter. Some
of the units are already completed and ready for occupancy
but State's delay in paying the gas bills accrued during
the construction period has resulted in the gas company's
refusal to provide utilities until the money is forth-
coming. (State expects the delay to be a short one.)
40Interview with James Loving, September 12, 1969.
41Ibid.
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The cost of rehab has been much higher than originally
estimated and State has applied for a mortgage increase,
along with many of the other BRP developers, and it is
hopeful of getting it.
Theater Project.
The second most notable activity which State is en-
gaged in is around the development of a movie theater in
the Roxbury area, something which the community completely
lacked. State, working through its subsidiary, Roxbury
Cinema Inc., took over a building that had been housing
a furniture store (but which had once been a theater) and
began rennovations on it. This received a fair amount
of publicity, not only because it was the first black-
owned movie theater in New England, but because "200 resi-
dents of the community donated a few hours of their time to
clear the theater of debris so that rennovation could
begin." 42 The volunteers, ranging from "real estate agents
and lawyers to carpenters, bricklayers, accountants and a
Harvard freshman," saved the company over $2000 by doing
the demolition. 4 A Department of Health employee, William
Vickers, who volunteered as a projectionist evenings and
42The Boston Globe, "State Enterprises Gets Cinema Loan,"
July 18, 1968.
4 3Janet Riddell, "100 Men Give up Weekends to Theatre,"
The Boston Globe, (undated).
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week-ends, explaining "1I went to projectionist school
in the army and used to run their equipment."44
The financing for the theater ($170,000) was provided
by the John Hancock Insurance Company and an arrangement
was made with the Esquire Theater chain for it to serve as
film broker and source of technical advice.4 5 The opening
of the theater was postponed from an expected date in
November, 1968 until the early part of 1969. The source
of the delay was in the rehabilitation of the theater,
undertaken by a white contractor from the Braintree area.
Working without plans or specifications, the contractor
ran into numerous problems, and some members of State feel
the resulting work was poor. When questioned as to why a
white developer had been chosen, the current president of
State held that it was done at the suggestion of the John
Hancock Company in that the contractor was experienced in
theater rehabilitation. 6 Two other members, however,
stated that the contractor was involved in other private
enterprises of Jack Robinson and that this accounted for
the choice.47
44
Ibid.
45Dick Mattulina, "Negro-owned Cinema to Open Soon in
Roxbury," Quincy Patriot Ledger, August 16, 1968.
4 6 Interview with Pietrow Frierson, August 11, 1964.
47Interview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
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Up to July of this year, the theater was only break-
ing even; this was attributed by State's accountant, James
Loving, to poor management.4 8 Now that a new manager -
has been installed, on a part-time paid basis, the theater
is just beginning to return a profit. Earlier discussions
as to the feasibility of following a movie-plus-live
entertainment format has been temporarily suspended until
the theater is better established. At present the policy
remains of emphasizing movies with an ethnic slant.
Gas Station.
The third operation State is involved in is a Merit
gas station located in the middle of Roxbury. Based on a
leasing operation, State purchased the site of the gas
station which was then3eased to the Merit Company. 9 The
entire operations--hiring, payroll, operation, etc.--is in
the hands of Merit and all State does is collect the
rental and pay the mortgage. The John Hancock Company
also provided the financing for this operation, although
Merit took back a second mortgage. Because the rental
value of the site is greater than the mortgage payments,
it is impossible for State to lose money on the operation.
48 Interview with James Loving, September 12, 1969.
4 9Ibid.
146.
Additional Projects.
The three projects discussed above are the only ones
to actually get off the ground. For a variety of reasons,
none of the other developments proposed by State have
materialized. The youth group began to fall apart when no
one within State provided the leadership or direction the
younger members required.50' 51 Left on their own, they lost
incentive, and when some members left to go to college the
group fell by the wayside. No one in State expressed much
hope that the youth group would be revitalized and begin
one of the businesses they had planned.
Another venture that fell through was that of a
machine shop which State at one time had talked of acquir-
ing. Although it employed little more than a dozen workers,
Jack Robinson was in favor of buying it because then State
could be said to be involved in industrial development and
gain prestige in this way.52 State also attempted to
develop a drugstore, one that would remain open in the
evenings, unlike the drugstores presently in Roxbury.53
50Ibid.
51Interview with Pietrow Frierson, August 11, 1969.
52Interview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
53Interview with William Weeks, August 15, 1969.
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However, a search for a black druggist willing to enter
business in Roxbury met with no success, despite offers
by State to pay most of the costs of establishing such
a business. Other ventures, such as an electronics firm
and a management firm were even more still-born. One thing
that has impeded State's continued expansion is that the
221(d)3 rehab project has been absorbing a great deal of
the time and resources of State, and delay in completion
of the units has held up the flow of rents which State
had been anticipating. State's accountant also maintains
that one main impediment to State's further growth is the
lack of a good marketable idea that it could develop,54
rather than financial limitations, for he feels investment
capital is generally available. The curtailment of
State's original business goals, however, is not the only
way that the organization has changed; perhaps more notably
it has altered the role that is to be played by the member-
ship body.
Internal Dynamics of State.
The most notable aspect of State Enterprises from its
inception was its large and diversified body of stockholders--
probably larger and more varied than the membership of
many "representative" community action groups. As noted
54Interview with James Loving, September 12, 1969.
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earlier, the vision of an organization which personally
involved and utilized the skills of so many community
people was a genuine inducement for many people to become
stockholders. In addition it apparently was a selling
point with outside financial and governmental institutions
as well. Control was to be exercised by the membership
through the extensive system of departments, the large
board of directors and by frequent meetings of the officers
with the general membership. After a year's operation the
discontentment and alienation of many members was evidence
that the original spirit of State Enterprises had not been
sustained.
Two major factors were critical in the abandonment of
the "wide-involvement" policy--the casual internal struc-
ture of State and the rather charismatic nature of its
president. Lines of authority and allocation of responsi-
bility were never explicitly laid out and the departmental
structure was frequently overlooked. The accounting and
reporting procedures were haphazard enough to prevent the
average stockholder from gaining a good understanding of
what was happening within State. The current president
of State has found a growing apathy among the stockholders
caused in part by their lack of involvement in the crucial
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decision-making of State.55 The frequency of stockholders
meetings began to drop from one, on the average, every two
weeks to one every three or four months.56
The structural problems might have resulted in an
aimless, slow-moving organization had it not been for its
president, Jack E. Robinson. He is clearly the most con-
troversial aspect of State, with members viewing him as
either a devil or the shining light of the organization.
All agree, however, that Robinson ran the show, and was
a persuasive speaker and leader. In addition, he was per
sonally successful in business (references, of uncertain
origins, to his having made a million dollars kept cropping
up) and many stockholders placed a great deal of faith in
him. As one member said, "The stockholders were comfortable
because Jack could always bring the ship home."57 Robinson
also displayed both initiative and energy and appeared
willing to put in the time necessary to get State off the
ground. (Since the officers of State received no pay,
they were dependent on outside jobs or income for support.)
His style was that of a "real gambler, willing to take
5 51nterview with Pietrow Frierson, August 11, 1969.
56 Interview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
57Interview with William Weeks, August 15, 196?.
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chances, " an approach defended by one member as appropriate
given the difficulties facing minority business.58 This
same person felt, on the other hand, that the unbusiness-
like approach that Robinson used made State vulnerable in
that "if anything went sour we had to remember we weren't
dealing in candy stores anymore." Many major decisions
were taken before the body and seriously debated there,
but equally important decisions were made by individuals
without consultation with any other parts of the organiza-
tion.59
A small clique began to develop around Robinson, and
it has been charged that Robinson began filling vacant
60
committee chairmanships with his own people. As Robinson
began to develop more power, more people gravitated to him
in the hopes that their particular interests could be
served. Apparently they were not mistaken. In the report
of a management consultant group called in to assist State
is the statement "There is evidence that there has already
been conflict of interest problems and also conflict between
contending groups." The report goes on the state "This is
58 Ibid.
5 9 Interview with George Daniels, August 7, 1969.
6Interview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
61Report on Survey of Organization, Policies, and Develop--
ment: State Enterprises , by Rath and Strong Inc., Dec. 1968.
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permissible when the parties all know that everyone has
their own primary business interest outside of State and
that the funds involved are largely supplied by the com-
munity. Such a situation is intolerable and fraught with
danger when some become full-time managers (without selling
in their conflicting outside interests) and substantial
public funds are invested." While the first situation
may be more legal than the second, it is unclear in what
sense it is more permissible. To some members of State
it was unacceptable that anyone should agree to represent
the interests of an organization and then use his position
with it to further his own personal interests. While some
people were reluctant to talk about the matter, it was
possible to unearth some information on the problem. The
process of assembling the rehab package was one instance
of conflict in that the head of both State and Roxbury Re-
newal--Jack Robinson--was a major property holder of the
units finally chosen for acquisition. (The current presi-
dent said he would have avoided such a conflict-of-interest
problem by setting up a straw between Robinson and State).62
A similar situation existed around the theater project in
that State was developing (under Robinson) a movie theater
62Interview with Pietrow Frierson, August 11, 1969.
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at the same time that Robinson was planning to open his
own, potentially competing, theater. Further, the con-
tract for the rennovation work on State's theater went
out without any competing bids to a white contractor
who, one member states, is also linked to the development
of the second, privately-owned theater.63 Many of the of-
ficers or board members of State are themselves unaware of
the extent of such problems since adequate documentation
of State's dealings has been lacking.64 During the first
year, a move was made to raise more capital by selling
common stock on the public market. To do so required a
vote by a two-thirds quorum, either in person or by proxy
on the question of establishing a preferred class of stock.
Such a quorum was not achieved so plans to go public had
to be postponed. This was satisfactory to a growing number
of dissidents within State who desired to overhaul the
structure of the corporation and set up checks and balances
on the exercise of power before an additional flow of money
was pumped into the organization. This attitude was sup-
ported in the report by Roth and Strong, the management
63Interview with Royal Bolling, July 7, 1969.
64A long period of transition between the presidencies of
Robinson and Frierson was required since no adequate
accounting, reporting, etc. systems had been developed
which would present the incoming officers with a clear
picture of State's operations.
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consultants:
We feel so strongly on this last point (the
dangers of conflicts of interest) that if the pro-
posed plan (or a reasonable alternative dealing with
these issues) cannot be.adopted, we recommend that
State change its charter to an association and not
raise public funds. Should the board decide not
to implement the plan, yet proceed with full-time
officers and funding, we would wish to be excluded
from further consultation. 65
It is evident that the major source of pressure for
greater dispersal of power came not from the general mem-
bership of State, but from those who were very near the
seat of power but felt excluded from its benefits. In
short, it was based less on egalitarian sentiments than
on a desire for a piece of the action. One member who
saw himself as outside both the primary and secondary
levels of power held that the older established business-
men were unwilling to move over and give someone new a
chance. 66 The opportunities being created through State
were being snapped up by the businessmen in control so
that the opportunity for new entrepreneurs to develop was
slight.
A further level of conflict of interest was evident
in the relations of State to the general black community.
Little concern was evidenced within State for the needs
65Survey on Survey of Organization, December 1968, p. 2.
66Interview with George Daniels, August 7, 1969.
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of the community, and at times worked counter to such
needs. Since they began out of pressures for black self-
determination, it is interesting to see where this policy
led in thelands of State. The criticism that has plagued
the white BRP developers as to their relocation policies,
their hiring practices and their workmanship and financial
dealings has meant that a significantly better rehab project
could have emerged at the hands of a concerned developer.
Although State's package is not yet complete, it is evi-
dent that, in general, it produced much the same product
as the white developers. Despite calls for black involve-
ment on the part of the community such involvement was
almost inevitably an object of hostility once it occurred.
As Sadelle Sacks of Fair Housing charged, the use of black
developers was an attempt to buy off the community and con-
stituted a bail-out for the rest of the BRP program.67
(While this is true, it is also a manifestation of the
power of the community to demand conciliatory measures.)
Those concerned about the tenants of the area, however,
soon had particular reason to be unhappy with State.
Regular meetings between tenants' grours and the BRP
developers were held, but the black developers consistently
67Notes from the Tenants Review Panel, May 7, 1968.
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failed to appear despite repeated requests to do so.
Tenants in one of Robinson's buildings complained that,
in the middle of winter, they were being left without heat
and water.68  While the white developers had to proceed
very gingerly, or at least cagily, in their dealings with
the community, the black developers felt less need to
evidence concern or good will. The tenants did not spare
State in their criticism, an outcome that provided both
satisfaction and amusement to the white "neo-colonial"
developers. While the black developers were certainly no
worse than the white developers, they were clearly little
better. The desire of some members of State to receive in-
flated prices for their property is ultimately reflected
in the mortgage price, hence the rents paid by tenants,
(especially if their recent request for a mortgage increase
is granted). Thus State, in order to avoid absorbing in-
creased rehab costs, has chosen to make future tenants
carry the cost of a questionable business decision. The
whole operation of State Enterprises has demonstrated, if
nothing else, the diversity of interests that lie within
the black community, even within such a defined sector as
"traditional business interests." What is real cause for
pessimism, however, is the almost insuperable difficulty
6 8Notes from the Tenants Review Panel, December 12, 1968.
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of establishing sufficient common ground to allow for
the consolidation of efforts by such a group.
This issue was most explicitly laid out in the meeting
of the Board of Directors when Jack Robinson resigned
from the presidency of State. This occurred in February
of 1969, and followed both the initial failure of State to
go public and the acceptance by the corporation of the
recommendations by Rath and Strong as to State's organiza-
tion and policies. Apparently Robinson felt that the op-
portunities at State were at a temporary dead-end and he
announced his desire to resign. He was quite clear about
his reasons for leaving; he wanted a greater return on his
time and energy than he was likely to get at State. With
the new organizational structure, Robinson felt his freedom
of action had been too severely constrained and he had to
balance the value of remaining at State aginst that of
developing his own private concerns and ". . .invariably
operating as a one man company, making my own decisions,
without having anyone else to answer to, my company could
move far more swiftly and rapidly than State can move." 69
The recent restrictions within State on conflict of interest
activities reduced Robinson's ability to simultaneously
serve both State and his own company. Robinson's argument
69Transcript of Proceedings of a Directors' Meeting of
State Enterprises, February 6, 1969, p. 31 (Xerox).
r157.
was that no one can be asked to abandon his own interests
in behalf of the interests of a collectivity like State
without just compensation. By this Robinson was not
talking simply about a salaried position as president, but
a substantial stock option plan. The membership of State
would not, in Robinson's eyes, ever be willing to function
in a manner where either large salaries or tremendous
amounts of ownership accrued to its executives. Royal
Bolling, who termed himself head of the loyal opposition,
concurred that a corporation where 35-40 percent of the
company assets were held by one man, and most of the de-
cisions were made by the same man (while the rest of the
members sat back and clipped coupons) was a complete per-
version of State's original intent.70 However, the majority
of the board (Bolling included) urged Robinson to remain
as head of State, for he still appeared to be the most
capable man available, especially now that his excesses
could be curtailed through State's reorganization. Robin-
son refused to reconsider and a new president was elected.
The refusal of Robinson to subvert his personal advan-
tage to that of the group's was a position held (though
less explicitly) by most of the leaders of State. Every
70Ibid., p. 17.
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major figure at State who was interviewed revealed private
deals he was promoting outside of State rather than
through it. This was also noted in the Rath and Strong
report, "The business leaders in State would prefer the
security of their own small business rather than gamble
with others on a bigger, more significant operation."71
It is questionable, however, whether it is the risk involved
that reduces attempts at cooperative action; more likely
it is the desire to maintain the independence of action
that brought these individuals into business for themselves
in the first place. At worst, it also represents a certain
degree of distrust that exists between many of the business-
men. Given this reluctance to join together, why was
State Enterprises ever begun? One guess that can be put
forth is that the founders, from the beginning, were using
State in a manipulative fashion. It provided a source of
initial capital and a mechanism for attracting additional
financial and mangerial resources, and as long as the
leaders were reasonably assured they could control these
resources they stayed with State. When free control was
curtailed, they dropped it.
In the six months following Robinson's leaving office,
the organization has been in a state of temporization--
7 lReport on Survey of Organization, December 1968, p. 15.
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seeking to consolidate its existing operations rather than
enter new projects. The current president of State,
Pietrow Frierson, has been described by a number of mem-
bers as an undynamic leader who does not move the organi-
zation along as Robinson previously did. Frierson, with
a background in personnel work, does not have the business
experience of many of the other leaders of State, and may,
in fact, have been chosen because he appeared less threat-
ening. While Frierson is concerned about restoring State's
image as a business run for and by the community, the pros-
pect of doing this appears slim.72 Without a dynamic
leader who will energetically work toward this end it is
most likely that State will continue to perform in the
manner established in its first year and a half of operations.
72 Interview with Pietrow Frierson, August 11, 1969.
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CHAPTER VI
Freedom Industries, Inc.
Both State Enterprises and EGandG Roxbury represent
attempts to incorporate "social" goals--reduced unemploy-
ment among blacks, use of under-utilized ghetto talents, etc.
--into fairly tradiional business operations which retain
a dominant goal, however modified, of increasing profits.
The head of Freedom Industries, Archie Williams, holds that
his company exists only to serve socially-useful ends and
that the business operation, in andof itself, is incidental
to this goal. For this reason, one newspaper account has
reported: "Freedom Industries is already being called by
most of those who have seen it one of the most intriguingly
innovative companies in the United States that is owned
and operated by black people."1
Archie Williams attended Brown University and later
Boston University Law School.2 Since 1957 he has resided
in Boston and has been engaged in legal work, primarily
related to the fields of labor and civil rights, and has
1Thomas Oliphant, "Freedom Industries, Innovation Makes
It Go," The Boston Globe, June 15, 1969.
2Freedom Industries represents primarily the efforts and
thinking of its president, Archie Williams, and he is the
source of a great deal of the information contained here.
To avoid the necessity of frequent, repetitious footnotes
giving interviews with Williams as a source, it can be
presumed that unless otherwise noted in either a footnote
or the text, Williams has been the direct source of infor-
mation. The interviews took place during August, 1969.
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also worked in, and in support of, many community groups.
He found he was frequently called upon to advise people
on business issues, advice that might be followed or
ignored. Suddenly Williams realized that instead of ad-
vising others he should attempt to carry out his own ideas
if he believed in them. It was not an interest in business
per se that motivated him, but rather constraints he was
confronting in his work in the community. At that time
Williams was serving as director of NECDC (New England
Community Development Corporation) in Roxbury and, as he
said, "I thought that civil rights activity was going to
be significant, but the limitations were soon evident."
For example, he was opposed to the whole structure of the
poverty program because he felt it fostered in the long
run the dependency of the black community on government.
When programs like EGandG's and AVCO's industrial develop-
ment projects came along, he objected because he thought
the money should come directly to blacks for their own
businesses. Increasingly he felt the community needed
ventures which would be self-sustaining and reduce reliance
on governmental and foundation aid, which helped meet the
short-range needs of black people but diminished the pos-
sibility of ultimate independence by blacks.
Williams gave some indication of what he meant by
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independence when he explained that he felt some form
of segregation had to precede any long-range goal of
integration and that the focus of activity in black com-
munities should be on increasing the political strength,
the unity, and the favorable self-image of blacks. One
of the few strategies that appeared capable of fostering
these goals and being self-sustaining appeared to be
business development. Williams never perceived that a
business, as such, could be isolated in the ghetto. "I
don't have any delusions about operating in a vacuum separate
from the rest of the economy," he said.3 "We want to be
able to cooperate and have an impact on its (society's)
economic structure." What he did envision was a creation
of a corporate structure that would be "a single unit of
power--in influence, money, and talent.t  He has used the
term "money machine" in reference to Freedom Industries,
and this best explains his perception of the role he expects it
to play in the community. Freedom Industries is expected
to operate and produce profit for use by the community in
much the same way an organization like Exodus might work
to produce an educational service that is open to the community.
3Nancy C. Anderson, "A New Power in Roxbury; the Ghetto
Means Money," The Harvard Crimson, February 24, 1969, p. 3.
4 Ibid.
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Early Development of Freedom Industries.
Almost completely lacking in actual business experi-
ence, Williams nonetheless left NECDC to begin developing
a business organization. He started by looking at ghetto
enterprises in nearby cities and similar quasi-sheltered
economic ventures in an attempt to set forth his own
schemes for development. He began to establish contacts
with sources of business assistance and counseling ("I
surrounded myself with experts") to supplement his own
meager skills. A major source of help came out the Busi-
ness Assistance Program (BAP) at the Harvard Business
School, a project run pretty much by graduate business
students. One of the students who has worked closely with
Freedom Industries since its inception says that Williams
caused something of a stir in his initial contacts with the
Business School.5 Not only did his militantly black talk
disconcert people, but his proposed schemes were seen as
being wildly ambitious and unrealistic. As Williams put
it, "They must have thought I was a fool." The concept
he put forth was described as that of "a multi-functional,
multi-urban, socially-oriented, black conglomerate." 6 The
51nterview with Peter Siris, June 3, 1969.
6Memorandwm from Peter Siris to the members of Freedom
Industries Advisory Boards, August 30, 1968 (mimeo).
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staff of BAP began setting up a series of planning teams
to assist Williams structure a corporate strategy that
would encompass his long-range objectives and his short-
term operational goals. Williams proposed to obtain as-
sistance from white businessmen, either in the form of
contracts as an independent supplier, or in the form of
financial and technical assistance. Whatever arrangements
were sought, Williams insisted on retaining complete owner--
ship of his business.
Williams' early brushes with white corporations led
to a repetition of the initial response which greeted him
at the Business School--his lack of staff, lack of business
experience and lack of clear ideas about the industries he
wanted to develop made him look too risky to the white
businessmen he met.8  He decided to focus on the elec-
tronics and food industries, and began another round of
negotiations with the heads of white corporations. This
and subsequent experiences with white financial powers has
left Williams quite cynical about their claims of concern
about the urban crisis, and the importance of the role
they can play. Terming their efforts "phoney support"
7Peter Siris, "Background Notes on Archie Williams," July
25, 1968 (mimeo).
8Memorandum from Peter Siris to Members of Freedom Industries
Advisory Board, August 30, 1968 (mimeo).
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he feels they have got to develop unique and riskier
approaches. In speaking of black entrepreneurs, Williams
says:
They (bankers) also say we have no experience in
the field of business. To me, this is an evasion
of the central issue. After all, if we had
equity money, experience, and all the other
"bankable" qualities, there would be no urban
crisis. 9
The contacts with white businessmen produced other
changes in Williams as a member of BAP records:
At the beginning of the year he (Williams) was a
bright, attractive, and articulate militant who was
given to broad generalities. By April he had
learned to talk with businessmen on their own
terms; with proforma profit projections, cash flow
estimates, and detailed manpower training programs.
He discussed black militancy, in a business context,
as the way to solve the problems of the ghetto;
and he provided an image of what white business-
men most wanted to see---a handsome Ivy League
Lawyer, involved in business, who just happened to
be black. 10
Progress of Freedom Industries.
In the spring of 1968 Williams made contact with an
unidentified private individual who provided most of the
seed money for Freedom Industries. The individual bought
$15,000 in stock to which Williams added an additional
$5,000. In June of 1968, Freedom Industries was incorporated
9Thomas Oliphant, "Freedom Industries," Boston Globe,
June 15, 1969.
10Peter Siris, "Background Notes on Archie Williams,"
July 25, 1968 (mimeo).
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and, at the same time, Freedom Foundation was established.
The unidentified individual turned over his portion of
the stock to the Foundation, so that 75 percent of it is
now under the ownership of the Foundation. The expecta-
tion is that the Foundation, through dividends or sale of
the stock, can begin developing an investment portfolio.
The resources from this are to be used to support social
services such as job-training centers, a scholarship fund
and day-care centers. The reason for setting up a separate
foundation is that Williams thinks "a company's effort in
the field of social problems, while immense, should be
divorced from its commercial activities." (The whole
role of the Foundation will be discussed in greater detail
later in this dudy.) Now that the parent company had been
established, Williams was ready to actually turn to the
development of a subsidiary.
Freedom Electronics.
The first breakthrough came after Williams had spent
many hours walking through Route 128 firms, talking to as
many people as possible. Finally he contacted the Digital
Equipment Corporation (DEC) who needed a local producer
and who were willing to contract with Freedom Industries
to do this work on an experimental basis--if the work
11Thomas Oliphant, "Freedom Industries."
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proved satisfactory the contract would be expanded.
Williams said this proved to be a common occurrence with
Freedom Industries in that "it could gain entrance into
a field because it was black but could stay only if it
produced quality work." On the basis of a few initial
commitments the first subsidiary, Freedom Electronics
and Engineering, was set up in August of 1968. To do
this Freedom Industries borrowed $35,000 from the Economic
Development Administration under the Department of Commerce. 1 2
Because Freedom Industries could not afford to train the
necessary skilled labor, arrangements were made with Rox-
bury's 0.I.C. (Opportunities Industrialization Center) and
M.I.T.'s Lincoln Lab to take over part of the training
load. Lincoln Lab did this by taking about one-third of
the starting work force into its own payroll and paying
the salaries of the workers while they learned skills on
the job. Even so, about one-third of the workers came
into Freedom Electronics without any requisite skills--
these people worked on less demanding tasks until they too
had acquired greater proficiency. At present every person
in the shop is capable of doing most of the jobs required
by any contract. While training was still going on in
the plant, it was possible to offset accompanying costs
12Nancy Anderson, "A New Power in Roxbury."
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by using either a cost-plus or a time-plus materials form
of contract. Under the latter, the time cards of the
workers were sent directly to the contractor. In this
way the costs of the lower output by unskilled workers
was passed on to the contracting firms.
When questioned as to the "hard core" nature of the
workers, Williams responded that the critical variable
was not a person's educational or skill level, or even
his work history, but rather his current willingness to
work. Given this, only the most severe mental limitations
could impede a man's success at his job in the plant. It
follows from this that motivation plays a key role in the
production capabilities of the work force, and Williams
holds that the workers are very satisfied. Of the forty
hired, only four have left, one due to pregnancy, one
entering college, one who began working in a civil rights
organization and one who felt the work at Freedom Elec-
tronics could not make use of her advanced level of skills.
The last worker has since returned since more skilled work
is now available.1 3
13It is interesting to contrast here the experiences of
EGandG Roxbury and Freedom Electronics. The executives
at EGandG, Inc. had originally ruled out the development
of an electronics plant, in part because it was thought
to require too high a level of skills, and instead went
into a non-growth industry which presented future problems
in growth. Two months after the start of both plants,
Freedom Electronics was in full production while ERI was
still training its workers.
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By October of 1968, Williams felt the plant had
already begun to be competitive on the basis of the
quality of its work. Over 91 percent of the production
that passes Freedom Electronics' quality control is ac-
cepted by the contractors, and no work has been late in
completion. By displaying the ability to perform, Freedom
Electronics has received additional contracts from Digital
Equipment, RCA, Western Electric, and Shintron Co.,
grossing over $800,000 in sales in five months. The work
has included making computer power supplies, and assembling
coaxial cables and plastic circuit boards.l4
Contracts, however, are still not easy to come by,
especially as the firm has no sales force. If Freedom
Electronics were willing to go into defense work, contracts
would probably abound but, as Williams says, "We try
like the dickens to avoid war stuff, even though it is
tempting." His reasons for doing so include: one, his
belief that business, especially his kind, shouldn't be
engaged in such work, and two, he doesn't want a high degree
of government contracts because of the dependency this
would create. Other smaller firms face this same problem,
and the solution Williams finds attractive is that employed
14Nancy Anderson, "A New Power in Roxbury."
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by Digital Equipment. This firm has set a level of
government work that it will accept and will pass over
contracts that would result in a greater percentage of
government business. Only a firm the size of Raytheon,
holds Williams, can engage in as much government work as
it wants without becoming dependent. The fields that
Freedom Electronics would like to enter deal with such
concerns as water and air pollution.
Freedom Foods.
The second major division Freedom Industries developed
was in the retail food business, and was run under a
second subsidiary, Freedom Foods. Williams was motivated
to enter this field because he wanted to provide some
necessity required by the residents and because Freedom
Industries needed an operation that was extremely visible.
A chain of supermarkets would meet these criteria, despite
the fact that it was a rough business with a very low
margin of profit. Freedom Industries began negotiations
with the Stop and Shop chain over the acquisition of a
store they owned which did a large volume of business and
enjoyed a good location, but the two companies could not
come to an agreement. At this point one of Williams
advisory board members (who was also on the board of
Purity-Supreme, another grocery chain) advised him to talk
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to the Purity-Supreme people. The chain had several
stores in the Roxbury-North Dorchester area, but they were
doing poorly and the chain had begun to concentrate on
suburban development. Because Purity-Supreme had just
been acquired by yet another food chain, a re-evaluation
of the business was taking place in any case. One of the
stores Freedom Industries was interested in had deterior-
ated to the point where a costly rennovation was required,
and the new chain was frightened of making a substaitial
investment in a ghetto store--especially in light of the
visibility it enjoyed. The result was that Purity-Supreme
was interested in divesting itself of two stores, so that
Freedom Industries was offered two 21,000 square-foot
supermarkets, at a cost of about one million dollars. 15
The new subsidiary, Freedom Foods, received a mortgage
commitment from John Hancock Life Insurance, of which
Williams and Purity-Supreme took back $500,000 in mort-
gages. Enancing was provided by the Episcopal Church.
At the time of sale the stores were grossing about $4 mil-
lion a year, which was poor in view of their potential.
Both stores required extensive remodeling, the worst one
needing about $100,000 for new lighting, a new ceiling,
freezer cases, etc.
15Thomas Oliphant, "Freedom Industries."
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An arrangement was made by which Freedom Foods pur-
chased administrative services at cost from Purity-Supreme,
to assist in training, management and buying. The con-
tract is open-ended and can be terminated whenever Freedom
Foods wishes, though Williams says "If I were Purity-
Supreme I'd have insisted that we use their help for the
entire period for which they hold the mortgage." The
agreement was also made that Purity-Supreme would absorb
any employees who wished to transfer out of the stores
that Freedom Foods had bought. About half of the workers
indicated that they didn't want to enter the employ of
Freedom Foods for a variety of reasons. Those who had
been with Purity-Supreme a long time wanted the security
of working within an established business and since Freedom
Foods had little experience in the business, the risk was
greater with them. Also, the size of Purity-Supreme's
operation offered more potential than the two stores of
Freedom Foods. The white employees were apprehensive of
their future under black ownership and even some black
workers welcomed the chance to work outside the ghetto.
To minimize these pressures, Purity-Supreme agreed to
transfer, within six months of the sale, any worker who
remained at Freedom Foods and later decided to rejoin
Purity-Supreme.
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Even with 30-40 people who were new to the operation,
Freedom Foods expected few training problems because of
the low level of skills required. They found, however,
that even stocking shelves is a complex process and the
labor costs of Freedom Foods began to mount as a result
of low productivity. Since the profit margin in food
stores is only about 1-2 percent of sales, high labor costs
(over 9 percent of sales) can wipe out the profit margin;
and during the training period labor costs reached 15 per-
cent and higher. This existence of untrained workers also
resulted in service in the store being poorer than it
should have been, and many new shoppers at Freedom Foods
quickly stopped returning. The initial boost in sales
that it experienced upon opening soon leveled out and the
hard job of building it up to a higher, stable level is
going on. At present the stores are averaging $90-100,000
a week in sales, as compared to $65,000 under Purity-Supreme;
it is expected that by late spring of 1970 the intake
will stabilize around $120,000 a week.
Another problem felt by Freedom Foods was that the
operation was subject to enormous rumors. Although Freedom
Foods had its own line of labels on their goods, people
were very aware of the Purity-Supreme trucks backed up
to the store. This naturally precipitated the story that
Th
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Freedom Foods was simply fronting for a white operation
and it became the object of hostility, even more than
would have been directed at a frankly white-owned store.
Rumors were not limited simply to the black community.
Williams once got a call from the John Hancock Company,
the mortgager on the stores, to ask about a story passing
through the white financial community to the effect that
Hancock was trying to undermine Freedom Foods. Although
Hancock didn't feel it was out to wreck the business,
they weren't sure if Williams felt the same, until he re-
assured them. In general Freedom Industries began to
develop a negative halo effect within the community--
a problem that will be expanded on later in this study.
These problems brought home to Freedom Industries the
awareness that one cannot anticipate acceptance by the
community, but rather that one must earn it.
Graphics 34.
As a design and advertising division, Graphics 34
serves primarily the in-house needs of Freedom Industries,
although they hold some outside accounts as well. The
art director is a woman who left the welfare rolls when
she began with Freedom Industries, after teaching herself
to draw and receiving subsequent professional training.
Williams noted, with obvious satisfaction, that some of
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the advertising ideas used by Freedom Foods have been
lifted by Stop and Shop for use in their own advertising
campaigns.
Freedom-Transatlantic Shoes.
This division imports economy-priced European shoes
and wholesale outlets have been developed in the mid-West
although markets in the Boston area are also being sought.16
Freedom Communications.
This operation has signed an agreement to buy a
television station in Birmingham, Alabama.17  While the
financial negotiations are underway, Freedom Industries
is making formal application to the FCC for approval of
the channel assignment. It has also made application for
a cable television franchise in Boston, in the belief
that cable television should serve individual neighbor-
hoods and be controlled by their residents. Williams
objects to the current practice, by large corporations,
of gathering up bundles of franchises all across the
country.
Freedom Housing.
Now in the process of assembling a site near Dudley
Station in Roxbury, Freedom Industries is hoping to build
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
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an apartment-office complex utilizing prefabricated
building techniques. It is hoped that a mix of income
levels will be found in the housing, and some plan of
using the rentals from more luxurious units to offset
the cost of more modest units is being explored. It is
also hoped that the residents of the project can assume
some decision-making role in matters relating to the
housing.
Future Projects.
In the working stages are projects relating to urban
education, a line of cosmetic products for black women,
and various manufacturing enterprises. One acquisition
that Freedom Industries is currently negotiating is that
of EGandG Roxbury Inc (ERI), discussed in the first case
study.
Present Financial State.
Each separate operation of Freedom Industries is
showing an in-house profit, but added together the profits
are not sufficient to cover the costs of total overhead,
much of which is handled by the parent body, Freedom
Industries. The expectations about the operations were
that they would take a long time to become profitable,
but once they did they would grow quickly; but in fact
the reverse happened--they quickly became profitable but
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expansion has proceeded slowly.
Freedom Industries and Community Development.
The description of Freedom Industries' first year
of operation gives a picture of where it is at in a
business sense, but it is also necessary to see how it
has functioned as a mechanism for community development.
The original purpose of Freedom Industries was
primarily that of creating an income-generating operation
that could support needed social services in the community.
The creation of such an institution in itself was expected
to be a source of power as well as the profits it gener-
ated. However, the focus was on the need for independent
funding rather than on the business operation per se.
As a result no extensive theory of the role of business
had been developed at the time Freedom Industries was
organized. The need to make day-to-day practical decisions
has caused the executives at Freedom Industries to shift
to some degree both the focus of their concerns and some
of their goals, and they now have a more comprehensive
and realistic view of business. Some of the key issues
that have emerged are discussed below.
Business versus Social Goals.
The major influences on the policy of Freedom
Industries have been Archie Williams and David Smith, a
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vice-president in the company. Smith, who is white,
worked with Williams at NECDC and has assisted in the
development of Freedom Industries at every stage. He
is currently responsible for development and planning.
With a history of community work in SNCC4id SDS behind
him, Smith holds to a "classical radical ideology." 8
Together, Williams and Smith represent a socially-oriented
view of business that puts them into conflict with other
members of the staff. A number of middle management people
have been recruited because they had skills that were
needed in the company (e.g. accounting) and not because
they shared the same ideological viewpoint. While most
are black and feel some loyalty to the black community,
they are basically "guys who are out to make a bundle"
and to attract them Freedom Industries has had to offer
salaries that are somewhat competitive with those offered
elsewhere.19 Conflicts have developed when this "profes-
sional" staff is required to make seemingly irrational
or uneconomical business decisions in order to accommodate
some social goal. One such incident that occurred was
related to the acquisition cfthe two food stores; the
18Interview with David Smith, August 27, 1969.
19Ibid.
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transfer of ownership brought a ten-day hiatus in opera-
tions and temporary lay-off of the workers. While
Freedom Foods was under no obligation to pay salaries
during this period, the view represented by Smith and
Williams was that the company should assume responsibility.
Since this involved a substantial amount in wages, some
of the staff vigorously fought this decision, to no
avail.20 Similar differences exist as to the types of
business thought appropriate for Freedom Industries
to enter. One viewpoint is that anything that is pro-
fitable should be considered while another is that some
other redeeming feature--the product is required by the
community or new skills are created, etc.--must be
present. (Since some redeeming feature can probably be
wrested from any business, the limits imposed by this
criterion would appear to be small. Most likely it
works out as a prohibition against a narrow range of
activities, e.g. defense work, sweat-shop businesses,
etc.) The reason for seeking the cable TV franchise in
Boston, for example, is primarily to provide a mechanism
for communication and organizing within Roxbury.21 While
Williams is optimistic about the degree to which middle-
2 0Ibid.
2 1Ibid.
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management is responding to and adopting the socially-
useful concept of business, others in Freedom Industries
find that tensions over the policy still run high.
To a degree, the accommodating process has also
moved the holders of the "social" view away from their
original positions. The expectations about the level of
social services which could be provided within Freedom
Industries have been curtailed in the face of economic
constraints. Early in the game, it had been envisioned
that things, like day-care centers, total health services,
and a guaranteed annual wage could be made available to
all the workers and their families. Now these schemes
have been postponed and may be dropped entirely. As
Smith has come to believe, Freedom Industries will have
to build closer ties to the public institutions that
provide such services rather than attempt to support a
parallel set of its own at a prohibitive cost. As it
is the overhead for personnel costs and fringe benefits
is twice what they would be in another comparable company
as a result of the extensive counseling and benefits
offered. The insurance policy provided for all the
workers is more comprehensive and the benefits are
scaled higher than they are in a standard insurance plan;
2 2 Ibid.
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in the food stores, this coverage is 25-30 percent more
expensive than the usual policy of supermarkets. This
means another one-half percent reduction in the already
limited profit margin of the stores.23 Similarly, Freedom
Industries set out to encourage workers to take advantage
of outside educational opportunities by offering to pay
their tuition or fees. At one time over 50 percent of
the workers at Freedom Electronics were attending school,
including one man who was studying engineering at North-
eastern University. The cost of doing this began to be
significant and Smith feels this led to an unconscious
decision on the executive level to push the program less.
The result is that the larger working force of the food
stores has not been encouraged, nor have they participated,
to the same degree that the electronics workers have.
Distributional versus Quality of Life Issues.
While the more ideological of Freedom Industries'
executives are in agreement over the broad goals of the
company, there are clear differences in their priorities
and, to a degree, their values. One set of priorities
holds that distributional questions, principally the need
for blacks to gain a bigger portion of society's resources,
are of prime importance. Another view places equal
23Ibid.
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emphasis on questions relating to quality of life
issues, particularly in relation to human needs in a
work environment. The first approach, which focusses
on the needs of blacks in the aggregate is most strongly
represented by Smith, while the focus on the personal
needs of individuals is the position fostered by Williams.
Within the quality-of-life framework Freedom In-
dustries offers the opportunity for developing an economic
institution in which the traditional authoritarian rela-
tionships found throughout most of society are replaced
with something more closely resembling a peer group rela-
tionship. Williams feels that hierarchically structured
relationships rely heavily on automatic responses to
"authority" and reduce the freedom and potential capa-
bilities of people all along the scale. He is attempting
to alter this structure within Freedom Industries and
hopes to ultimately wipe out the distinction between
management and labor in the firm. One manifestation would
be a company union that would be an advocate for all of
the people in the firm, and would attempt to deal with
any issues, personal or economic, that affected the em-
ployees.
At present, Freedom Industries has begun to enlarge
the scope of decisions over which the workers have either
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influence or control. These range from the design of a
plant or a choice of furniture to questions of work
schedules and vacations. In addition Williams encourages
the workers--laborer and management--to voice grievances
and fight for their positions, and he feels they have
gotten more aggressive about doing this. The company
bends over backward to support a worker and rarely resorts
to firing. (Someone in the firm stated "It's almost im-
possible to get fired from Freedom Industries!")
This egalitarian philosophy is evidenced in the
company's life insurance and medical plans. Traditionally
such plans are scaled so that executives receive a much
higher level of benefits than the average worker. When
Freedom Industries requested that the same plan be written
for everyone, president to trainee, the insurance com-
panies balked but eventually complied. Both Smith and
Williams expressed a desire to move towards a salary-
equalization policy (There's no reason why my secretary
should be making less than me," said Smith but the fact
is that the secretaries do make less than their bosses)
and both indicated that it was probably illusory to think
this possible. In view of the need to attract "guys out
to make a bundle" this policy becomes even more wishful.
Some modification of salary scales among the executives
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has taken place however, with fairly marginal differences
between executive levels. Williams also noted with just a
shade of bitterness, that Freedom Industries is the only
venture in its field that has held to its original
intentions and hasn't been subverted simply by a desire to
make money. He stated that every nickel and dime are put
back into the business, whereas in many other operations
the executives have used the profits to begin living high.
The "quality of life" concerns have also been expressed
in an attempt to make the daily activities within the
the company humanistic and personal. The management directly
involves itself with the company's employees, interceding
on their behalf in problems with school authorities, police,
credit institutions, etc. Williams reports that he and
the other managers are likely, in the course of a day, to
drive a sick employee to a doctor, serve as a witness for
a relative in court, or help intervene in foreclosure
proceedings. This policy of "personalization" is expressed
in the training philosophy of Freedom Industries:
Freedom Industries believes that workers must
be treated as more than skilled operatives - they
must be treated as people. In working with the
"hard core unemployed", technical skills represent
only the first step in job training. Human skills
are a more significant and yet more difficult
segment of a man-power program. Before all else
a worker must be able to come to work. He must
stay healthy and his family must stay healthy.
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The high rates of disease in our inner cities lead
to high absenteeism and a disrupted work environ-
ment. Workers must be freed from other family
pressures. Women must have day care centers for
their children and workers must learn about terms
of credit, so they do not have to quit their jobs
and disappear when the collection agent arrives.
A worker must be motivated in his work environment.
He must feel that his job has a future - that his
training will not lead him to a dead end. He
must feel that the company is legitimately con-
cerned about him and that he can participate in
developing his own work environment. And he must
be given the opportunity to broaden his technical
and educational background in ways not directly
related to a specific job. He must be given the
opportunity to seek and grow. 24
The way this policy would be carried out in the
training of a supermarket employee, for example, is through
education in economic buying, food production (visiting
farms and processing plants), nutrition, and food pre-
paration as well as basic remedial training, specific
job skills, courses in the human environment (taxes and
budgeting, housing, etc.) and the community environment.
The result would be the creation of "food specialists" who,
in turn, could serve as educators for the rest of the
community. Workers would rotate in setting up special displays
to demonstrate some tract on food or nutrition so that
shoppers could share in their information.
The result of changing both the nature of the work
engaged in, and the allocation of power and resources
24 "Application for Training," Funds (mimeo).
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between workers would be a radically new work environment.
Williams points to the electronics plants, where a great
sense of cooperation and good will is said to exist, as
evidence of the early effects of these policies. The
workers are committed to the success of the plant, some
bringing in tools from their own homes when the operation
could not afford to buy them, or coming in on weekends
or evenings to work. Williams is excited by the possibility
that Freedom Industires could serve as a change model for
the "disinterested Raytheon's" and the residents of poor
white communities like South Boston.
While Williams'stated motivations and philosophy
appear quite genuine, his relations with his employees
could as easily be termed paternalistic as humanistic.
His authority as president of a company has apparently
sensitized him to the responsibilities he has acquired
in regard to his employees, and he apparently prefers to
carry this out in a personal rather than institutionalized
manner. The satisfaction he derives from this role, as well
as his closeness to the problem, tends to distort his
ability to judge the results. In regard to his policy of
decentralizing decision-making, for example, he has given
the workers authority over very insignificant questions
(i.e. the colors a building is to be painted), but not
over such matters as contracts, etc. To talk of workers
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influencing decision-makers as a result of gripe sessions
falls radically short of making workers the decision-makers.
To exhibit personal concern and assistance for the problems
of an employee is desirable unless such aid can be had
only through the kindness of a superior. When questioned
as to the need to make structural changes if one is serious
about sharing authority and responsibility, Williams
maintained that one cannot bureaucratize or structure
humanism and concern for an individual; he was seeking to
build such a concern in the company by altering the atti-
tudes of those making decisions. While Williams may
be right, his position ignores the possible "humanistic"
value of a more far-reaching distribution of power, and also
indicates the limits of his own definition of "shared
decision-making."
The second major emphasis within Freedom Industires
as represented by Smith, is one that is seeking to create
just such structural changes--both within and outside
the company. While an operation like Freedom Industries
is seen as a key to greater economic and political clout
by both Williams and Smith, Smith places a higher priority
on this objective. He tends to view the company in light
of its ability to foster organization within the black
community and to consolidate power vis a vis the larger
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white community. By creating some power base in the
community as a result of its own economic activities, it is
expected that the company will be able to leverage more
resources to be used by the community. Smith holds that
the present clout held by Freedom Industires in relation to
city officials or financial institutions is very marginal,
although some changes in attitudes have been experiences. 25
In regard to the internal situation at Freedom Industries,
Smith feels that more significant structural changes should
be made if the thing is not to be a sham. He remarks
"at worst, Freedom Industries is no better than a black
Polaroid." While relationships in the executive levels
were felt to be very open and casual, Smith was less glowing
than Williams on the environment at the food stores or
electronics plant; "While the plant is about as good as
that kind of operation can be, the food stores are little
different from the average store." Smith, however, notes
that it has been more difficult than he expected to
decentralize the decision-making process. On the one
hand, the demands of the business favor a centralized
process, and on the other, the decision-making capabilities
of the workers have to be developed. Before that takes
2 51nterview with David Smith, August 27.
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place, the personal problems of the people have to be met
for "if a guy's mainlining, and we have a couple who are,
that is a more critical problem than making decisions at
work." 26 It takes education and training on the part
of both workers and management to accomplish a sharing of
responsibility and this means a financial commitment
that Freedom Industires is unable to make at present.
Relations with the Community. Freedom Industries has
attempted to involve itself and to assist other organiza-
tions in the community. By paying for a year's ads in
advance with a local black newspaper, it provided the
paper with working capital it needed at the moment. It
extended food on credit to the freedom schools set up
during a school crisis. It fed, and helped negotiate for,
the black students who were sitting in atBrandeis University.
Whenever possible, it utilizes the services of other black
businesses in the community; for example, it uses only
Paradise Cab, a recently organized black taxi company, in
the pickup arrangement at Freedom Foods. 27
In addition, Freedom Industries attempts to carry to
the community the idea that the company is related to it
26Ibid.
27Nancy Anderson, "A New Power in Roxbury.
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and is one which the people can influence. The same "peer
relationship" that is sought with Freedom Industries is
also sought between it and the community. This is what
Williams feels is at the heart of the "negative halo effect"
accruing to the company. The experience with Freedom Foods
is that people who previously remained mute in the face
of poor service or goods at a white-owned supermarket
are now becoming extremely vocal about about any deficiencies
in the black-owned stores. As Williams related, "There
are husbands who had never in their lives stepped into a
grocery stores. Now they're doing the shopping and they're
all experts on the price of a can of chickpeas. Even an
old classmate of mine from college comes to me to complain
if the lettuce is at all wilted." If any single thing is
found lacking, the whole store is responsible and the people
make their criticism known. When sales began to dip, Freedom
Foods went to competitors' stores and interviewed people as
they were waiting in line as to why they weren't at Freedom
Foods. The most frequent complaint was that it was always
necessary to wait in lines at Freedom Foods. All of this
is regarded by Williams as evidence that the shoppers'
expectations have become more exacting and they feel they
have the right to criticize and further, that they can make
some changes if they do. All the same, "It hurts like
hell, " says Williams.
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The attitudes of the community in general has been
somewhat more ambivalent, being both hostile and impressed.
Freedom Industries is sufficiently like a community organiza-
tion as well as a business to subject it to the same
criticism and kibutzing that greet the activities of every
community group, from Exodus to a local APAC. In this
way, Roxbury is much like a small town in that few things
can be kept private and almost all actions will be greeted
by some mildly hostile debunking. Freedom Industries
made clear its concern for the community and having done
that it is subject to failure in the way an indifferent
business would not be. The suspicion that Freedom Industries'
leaders are really selling out, or fronting for whites, or
making a million dollars, increases the hostility. This
was evident in the relations with the Youth Alliance, a
group of teenagers who had organized themselves and played
a fairly militant role in the community. Freedom Foods
gave the Alliance a contract to deliver ad leaflets,
despite the fact that there existed some hostility among
the members toward Freedom Foods as a result of the
"fronting for whites" rumors. When it was discovered that
the Alliance was failing to deliver the ads, and was instead
stocking most of them in their headquarters, the contract
was ended. To the Alliance, this was clear proof of the bad
intention of Freedom Foods.
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Those who accept Freedom Industries on face value and
ignore the rumors tend to be more impressed with the operation
than Williams thinks they should. This too can be illusory
and the result will be that the community will expect
miracles from him. What he feels is necessary is that
four or five operations similar to his be developed if
any real economic force is to be developed.
As to the role the community will play in actually
controlling Freedom Industries, Williams' stand has remained
unchanged. He wants no community control of the company
and he repeats, "This business should be thought of as a
money-making machine, that's all. The community can
control the money it makes." Williams expresses some
anger at the people (mostly white) who keep asking him how
he is going to give the community some control. "White
businessmen that I go to for financial assistance want me
to have community control, something they'd never think of
having in their own business," he said. Others in Freedom
Industries who are sympathetic to the idea have more closely
examined the problems of community control. One major
problem is evident when one distinguishes between ownership
and control. The first implies simply dividends and is
fairly easily dispersed, although "peoples' capitalism"
is of no benefit if it means tiny bits of equity in small
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businesses, says Smith. Control, however, is much more
difficult to achieve--either one has broadly dispersed
control through an unmanageably large body that does not
allow for any efficient decision-making or one reduces
the decision-making body to something like a Board of
Directors, which in actuality, often means that control for
the larger body is a delusion. The problems of developing
a large body of informed residents also produces a stumbling
block for, as one Freedom Industries executive noted, the
operation of the business could be wrecked at the hands of
the residents. As an illustration, he pointed to Freedom
Foods which, in money volume, does a phenomenal business,
but doesn't make large profits. The average shopper, faced
with soaring food costs, would move to slash prices if he
could. However, even a one or two cent decrease on any
item (a cut that would pass unnoticed to most shoppers)
could entirely wipe out a profit margin of the store. 28
When asked to comment on the structure provided by the
Community Self-Determination Act where an appointed, and
buffered, business board makes the decisions, the response
was, "If the community cannot really make the business
decision, why have the structure?" 29 As Smith put it,
28Interview with David Smith, August 27, 1969.
2 9 Ibid.
I
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"I want to get control spread, but can't figure how to do
it. That's my main ideological bitch."
The difficulties of accommodating widely-dispersed
community control has led those supporting such a
philosophy to revise their thinkirgon the constituency
appropriate as a base of control. Where they previously
held that the entire community should be the base of
control, they are now thinking that each institution
should define its own unique population made-up of those
to whom the institution is centrally relevant. For Freedom
Industries such a group might consist primarily of its
employees, and to some degree, its consumers. At present,
though, no stable, long-term policy has been established
but is instead developing out of a series of ad hoc decisions.
Freedom Foundation. What the community is definitely expected
to control, in relation to Freedom Industries, is the bulk
of the profits they make. The control of the Foundation,
with its ownership of 75 percent of the stock in Freedom
Industries is at present in the hands of two of the company's
executives, Smith and Williams, and over a half-dozen other
community people. These include Mel King and Bryant
Rollins of the New Urban League and others suggested by
local community organizations. Williams hopes that ultimately
3I1nterview with David Smith, September 15, 1969.
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Freedom Industries will exercise no role in the administration
of the Foundation. Here again there are different concep-
tions about the role the community can play in controlling
the Foundation. On the more conservative side, it is felt
that representatives of community groups (perhaps a body
like the United Front) should act as the directors of the Foun-
dation while a more liberal view is that access should be
widened to allow more leadership to emerge from non-organiza-
tion people. A decision as to whether the stock held by
the Foundation is to be voting or non-voting and how much
additional stock will be issued are questions currently
being discussed within Freedom Industries. Discussions
of the alternatives remain academic at the moment and will
continue to until Freedom Industries begins making a profit.
The existing structure of the Foundation in relation to
the corporation itself may, in the future, produce tensions
that are already evidencing themselves in Freedom Industries.
These tensions arise out of the conflicts between meeting the
in-house business and service needs of the company and
the income-needs of the Foundation. Profit absorbed internally
on medical services for Freedom Industries' workers will mean
less profit to be distributed by the Foundation. Decisions
to reinvest surplus profits in additional expansion will
also reduce or eliminate dividends to the Foundation. Until
the time when the Foundation can develop a sufficiently
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diversified investment protfolio, its operations will be
very dependent on Freedom Industries regardless of the
company's absense from the Foundation's board. At present,
only one community leader, Mel King, is on the Board of
Directors of the corporation itself and this is the body
that will be formally responsible for such decisions as
declaring dividends, etc. What is evident in Freedom
Industries in its first year of operations is that the
oprations of the business has assumed a greater importance
than its founders had really anticipated. The internal
concerns of the company--be they desire for growth or
additional services for the workers--are, at present,
overshadowing the focus on community social services.
Whether this will change once significant profits start
being generated to support such services is unclear,
although this is the hope of the company's executives.
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CONCLUSIONS
In summarizing the results of this study it is
necessary to clearly state the concerns that motivated
it, for this research has been primarily an attempt
to answer questions that have been personally troubling.
The questions arise out of two clear positions that have
been supported by many black leaders: one, that blacks
must control the institutions that effect their lives
in critical ways and two, that black communities must
foster their own values and culture and create the
institutions which will best serve these values. As a
rule, these two positions are seen as complimentary--if
black parents desire a different kind of education for their
children than can be gotten in a Boston public school,
they must achieve control over a particular school and
supplant the old-style education with a new. The
assumption here is that by controlling the old institutions
one is in a position to transform it. A more pessimistic
view is that controlling such an institution only means
that one becomes absorbed in it in a higher level, with
the result that one loses the capacity to alter it. The
parents who gain control of a local school in Roxbury may
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only be investing their energies in buttressing up a
deteriorating school system. Thus it occurs that a
new and larger institution must be controlled before the
qualitative goals of a group of dissidents can be imple-
mented. To stop short of this, and demand only a change
in a fragment of the dominant institutions, is to believe
that "the goals of the 'revolution' can be realized for
one group without going through to completion that necessary,
protracted struggle of transforming the society for all
groups." 1
This problem becomes potentially more conflicting
in the area of black economic development. On the one
hand, blacks are clearly demanding an equitable share
in the economic institutions and resources of this country,
but they are also encouraging a concept of black brotherhood
in which mutual dependence and a communality of interests
are fostered in the ghetto. Either the goal of black
brotherhood and solidarity is merely a tactical one which
increases the likelihood of achieving a redistribution
of economic resources or it stands as an end in itself.
The central question , then, is whether the economic
enterprises which are being promoted in ghettos are
compatible with the vision of new human relationships
1Alan Haber. Economic Development Strategies in the Urban
Ghetto: Decolonization and modernization, June 1968 (iiImieo).
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which are being fostered between blacks? A traditional
critique of capitalism holds that this dominant form
of economic institution in our society embodies the
values of individual competition, concern for status,
a material definition of value, and hierarchically-
defined relationships--all of which would be incompatible
with the development of solidarity and fellowship between
blakcs. It is the validity of this statement that has
been a central concern of this study though stated
more generally it asks: What goals are being expressed
in current black economic development and to what degree
have traditional economic institutions and structures
been able to accommodate the goals of black solidarity
and self-determination? In short, is economic develop-
ment a promising strategy for community development
and if so, what kind of community development?
The sampling of writings and statements on the
subject of black economic development included in the
introduction to this paper make it clear that there
exists little consensus as to what the goal or direction
of development is. On the one hand, it is claimed that
black economic development will serve as a reaffirmation
of the free enterprise system and traditional private
ownership, while another view holds that the new
economic development will be formed around a collectivity--
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that of the entire black community. Another major position
is that the outcome of ghetto development will be a new
corporate imperialism in which large economic gains will
be made by ghetto residents at a cost of ghetto independence.
This is contradicted by the position that ghetto develop-
ment policies are to be criticized because they will never
create anything more than small, uneconomically-viable en-
terprises. A final set of assumptions relates to the degree
of racial isolation that will result from black economic
development, one view holding that the policy is separation-
ist while another foresees greater integration resulting.
The purpose of this tudy, then, has been to begin developing
a more accurate set of assumptions about the nature of cur-
rent economic development and this will be done by analyzing
the major issues which have emerged out of the case studies
and by drawing some tentative implications from the analysis.
Finally, an attempt will be made to describe the role of
economic development in a context of community development.
Most of the distinctions between the many and varied
programs of black economic development can be attributed
to differences in regard to three major issues:
1. Who is to control a given enterprise and through
mechanisms?
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2. To whom are the benefits dispersed and
what structure provides for this?
3. Should economic development be an end in
itself or a strategy for political development?
Control
The issue of control permeates all aspects of black
economic development and it is useful to look at control
as it functions on three levels: one, the relation between
white corporations or financial institutions and black
businesses; two, internally within the black community
and three, in the political arena outside the ghetto.
Control, as it is used here, is not limited to formal,
legal power, but includes the use of political and
economic influence.
Control by White Business Institutions or Ghetto
Enterprises:
The first level of conflict over control lies between
the black enterprises being developed and the white
financial and business institutions that are involved
with them. The original forces of the current phase of
black economic development was on the need for blacks
to control their own economic institutions, and the
visibility of the many ghetto businesses, primarily
retail stores, that were clearly owned by whites was a
constant reminder to blacks of their own lack of control.
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Many riots were used, in part, to either soften the hold
of white ghetto merchants or to force them out entirely.
The goal, at that time, was to transfer ownership of
these businesses out of the hands of whites and into
the hands of blacks; a larger part of ghetto economic
programs are still directed to this end. It soon became
apparent, however, that emotionalism over the issue of
control of these businesses had clouded the fact that
many of them were very marginal in value. Bigger and
more viable businesses were needed but they involved
substantial amounts of capital and financing if they
were to be developed. Since the ghetto was without such
resources, blacks were faced with the contradiction that
"controlling our own economic institutions" in the
ghetto involved dependency on white financial institutions
outside the ghetto. Those blacks who are attempting to
develop some program of economic development have had to
confront this issue squarely and decide for themselves
what the nature of external control is and how much they
are willing to accommodate to it. The range of answers
that have evolved in Roxbury include, at one end, that
if the United Front (an association of most major
community groups, which is seen as a militant body) who
operated a program of business development that is funded
by white no-strings contributions and, at the other, the
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black managers of ERI who sought to thoroughly imbed them-
selves in a white corporation. The most common model,
no doubt, lying somewhere between these extremes, will
be that of an independent black business that allows
itself a limited dependency on white institutions in
order that it can use the resulting gains to increase its
own long-term viability.
The degree to which this constitutes "control" by
white institutions is largely a matter of interpretation,
for the formal arrangements between a black business and
a white institution rarely reveal the actual allocation
of power. This is illustrated in an article on Roxbury's
economic development by a former New Republic writer,
James Ridgeway. Being hostile to capitalism and large
corporations, he is sensitive to the role they are playing
in ghetto development, and to the control they exercise
there. After looking at Freedom Industries, he concluded:
Since Freedom Industries has no experience
in this field (electronics) it depends on
the contractors for management and training,
which leaves it pretty much at the mercy of
the bigger companies.
In relation to Freedom Foods:
Looked at one way, a black company has taken
over two stores in a black community. Looked
at another way, a scared white store owner
has got himself a black front. While quitting
the retail end, he still controls things as
mortgage holder and sole supplier.
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After briefly discussing the other black ventures in
Roxbury, Ridgeway summarizes by saying:
If black business succeeds in Roxbury, it
will create more jobs and the illusion of
control. In fact, however, the black
militants who talk about survival strategy
will have duped themselves. Their colony
may have shifted hands from small white
store owners to large insurance companies,
but it's still a colony. 2
The questions Ridgeway poses are common ones and
troublesome to answer--what constitutes control by white
institutions and what is the alternative? Ridgeway's
conclusions suffer from too rigid, or too superficial,
a view, of what constitutes domination by white insti-
tutions, but because his view is shared by others it
demands examination. First, it is presumptuous to
assume that a developing company, simply because it
lacks experience, is at the mercy of bigger companies.
This may or may not be the case, but it is not automatically
true; it presumes a far narrower range of alternatives
open to a black entrepreneur than is realistic. This
is illustrated in Ridgeway's own observation that
Freedom Industries was dependent on electronics contractors
for training when in fact Williams utilized the services
2James Ridgeway. "Urban Bourbons and Blacks," Mayday,
No. 2, October 18-25, 1968 .
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of Lincoln Laboratory and OIC, which involved no
compromise of Freedom Industries' independence. Still,
while it is possible to avoid some dependency relation-
ships, others are unavoidable, such as Freedom Foods'
relationship to the mortgage holder on the stores.
(Was Williams to pay a million dollars in cash for
them?) Nearly every business, white or black, is
dependant in some fashion --but even these relationships
are negociable. Here Stokely Carmichael's preconditions
for viable coalitions are most relevant to business
partnerships and bear repeating: 1. recognition by
all parties of the self-interests involved, 2. mutual
belief that each party stands to benefit by an alliance,
3. an independent base of power by each party, 4. alliances
dealing only with specific and identifiable goals. Freedom
Foods' arrangement with Purity Supreme seen from this
perspective, is less a situation of black dependency on
whites than of mutual dependency. The need of Purity
Supreme to get out of Roxbury coincided with the need
of Freedom Industries to buy a supermarket and this
placed them both in a bargaining position. The
bargaining strength of a black businessman derives from
the particular circumstances surrounding a given business
negotiation and its existence cannot blanketly be denied.
3Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton. Black Power,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 80.
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The David and Goliath relationship that existed between
Eastern Gas and State Enterprises demonstrated the
extent to which the political power that automatically
accrues to a black organization in any black-white
relationships can compensate for a shortage of economic
power. At times this political clout may even override
the existence of white institutional power--this may
have been the case when Purity Supreme did not press
Freedom Foods into a committment for management services
equal to the duration of the mortgage it held. Such
an arrangement could have been damaging to them both
when it became public. The case of ERI demonstrates
two points--one, that independence may not be a goal
sought by black businessmen, especially if their
personal needs can be better served by foregoing business
independence. For them, individual power and financial
independence must be weighed against the values of a
vaguely-defined "community autonomy." The second point
is that the problems of doing business in the ghetto
remain severe enough that a white corporation does not
necessarily want control over a black operation. What
they do want, as shown in the case of EGandG, is control
over their own corporate funds. ERI was a white, not a
black, creation; EGandG's curtailment of ERI's autonomy
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did not represent a white "takeover" because it never
really belonged to the blacks.
The other question that Ridgeway's analysis poses
relates to the alternatives available to a black business-
man who seeks to avoid any control by white institutions.
The alternative of seeking financing in the black commun-
ity is obviously limited--that's what economic develop-
ment is all about. The route taken by the United Front
of using white funds with absolutely no conditions
imposed is free of white control in a narrow sense,
but leaves the group tremendously dependent on the
good will of white donors. In any case such sources are not
adequate in the face of the resources required. The
tradeoff is between a short-term infringement on their
control and the long-term strength and independence
that will result from growth. A good example of this
is the arrangement between State Enterprises' contracting
subsidiary and Poley-Abrams which resulted in controls
by the white firm for the duration of the rehabilitation
job but provided bonding which gave them access to a
$1.5 million job and increased their chances of getting
similar jobs in the future. If it is the intent of a
black businessman to retain control of an economic
enterprise, yet to make use of the necessary resources
held by whites, he can probably do so if he has both
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brains and discipline. It requires brains to under-
stand the inplications of certain activities and
relationships and discipline to balance the needs for
short-term resources with long-term requirements for
independence of action. Without a substantial use of
outside capital, it would seem impossible for a ghetto
to develop its own self-generating sources of capital
or funds.
Control within the Ghetto: A strong concern for the
decentralization of decision-making has been attributed
to black communities as a result of their political
and organizing activities and as a result of the
pronouncements of many black leaders. What this view
fails to take into account is the motivation behind such
activity and rhetoric. When black leaders are confronting
dominant white institutions and demanding that control
be shared they are speaking from the positions of have-
nots. The objective they seek in decentralizing decision-
making is really a re-alignment of power. Thus dispersed
decision-making assumes tactical importance; this contrasts
with the view, expressed primarily by white radicals of
an SDS persuasion, that "participatory democracy" is a
goal in its own right. This view tends to emphasize
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the psychic values of self-government where the
elimination of despair, alienation and turmoil is said
to result when ghetto residents participate in the deci-
sions effecting them. 4 Further, by sharing in the
ownership of profit-making enterprises, the need by
the poor for demeaning handouts which strip them of
dignity is said to be eliminated. Thus, some radical
thought holds that control of black economic ventures
must not be retained by a leadership elite but must
permeate through the com munity.
If the emphasis of many blacks on decentralized
decision-making is in fact a tactical strategy to gain
greater access to power, one could expect that upon
achieving power, the same blacks would quickly lose
interest in shared control and decision-making. This
is, quite clearly, what has been occurring in much of
the economic development activity in Roxbury, where
blacks are beginning to accrue power or control and see
no need to give it up (to other blacks). In some cases,
demonstrated best by Jack Robinson and State Enterprise,
the ability to control a situation is related to the
capacity to make money. Robinson felt his own autonomous
company could produce more wealth for him than State
4 Gar Alperovitz, "Are Community Corporations the Answer?"
Boston, June 1968, p. 49.
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could with all its new checks of power. On the other
hand, is Archie Williams who feels he can best maxi-
mize his power in behalf of the black community by not
dissipating it through a structure of decentralized
control. Frequently, he says, white businessmen, who
are offering financial assistance to Freedom Industries,
want to see a community-control structure built into
the company yet these businessmen have never attempted
such a thing with their own businesses. 5 The problems
of doing so are numerous.
The most obvious problem is that of defining a
community within which control is to be shared. The
attempts to translate a general concept of community
into something operational is a problem that has con-
fronted all three of the businesses studied. This
problem was resolved by EGandG in setting up ERI when
it decided that ERI employees would represent "the
community." Bert Lee, however, relates that EGandG
originally intended to extend the opportunity for
ownership of ERI only to the executives of the plant. 6
Only pressure from the ERI managers changed the plan
to extend equity to the non-executive personnel. Even
so, the managers are cynical of the role of "community
51nterview with Archie Williams, August, 9, 1969.
6Interview with Bert Lee, July 18, 1969.
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control" of ERI. First, most of the stock will be
held by black executives, most of whom live outside of
the ghetto. Are they members of the community? Even
those workers who do live in Roxbury are unlikely to 25
years from now when EGandG's maximum divestment of control
will take place.
Within Freedom Industries this question, has received
a great deal of attention, some of which is reported in
the case study. However, an unexamined and basic con-
tradiction was revealed by Williams while discussing
another aspect of his operation altogether. When
questioned as to the company's black-white employment
ratio, Williams stated that they didn't keep track. In
his eyes anyone who lived in Roxbury, black or white,
who shared a concern for the community was a part of it.
Thus even the crudest definition of the community (total
population of blacks within a given area) was irradicated.
When Freedom Industries had to make an operational
definition in regard to control of Freedom Foundation it
chose to regard the population of the "community" as
a series of organizations. State Enterprise, on the
other hand, opened its membership to the community-at-
large as individuals but deliberately excluded organiza-
tions from membership.
212.
Once an economic enterprise has operationally defined
a "constituency" for control, a new series of problems
emerges as it sets up a structure for the "community"
control. If a policy of direct (non-representational)
control is pursued, the conflict of accommodating the goals
of the business to the unwieldy nature of the decision-
making procedure is great. Freedom Industries has decided
this question in favor of the goals of the business--
which is to provide resources for the community. State
Enterprise originally decided in favor of wide-spread
control, but its experience revealed the difficulty of
maintaining decentralized control. The tendency for
more power to accrue to those closest to day-to-day
decision-making is predictable enough. What was less
evident was that the other potentially contending groups
who remained quite close to the activities of the company
could also be effectively excluded from the exercise of
power. If those whose self-interest is at stake cannot
manage to be effective, those individuals who are indif-
ferent are almost certainly bound to be excluded from
control when sporadic issues of interest arise.
If the goal of direct control is modified, either by
a system of representation or by a reduction in the areas
open to control (eg. the choice of a business manager
rather than actual business decisions) it would seem that
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the psychic values claimed for it would not be produced.
Control which is not psychologically perceived and
experienced cannot reduce feelings of "alienation," etc.
The average stockholder of Sears and Roebuck probably
feels quite removed and pcwerless in relation to the com-
inny he "owns." In addition, substitutions of a black
elite for a white elite or an unresponsive black business
for an indifferent white business is little consolation to
the black who is on the bottom. For him the situation of
the haves and have-nots, in relation to power, has switched
from a black-white context to a black-black context. Thus
the original meaning of "community" control of business
which was that blacks should control previously white-owned
businesses has been extended to mean wider black control of
black businesses and many black businessmen are finding this
impossible to live with.
External Political Arena: A final aspect to the control
issue is raised by some conjecturing about the shifts
that might occur in the making of municipal political
economies if powerful new actors, like the national
corporations, begin to involve themselves in ghetto
activities. Should the federal government's emphasis
on the role to be played by corporations in ghetto
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development ever be supported by large amounts of Federal
money, such funds could circumvent municipal structures
and enter the ghetto via private institutions. This would
be especially significant if the funds for ghetto economic
development ever began to substitute (as some people fear
they're intended) for more traditional forms of social
service funding, especially those which pass through
the control of local government. Some hint of this is
seen in the role Eastern Gas envisions for itself in
relation to State Enterprise and future developmentin
Roxbury. Eastern would like to be a funnel for Federal
and private monies which could be utilized in the develop-
ment of Roxbury through an operation like State. If
significant corporate intervention in the ghetto is induced
by heavy Federal subsidies, the powers of city government
could be weakened. For example, if Federal grants to
corporations covering skills training and remedial
educations costs were developed at the expense of aid to
cities for adult education, a weakening of local municipal
power would occur. The danger that some foresee in this
is that municipal power would be eroded just as the blacks
are about to obtain control of the cities. 7
7Richard Cloward and Frances Piven, "Ghetto Redevelopment.
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If the city is reduced in power instead of strengthened
the blacks will have lost an important power base; as funds
for services, jobs and facilities are routed through
quasi-public/corporate structures, black access to control
will be diminished.
Such an outcome could occur only if the scale of
Federal support available to corporations for ghetto develop-
ment were to become much greater than it is today, for no
prolonged or extensive involvement by business in the
economics of the ghetto is going to take place without
it. EGandG, for example, had expected greater Federal
support of its Roxbury operation and when government
contracts for ERI did not materialize and losses mounted,
they soon began to cut back the project. There is little
likelihood that the Federal government would make the
committment necessary to attract considerable corporate
intervention, in part because it would be very costly
and in part because the return on its investment--in
terms of altered social or economic conditions in the
ghetto--would be a very slow one. It is likely, however,
that minor shifts and adaptations in the local political
arena will be forthcoming in response to limited corporate
intervention.
216.
Benefits
A second major issue of particular concern to the
ghetto, is the means and substance of the benefits dis-
persed as a result of economic development. While this
can be directly tied to the question of control, an
operation like Freedom Industries clearly separates the
two.
Traditionally, the black,bourgeoisie businessman
or professional, has been criticized for his neglect of,
and alenation from, the rest of the black community.
Black businessmen have generally functioned as a conser-
vative force in the community. Today, the old-line
businessmen are becoming increasingly sensitized to
the new political spirit of the black community, but
this does not necessarily alter their way of working.
State Enterprises demonstrates well the ability of the
traditional business interest to adopt the rhetoric of the
militant black leaders and convert it to their own ends.
State went further, in latching onto opportunities
created by the political acts of the militant leaders.
While they solemnly state "The emerging Black Middle
Class has a great opportunity, and a compelling obligation
to help its less fortunate brothers attain economic security." 8
8 State Enterprises Philosophy (mimeo).
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State used the opportunity to provide low-cost housing
in a fairly shabby way. One of the expected benefits of
black enterprises was that they would be more responsive
to the black population; the behavior of some leaders of
State around tenant complaints show that they may prove to
be equally indifferent. On the other hand, Freedom
Industries has remained responsive to community sentiment.
One difference might be that the success of a major
operation of Freedom Industries (the food stores) is
dependent on the good will of the residents, more so than
the less competitive movie theater of State. 9 The
degree to which any black enterprise must work to develop
acceptance by the community is a point of some conjecture.
One position taken is that blacks react negatively to
the traditional capitalistic orientation toward profits
and regard black capitalists as being as exploitative
as white capitalists. 10 A Newsweek magazine article
on the subjects concludes, "Despite some ghetto ventures
into black entrepreneurship, black capitalism is almost
universally scorned by today's black leaders. 11 Robert
9Since State's income from the gas station occurs from the
lease of the land and not sales directly, they are not
required to be consumer-oriented.
10Peter Siris.
11Newsweek, "Angry--But They Still Have a Dream," June 30,
1 969.",*
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Hall of Watts Operation Bootstrap agrees "To me black
capitalism means one or two people are going to get rich.
We need black economic development that helps everyone,
not a few." 12 However, a recent survey done in Roxbury
asked a larger sample of residents questions about their
buying habits, including a question relating to the take-
over by blacks, of most of the white businesses in the
community. 13 The response was 75 percent in favor and
8 percent disapproving. When questioned further, almost
half of the respondents expressed a willingness to pay
higher prices at black-owned stores and nearly 85 percent
expressed a willingness to travel out of their way to deal
with a black-owned store, given that the price and quality
were equal to that of the white stores. While part of
the positive responses were based on a distrust of whites
or an expectation of better treatment by blacks, most
supported the idea because sticking together meant helping
other blakcs. While these responses are not to be taken
at face value, they do indicate a lack of the hostility
toward black capitalists presumed by black leaders. Those
who opposed the idea, did so in the assumption that a
12Ibid.
13The request was made that the source of the survey not
be identified until the survey was made public.
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black store would carry poorer quality goods or charge
higher prices. Thus, while a black businessman may
have to overcome no greater antagonism because he is a
"black capitalist", the experience of Freedom Foods
indicates he does not garner any automatic support
either. The critical attitude of many residents to the
operation of the food stores, which Williams attributes
to a growing "peer relationship mentality" in their
part, could also be a result of a tendency of many blacks
to overtly or unconsciously deprecate the abilities and
efforts of other blacks. Thus, some shoppers are critical
of Freedom Foods, not because "I have the right to judge"
but "If its black-owned its got to be bad." The question
remains as to whether a black businessman is made to
feel a need, by pressures from the community, to provide
benefits to the community that a comparable white business-
man in a white area does not feel. The experience of the
businesses studied indicates that the average consumer or
man-in-the-street is relatively indifferent to the social-
orientation of a business. The leadership level, however,
will attempt to bring pressure on a black-business to act
in behalf of some community goal when the business in some
way touches in areas of public concern. As noted earlier,
the expressed intentions of Freedom Industries have placed
their entire operation in this public arena and the existence
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of certain political feelings within the community have
led Williams to boycott certain advertising media (eg.
Boston radio station WILD) and certain financial sources
(eg. Boston's Urban Coalition Group) in additional to
its other community acts. ERI became "public property"
during the period of its inception and leaders responded
by bringing conditions to bear on equity and staffing
matters. Two of State's projects, the theater and gas
station, are strictly private entrepreneurial activities
and are beyond the attention of the black leaders; their
rehabilitation project was public by virtue of the
history of the BRP program.
Ultimately, however, the distinction between business
leaders and the degree to which they were willing to put
benefits--services, money, influence, leadership--back
into the community was a direct function of their own
acquisitive desires rather than a perception of the power
of other sectors of the community. The "power" of community
leaders was, after all, not a terribly real threat. If a
group like State Enterprise or EGandG/ERI chose to solidly
confront community leaders with an issue (like the firing
of the ERI managers or the failure to provide heat in an
apartment) a showdown would result in which the leaders
would have little real recourse of action. Williams, on
the other hand, chooses to be susceptible to community
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pressures. This is critical in that so many of the
benefits attributed to black economic development (eg.
recirculation of money through investment in further
black enterprises) are all predicated on a greater
responsiveness in the part of developing black businessmen
than is warranted and few businessmen can sufficiently
subjugate their own individual wants to those of some
hypothetical community. A conclusion to be drawn is that
there is little inherent in the present environment of the
black businessman to guarantee a greater responsiveness
in his part. Some, like Archie Williams, are motivated
by both ideology and the threat of social sanctions from
the environment in which they operate--that of the black
political leadership.
Economic Versus Political Goals
"There's nothing the matter with niggers that money
can't solve," a young black boy is quoted as saying, and
this suggests the most basic issue underlying different
strategies of black economic development. 14 Is
economic development and a higher per-capita average
incomean end in itself or is it to be used tactically
towards political changes?
14Theodore Cross, "Black Capitalism."
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It is relevant here to place the potential of ghetto
economic development in perspective. While there is
obviously inadequate data as yet in the availability of
investment capital and black entrepreneurial skills, and
the success of current operations one can still get a
general sense of the scale of activity that is either
required or expected. One writer on the subject has at-
tempted to establish a crude measure of the amount of
employment to be expected from black enterprises. The
average annual non-white employment has been growing by
almost 160,000 jobs per year from 1960 to 1967 and given
that an increase of 50 percent of this rate is required
to keep even with the growth of the labor force and to
absorb some of the unemployment and under-employment, 240,000
jobs will be required annually for several years. 15
It is unlikely that more than 10-15 percent of those jobs
will be created through black ventures. This means that
85-90 percent of black employment will have to occur
within the white business sector. The role that divi-
dends would play in providing income is, on a larger
scale, even more minimal. As Dorr also noted, it's
15Michael Brower, "The Promotion of Black Ownership and
Business," (unpublished draft, December, 1968).
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the jump in a man's income from $2500 to $6000 in wages
that's crucial, not the jump from $6000 to $6300 from
dividends.
While EGandG established a primary goal of employ-
ment in their ERI operations, the other black firms
focussed less on this goal. Even EGandG's total investment
(training, equipment, purehose, etc.) of something like
$1,400,000 has resulted in only 40-some production jobs
instead of the original 140 envisioned. 16 While Freedom
Industries employs about 180 people, the bulk of them
are in the previously existing food stores so that the
total increase has not been that great. While one of the
industry selection criteria of Freedom Industries is
that it be labor intensive if possible, they have no
illusions about black employers solving the unemployment
problem. State Enterprises has developed only a small
handful of permanent jobs (eg. theater manager), the bulk
of its employment resting with the construction crews on
the rehabilitation project.
The fact that Dunn and Bradstreet figures show that
there is only a 50 percent chance that a new venture will
last 18 months and that odds are five to one against sur-
vival after ten years, suggests that it is shaky to rely
16Steven Trooboff, "EGandG Roxbury, Inc."
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on black business to increase the per capita income of
black communities (especially if a man leaves a wage-
earning position to enter business on his own). 17
Thus, if significant wide-spread economic benefits are
unlikely to follow from the present activities of black
business, and if some of the anticipated psychological
and social benefits are just as dubious, what can be
expected from black economic development?
There are two possible goals of the changes that
can result from the current programs of ghetto economic
development. The first, and easiest to achieve, is that
of giving blacks a piece of the action through the creation
of traditional black capitalists. Probably most of the
efforts in ghetto development will end up this way.
This meets one problem, that of the inequitable distribu-
tion of entrepreneurs between the white and black popu-
lations of this country, but does nothing towards meeting
the political or economic needs of most blacks. This
view holds that the development of black business is an
end in itself and is exemplified by the model of ERI.
The second view holds that economic development should
be focussed on the creation of economic and political
institutions which can strengthen the black community's
ability to confront repressive institutions. It can
provide a mode of organization for the community, it can
17 Michael Brower,"The Promotion of Black Ownership."
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provide some economic independance and it can develop
political influence for a black neighborhood as a
collectivity. This collective body would serve both
as the producer of changes and the object of change. In
the words of one black leader "Modernization is a time
for dynamism when it is absolutely necessary to call for
and push for new forms, new institutions to solve old
problems." 18 One old problem blacks have always been
keenly aware of is inequality so that one of the inovative
forms they are in the process of creating is that of
"people's capitalism" which attempts to confrontinequality
in economic enterprises through wide distribution of
profits. This takes the question of inequitable distri-
bution beyond that of a racial concern and really focuses
on class.
The minor attempts of Freedom Industries to deal with
such values as inequality of workers, the fragmentation of
work, arbitrarily assigned status, and profit measures of
value suggest that the constraints of the profit system are
severe. When forced to choose between working towards the
goal of radically restructuring the economic system of the
society and working towards an increase in resources within
the black community, Freedom Industries has chosen the
latter. The job of creating microcosmic models of an
idealized economic system in ghettos across the country
15Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, "Black Power."
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is like asking for franchised radicalism, and the current
attempts at black economic developments are not likely
to create even a few such models. The least that can be
expected to result is that there will be a more equitable
destribution of entrepreneurs between the black and white
populations; the most that can be hoped for is that
black communities will gain increased access to power and
resources and that these goods will filter down into the
community. What will not occur are economic institutions
based on values that depart radically from those dominant
in the society today.
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Summary.
Using the case studies and other general data, it is
possible to draw a general picture of the directions which
black economic development seems to be taking. One of the
most clear-cut conclusions is that the black man entering
business today is not seeking to develop a separatist
economy. While many of the small-scale retail or service
stores in the ghetto are almost by default dependent on
an all-black market, few new businesses are initiated
on the assumption that a segregated market can be restored.
Now that black businessmen feel that the opportunities
in business are beginning to open up, they are seeking
larger operations in such fields as manufacturing,
communications, construction, etc., and the most efficient
operations are the medium to large enterprises that require
substantial capital investment and a much larger market
than can be sustained within a black community. The
criticism that black economic development would foster
segregation does not appear to be true--most businessmen
are quite willing to function in a larger-than-ghetto
economy.
The threat that controlling white corporations would
be excessive and that a new brand of colonialism would
develop also does not appear realistic at present. The
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major role played by white financial institutions appears
to be in the provision of traditional forms of financing--
something almost inevitably required by a black business
and the degree to which such a relationship connotes
control is a result of the particular power position of
the black businessman. Further, it appears that white
institutions have not generally sought to exercise
excessive control. This, of course, is because most
white financial or business institutions have not made
excessive or risky investments either. When they do, as
in an industrial-turnkey operation, it can be expected
that they will be very controlling, especially when their
investment is being threatened. This lack of autonomy
for a turnkey operation in the period when long-term
policies are set means that black communities inherit a
business that is locked into, for the most part, an esta-
blished mode of operation. If blacks are to be given the
maximum freedom to establish their own long-range business
policies it is important that Federal assistance for
development be in the form of programs that can be utilized
directly by black interprise rather than programs (eg. tax
incentives for corporate investment) that require significant
intervention by outside institutions. A structure like
that proposed in the Community Self-Determination Act, in
which a community corporation would serve as a channel for
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outside investment, would provide a safeguard to the
black communities'independence if significant amounts of
corporate money ever became available to the ghetto. In
the face of inadequate Federal subsidies, however, massive
outside investment is not likely to take place. Limited
involvement by white business in the form of sheltered
contracts, mortgage funds, etc. are more likely to be
the norm in ghetto development, and entail less likelihood
of outside control.
As to whether structures favoring individual or
collective enterprise will predominate is less clear.
It is quite likely that experimentation with forms of collective
economic institutions will continue for a number of reasons.
First, this mode of organization is so common throughout
most of the community service work in the ghetto that
there is likely to be a natural spill-over into economic
affairs. If groups exist to drive large numbers of students
to distant schools, it is natural to have groups work at
developing business in the ghetto. Further, the relative
scarcity of financial and technical resources in the ghetto
fosters attempts to develop collective economic bodies.
The degree to which this will change over time as more
resources find their way into the black community is
unclear; historically the periods of great need have been
the periods of reciprocal support. (The mutual aid societies,
which later developed into the large black insurance industry,
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were possible only among the poorest blacks. Attempts at
collective action among better-off blacks, like establishing
a black bank, have traditionally failed.) It is quite
clear, however, that no widespread communal ethos exists
within most ghettos, and that even the leadership does
not demonstrate a wide interest in broadly-based
collective economic endeavors. A minority of the leader-
ship, primarily young militants, are the major source of
concern for the decentralization of control and benefits
associated with economic enterprises. In fact, it
becomes apparent that the formal structures of an insti-
tution--be it traditionally capitalistic or more communal--
is less critical in determining the way benefits are
dispersed than is the ideology of the leaders of the
enterprise. Given that the people involved seek to
maximize either their own self-interest or that of some
larger community, they can generally manipulate any given
structure to any ends. While it might not be the most
critical factor, the structure nonetheless does provide
outer limits and constraints to the forms of human rela-
tionships carried on within them. Small economic institutions
existing within the context of the general value system
can deviate very little from it without sacrificing their
own viability.
This leads to the final question, of the degree to
which economic development can function as strategy of
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general community development. To repeat, community
development is held to be an increase in the capabilities
of ghetto residents, in the aggregate, to influence and
control the institutions that effect them. In these terms
economic development seems to have the potential for
promoting community development in the following ways:
By acquiring economic influence as a result of
control over real estate, payrolls, commercial
good will, etc.
By achieving some measure of economic independence
for the support of internal ghetto services and
the confrontation of external sources of power.
By contributing to the growth of black pride
and providing a focal point for the development
of group identity.
By increasing political influence, both within
and outside the ghetto.
Through the growth of specific goals (increased
black employment or improved ghetto communica-
tions) that follow from the choice of specific
industries.
The degree to which economic development can become
a potent force in meeting the above objectives depends
upon the scale it achieves. Even more importantly, it
depends on the degree to which black entrepreneurs con-
sciously seek to use their businesses in support of the
community. The evidence of the case studies suggests
that this will be the most insupperable barrier to the
effectiveness of economic development.
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